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'There are those who, like the defendant Streicher, were the instigators, the theorists, the 
propagandists and the approvers of these crimes. ... we submit that the way of that minority 
which conceived, ordered and executed the satanic plan was only made possible by years of 
steady incitement to and justification of murder on the part of this group of defendants. Those 
who decreed these murders would not have had the courage to order them, and those who 
executed and helped to execute these orders might have shrunk with the panic of amazement and 
fear from the terrible deed but for the fact that through the activity of these defendants a mental 
climate was created in Germany which made of these horrors an act of State, a measure of 
national purification, a grim but just necessity. ... direct responsibility for crime, in proportion to 
the potential and actual magnitude of the evil caused, attaches to persons guilty of incitement to 
and encouragement of such acts or what naturally leads to such acts.'
1
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EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION 
 
This volume of three interrelated studies aims to explore the various contingencies through 
which individuals responsible, to various degrees, for promoting expressions of racist hate were 
subjected to markedly different types of legal responses within the landmark Nuremberg trials 
programme.  These contingencies, together with loose judicial reasoning, complicate scholarly 
efforts to identify the historical emergence of this type of transnational hate crime, and to 
illustrate the complications that arise when seeking to ascertain its implications as a precedent.
2
 
   It needs to be emphasised at the outset that what follows is not a comprehensive study of the 
origins of the criminalisation of hate speech in general as this would have to include a full 
comparative survey of all domestic laws and their judicial interpretation, application and 
institutional enforcement. In addition, the interaction between domestic, regional and 
international criminalisations would also have to be addressed in what would amount to a 
massive multi-volume study. Although this wider type of potential survey of legislation far 
exceeds the scope of the present study, it has to be acknowledged that a strong case can be made 
for this more comprehensive approach, and - if it is ever completed - for understanding and 
interpreting the contents of what follows within this wider context of transnational regulation. 
For example, there has clearly been a measure of interaction, albeit of an inconsistent type, 
between US immigration and naturalisation law and practice, and international criminal law 
relating to hate speech, with the Streicher case expressly referred to as a precedent for the idea 
                                                 
2
  Legal and other historians have to confront the complexity of trying to create a categorical "timeline," or identifying an 
unambiguous "origin" of a stream of case law. The historian's choice of precedent can often be as highly selective as that of 
lawyers when interpreting what is to count as a precedent.  
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that "persecution," as a subset of crimes against humanity,
3
 can include racist and anti-Semitic 
propaganda.
4
 
   It would indeed be interesting to ascertain what lessons have already been gained or still could 
be learned from the experiences of nation states not only with respect to the framing of hate 
speech laws and various "exceptions," "qualifications" and "reservations," but also their 
interpretation and practical institutional enforcement. In addition, purely national constitutional 
and human rights challenges to such legislation may prove instructive at the policy level for the 
re-drafting of transnational measures to remove vulnerabilities on constitutional grounds of, for 
example, unlawful "intrusions" into so-called "private" beliefs, thoughts, political association, 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression (both in terms of "viewpoint" and content). In 
turn, this leads to concerns, expressed even in the context of post-genocidal societies such as 
Rwanda, that widely drawn hate speech laws can be abused by governments to suppress dissent.
5
 
Other possible legal objections can relate to the possibility of a perpetrator facing "double 
jeopardy" for a single offence and related "due process" based objections.
6
 
 
                                                 
3 See London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c). Aug. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1544. 1547. 82 U.N.T.S. 279, which  
declares that "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds" constitutes Crimes against Humanity within the IMT's 
jurisdiction. What are popularly termed the "Nuremberg Trials" after the city location of these trials were formally designated 
"IMT." 
4 For example in the Koreh case, the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals made explicit reference to the Streicher case in its 
opinion regarding the "denaturalization" of a Hungarian newspaper editor, Ferenc Koreh, who had published anti-Semitic 
articles. The US government sought to denaturalize Koreh on several grounds, including illegal procurement of a visa on account 
that he "advocated and/or assisted in the persecution' of Jews" in his role as editor of a Hungarian newspaper. The court rejected 
Koreh's argument that his role as propagandist [d]id not "assist in the persecution" of Hungarian Jews. After quoting from the 
Streicher judgment, the court noted: "Although the underlying legal basis for the prosecution of Streicher differed from the basis 
for this denaturalization case against Koreh, the recognition of the nexus between propaganda and persecution is no less 
applicable for that reason." United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 431(3rd Cir. 1995) at 440. 
5 See Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, 10 (Nov. 
28, 2007): 'The threat of criminal prosecution for legitimate dissent is disturbingly common, and officials in some countries have 
explicitly cited the example of RTLM in order to quell criticism of the governing regimes.'. 
6 Gregory R. Nearpass, Comment, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and Practical Concerns to Penalty-Enhancement 
Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 Alb. L. Rev. 547, 561-69 (2003). 
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   For example, the US Congress passed the first piece of federal legislation addressing hate 
crimes in 1871: namely The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.
7
 This made it illegal for persons to 
conspire to deprive: "any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the laws."' Section 1985 of this measure both prohibits, and 
provides a cause of action for recovering damages for acts depriving any person or class of equal 
protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, causing injury to 
persons or property, or depriving any person of having or exercising the rights and privileges of 
citizenship.
8
 Section 1986 imposes liability for all damages caused by such wrongful acts on any 
persons who know of the wrongs conspired to be committed. As interesting are the limitations of 
this measure. In order for federal jurisdiction to apply, the Act requires the victim of hate crime 
to have been participating in a specified "protected activity." In addition, the Act also requires 
proof of a nexus between the hate crime and the protected activity itself.  
   Perhaps unremarkably, given the social context of a nation state founded on the genocide of the 
indigenous native Americans and, in part, built up economically through the institution of racist 
slavery, it took the US Congress nearly a century to enact the next relevant measure: the 1968 
Civil Rights Act.
9
 This measure, codified as 18 U.S.C.A. § 245, prohibits race-, color-, religion-, 
or national origin-based intimidation or interference with: 'voting, participating in programs or 
activities provided or administered by the federal government or by states, and enrolling in 
public school or college.'
10
 § 245(b)(2)(C), effectively prohibits interference with employment, 
for willful injury to and interference with an individual because of his or her race, religion, and 
national origin. It establishes a penalty of a fine and/or imprisonment of up to one year if no 
                                                 
7 Now codified as 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1985-1986. See David Hong, Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, 10 Geo. J. Gender & L. 
279, 287-94 (2009) 
8 § 1985(3). 
9  Han, Eun Hee, 'Hate Crimes and Hate Speech,' Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law, Vol. 7, Issue 3 (2006), 679-700. 
10 18 U.S.C.A. § 245(b) 
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bodily injury results, and fine and/or imprisonment of up to ten years if weapons, explosives, or 
fire is used, or if their use is attempted or threatened. Those whose acts result in death, or whose 
acts involve kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse, or attempts at either, can be fined, imprisoned 
for any number of years or for life, or sentenced to death.
11
 Subsequent constitutional challenges 
on grounds of the alleged state intrusion on "privacy," upheld this measure, and determined that 
Section 245 of the Act created a substantive right "to enjoy state provided benefits free from 
private harassment motivated by racial animus."
12
 
   The USA position is also instructive because of its federal structure where some, but not all, 
hate crimes, including hate speech, fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal State, and thus allow 
enforcement by the FBI, whilst others are reserved for individual states.
13
 In addition, the 
constitutional settlement between states and the Federal Government restricts the scope of 
Federal laws in ways that can mean bizarrely that hate crime and hate speech measures have to 
be constitutionally justified in terms of Federal legislative powers concerning "freedom of 
commerce" as established by the "Commerce Clause" of the US Constitution.
14
 Furthermore, for 
some but not all purposes gender, disability and sexual orientation receive legal recognition, 
thereby creating issues concerning a patchwork of inconsistent discrimination within US anti-
discrimination measures taken as a whole,
15
 with various ad hoc qualifications not based upon 
identified harm or grounded in general criminal law principles or anti-discrimination principles. 
                                                 
11  § 245(b)(5). 
12  United States v. Bledsoe 728 F.2d 1094 (1984), 1096-7. See also the failure of a challenge on similar grounds in United 
States v. Lane 728 F.2d at 1097. Both cases involved racist  murders. For a successful constitutional challenge to gender based 
hate crimes, see United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
13  http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes. The FBI's jurisdiction is based on four federal statutes 
including sections of the US Criminal Code relating to conspiracy against rights, interference with federally protected activities, 
damage to religious property and obstruction in free exercise of religious beliefs,  and criminal interference with fair housing. 
14  Christopher Chorba, Note, 'The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and the 
Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act,' 87 Va. L.Rev. 319, 348, 355 (2001); Christopher DiPompeo, 
Comment, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element 
Analysis, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. Pennumbra 617, 649-68 (2008) (Commerce Clause). 
15  On housing related measures, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 3631; on religious matters, see Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 
(1990), amended by Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, § 7, 110 Stat. 1394 (1996). 
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The last decades have seen a number of specific legislative initiatives. The Hate Crimes Statistics 
Act of 1990, requires the US Attorney General to collect and publish data on crimes motivated by 
"discriminatory animus."
16
 Four years later, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 created a civil 
remedy for victims of crimes motivated by gender.
17
  Finally, the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement 
Act of 1994 specified eight specific crimes for which judges could impose enhanced sentences if it could 
be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes were indeed hate crimes.
18 
   The most recent US measure can be regarded as a response to some of these historical lessons. 
On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed into law the first bill expanding the parameters of 
federal hate crime law in over forty years: 'The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act ("HCPA").
19
 In response to the historical ad hoc provisions and difficult 
to justify qualification and restrictions, this measure broadens US federal hate crime law to 
incorporate "violence motivated by the ... gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
disability of the victim." It also enlarges federal jurisdiction over hate crimes by removing the 
requirement that victims engage in "federally protected activities," and enhances federal funding 
for the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. 
   Arguably these trends in favour of the belated replacement of a patchwork of ad hoc and 
inconsistent provisions regulating hate crime, including hate speech, with more general codified 
measures backed up with enhanced enforcement measures could serve as a possible instructive 
guide for both other nation states and transnational regulation. 
                                                 
16 Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 534). 
17 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.). 
18 Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003 (1994) (codified as 28 U.S.C. 994). 
In the case of Rice, 6 years after  a double  murder of two lesbians, the US Attorney general John D Ashcroft, held a nationally 
televised press conference (April 11 2002),  to announce that the US Justice Department was to invoke the federal hate crime 
statute for the first time to charge the alleged murderer with hate crime.  The speech justified the invocation as ‗criminal acts of 
hate run counter to what is best in America,our belief in equality and freedom … we will pursue, prosecute and punish those who 
attack law-abiding Americans out of hatred for who they are … hatred is the enemy of justice, regardless of its source.‘ 
19  Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701-4713, 123 
Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as amended in scatted sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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   In additional to purely domestic national legislation, it is necessary to set the following 
historical account of the origins of hate speech jurisprudence within international law within the 
context of the emergence of transnational human rights measures both promoting and, in one 
sense restricting conceptions of "freedom of expression." Here we have witnessed a degree of 
overlap between historical developments within international human rights law, international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law, as well as noticeable differences of emphasis 
and focus.  
   At a general level, conceptions of "incitement" and "hate  speech" give voice to efforts to link 
linguistic and other symbolic expression with its complicities in violent, xenophobic and 
sometimes genocidal outcomes, where incitement falls under the broader category of "abuse of 
rights."
20
 The international human rights framework, which within European at least has been 
decisively influenced by the horrors of Nazism and the Holocaust,
21
 has developed legal 
measures to confront both acts and programmes of incitement and broader notions, stemming 
originally from the civil law tradition, of "the abuse of rights."  This idea has been adapted from 
its civil law origins to the international law context where, during the first decades of the 20
th
 
century, it attained the status of a general principle of international law or as part of customary 
international law.
22
 Understood as a practice, the abuse of rights has been recognised as 
involving the hypocritical demand to exercise a "right" to act in a manner tending, in practice, to 
be destructive of the rights of others. Considered in terms of its practical consequences, the abuse 
                                                 
20
 See, e.g., ICCPR, Art. 5, providing an abuse of rights provision in relation to other recognised rights including Art. 19 
expression rights. 
21 During the immediate postwar period, Hersch Lauterpacht was one of many international lawyers campaigning for the 
regulation of militaristic propaganda, sedition, and what today would be termed hate  speech as a key element of part of the 
historically emergent human rights framework. See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man (1945), 108. 
22 See ECHR, Art. 17. H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933), ch. 14, 298: ‗the prohibition 
of abuse of rights is a general principle of law‘. See also M. Byers, ‗Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age‘, (2002) 47 
McGill Law Journal 389. 
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of rights through hate speech typically involves a reduction in the reality and viability of rights 
as a whole.  
   Unsurprisingly, the experience of Nazism and racist, militaristic and xenophobic propaganda 
within that movement, encouraged international lawyers to debate the role of transnational 
regulation of propaganda as a strategy for preserving post-war peace as well as individual 
rights.
23
 This included the development of notions of imposing legal responsibilities upon states 
for allowing or encouraging destructive forms of  propaganda arising within their borders.
24
  
   Article 20 of the ICCPR introduced prohibitions of propaganda inciting war, ‗hate  speech.‘ 
This forms part of a package regulating freedom of expression including Article 19, whose 
subsection 2 recognises the necessity for lawfully constituted restraints on such expression. 
Particularly relevant for present purposes is how hate  speech is defined in terms of 'advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence.'
25
 
   Another historical landmark in the criminalisation of racist hate speech as a crime against 
humanity occurred in the mid-1970's  with the creation of the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
26
 The Apartheid Convention was 
adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November 1973, by 91 votes in favour, four against 
(Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 26 abstentions. It came 
into force on 18 July 1976, and has been ratified by over 100 states. This treaty remains in force 
despite the transition of South Africa to democracy. In terms of hate speech, Art. II provides: 
‗For the purpose of the present Convention, the term ―the crime of apartheid‖, which shall 
                                                 
23
 See the analysis of propaganda in E. Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (1954), 208-10; J. Stone, Legal Controls 
of International Conduct: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War-Law (1954), ch. 11, Discourse 15, 318-23.  
24 H. Lauterpacht, ‗Revolutionary Propaganda by Governments‘, in H. Lauterpacht, International Law, collected papers arranged 
and ed. E. Lauterpacht, Vol. 3, The Law of Peace, Parts II-VI (1977), ch. 8, esp. 293-5. 
25 ICCPR, Art. 20(2). 
261015UNTS243 (Apartheid Convention). 
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include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in 
southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts‘, extending the reach of the 
Convention beyond the specific case of pre-1994 South Africa. This measure establishes 
individual criminal responsibility for apartheid, including of persons who through hate speech 
‗directly incite or conspire in the commission‘ of apartheid, as well as to those who ‗directly 
abet, encourage or cooperate‘ in the commission of this crime.27 In addition, State Parties 
undertake to ‗suppress as well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid‘, Art. 
IV(a).
28
 The Convention still remains in force, but since 2001, its provisions have been partly 
superseded by the 1998 ICC Statute, which incorporates the crime of apartheid as a "crime 
against humanity."
29
  
    From 1952 until 1990, all aspects of apartheid were annually condemned by the UN General 
Assembly as contrary to Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter and was regularly condemned by 
the Security Council. In 1966, the General Assembly categorised apartheid as a "crime against 
humanity"
30
 and in 1984 the Security Council endorsed this determination.
31
 The Apartheid 
Convention not only declared apartheid to be unlawful as a violation of the UN Charter but also 
an international crime. 
  The Apartheid Convention declares that apartheid is a crime against humanity and that 
―inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and 
practices of racial segregation and discrimination‖ are international crimes.32 Article 2 defines 
the crime of apartheid –―which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation 
                                                 
27 Art. III(a)and(b) 
28 See M. Cherif Bassiouni and D. H. Derby, ‗Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the 
Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments‘, (1980-1) 9 Hofstra Law Review 523. 
However no one yet has ever been prosecuted under the Convention. See J. Dugard, ‗Introduction to the Convention on the 
Suppression and Punish ment of the Crime of Apartheid‘: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html.  
29 ICC Statute, Art. 7(1)(j). 
30 UNGA Resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966  
31 UNGA Resolution 556 (1984) of 23 October 1984. 
32 Art. 1. 
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and discrimination as practised in southern Africa‖ – as covering ―inhuman acts committed for 
the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any 
other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them‖. It sets out  those acts that fall 
within the ambit of the crime including murder, torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary arrest of 
members of a racial group; deliberate imposition on a racial group of living conditions calculated 
to cause its physical destruction; legislative measures that discriminate in the political, social, 
economic and cultural fields; measures that divide the population along racial lines by the 
creation of separate residential areas for racial groups; the prohibition of interracial marriages; 
and the persecution of persons opposed to apartheid. 
  Under this Convention, international criminal responsibility applies to individuals, members 
of organisations and representatives of the State who commit, incite or conspire to commit the 
crime of apartheid.
33
 Consideration was given in 1980 to the establishment of a special 
international criminal court to try persons for the crime of apartheid (E/CN.4/1426 (1981)). 
However, no such court was established and it was left to State Parties to enact legislation to 
enable them to prosecute apartheid criminals on the basis of "universal jurisdiction." The 
Apartheid Convention allows State parties to prosecute non-nationals for a crime committed in 
the territory of a non-State party where the accused is physically within the jurisdiction of a State 
party (arts. 4 and 5). 
   The historical emergence of such laws against incitement and persecution through words alone 
can then be understood not as "restrictions upon freedoms," (at best a "necessary evil"), but 
rather as protective measures. Historical insights suggests that these have proven to be necessary 
to curb the cynical and hypocritical invocations of rights to further the cause of undemocratic 
political programmes, including extremist and xenophobic nationalism, racism, militarism, 
                                                 
33 Art. 3. 
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warfare and religious sectarianism, or other types of clearly antisocial or criminal consequences. 
The historical emergence of efforts to prohibit the most damaging forms of hate speech through 
law is better understood not in classic liberal terms of problematic restrictions upon freedom of 
expression, but rather as a part of the defense of democratic values, and thus the vindication of 
community-wide interest in the right to self-determination, together with the various human 
rights to "freedom of association," "religious belief," "right to life, "and "security" of both the 
person and property that stem from this preeminent right. Restricting forms of hate speech that 
advocate or incite civil war, religious sectarianism, tribal or state on state warfare cannot be 
separated from the historical movement to introduce protective measures designed to prevent the 
massive diminishment in the practical exercise of those core rights that stem from these types of 
collective conflict, including rape and sexual violence.
34
 
   Through three contrasting case studies, the following study explores situations where 
individuals complicit in the hate crime type propaganda of Hitler's Germany, received 
completely different legal outcomes. Do these outcomes represent problematic 'discrepancies' 
causing a measure of instability in the founding elements of the doctrine of "incitement to 
genocide," which today would be classified  in whole or part as hate crimes? Alternatively, can 
they be 'reconciled', and these founding moments better secured, once we properly understand 
the applicable legal doctrine? The three case studies under examination are those of Julius 
Streicher, the private publisher of the grossly anti-Semitic weekly newspaper Der Stürmer (The 
Attacker); and Hans Fritzsche, a mid-level German radio broadcaster within Goebbel's notorious 
Ministry of Propaganda; and finally Carl Schmitt, a German professor of public law at the pre-
eminent University of Berlin. It is widely recognised that, in Gordon's words, the first two 
Nuremberg decisions: "essentially mark the birth for the international jurisprudence for hate 
                                                 
34 M. G. Kearney, The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law (2007) 
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speech. ... [they are] the most significant pre-ICTR international precedents regarding media use 
of hate speech in connection with the massive violations of international humanitarian law."
35
 
The theme of possible 'discrepancy' arises because of the dramatically different legal outcomes 
the international criminal justice system produced in these three cases. This was despite the fact 
that each of these individuals – according to prosecution statements and evidential materials – 
was complicit in Nazi propaganda associated with hate crimes, namely, inciting genocidal 
atrocities contrary to the newly-codified offence of crimes against humanity, particularly the sub-
set of "persecution." We critically explore the contention that, despite the formalist tendency to 
seek to rationalise legal decisions in terms of a "logic of legal doctrine," a range of highly 
pragmatic, contingent and institutional factors, operating independently from the objective and 
strict application of legal doctrine to given material facts, best explain these divergent outcomes. 
   Is the history of the emergence of actual and proposed prosecutions for incitement to acts of 
genocide and crimes against humanity rooted in law at all, understood as doctrinal rules giving 
effect to general legal principles and underlying axioms? Alternatively, or in addition, is it more 
useful to examine the intersection of various factors other than doctrinal rules or theories? To 
avoid misunderstanding, the term 'incitement to genocide' is of relatively recent coinage 
stemming from the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide Convention),
36
 which is now incorporated into the ICTY 
(Yugoslavia), ICTR (Rwanda) and ICC (Rome) Statutes.
37
 Such incremental legal recognition, of 
course, post-dated the International Nuremberg Tribunal (IMT) of 1945-6, and emerged towards 
                                                 
35 See Gregory S. Gordon, 'A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations: The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New 
Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech,' 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 139, 143 (2004) 
36 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.  
37 Colette Braeckman, Incitement to Genocide, in Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, 192 (Roy Gutman & David 
Rieff (eds.) 1999). 
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the end of the American-led Subsequent Proceedings at Nuremberg (NMT) in which over two 
hundred mid-level Nazi war crimes defendants were prosecuted between 1947-9. 
   Once drafted in the summer of 1945, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal did not expressly 
use the term ‗genocide‘. However, the indictment under Count Three, Article 6(b) ‗war crimes‘ 
did, albeit as a point and issue of "fact," accuse the Nazi defendants of committing crime that 
were analogous with genocide. While drafting the Nuremberg‘s indictment, former prosecutor 
Telford Taylor noted: ―We used the word ‗genocide‘, newly coined by Raphaël Lemkin (at the 
time a member of the American prosecution staff) to describe: ―the extermination of racial and 
national groups, particularly Jews and Poles and Gypsies and others.‖38 During these trials, the 
concept of 'genocide‘ was implied and, on occasions, deployed by prosecutors, but not actually 
prosecuted as a separate offence. Instead, at Nuremberg, offences that today would fall under the 
heading 'incitement to genocide' and could, on occasions, be differentiated from the wider 
category "crimes against humanity" were classified as acts of "persecution."
39
 Indeed, acts of 
genocide were not internationally recognised as a separate and distinct criminal offence until the 
adoption in 1948 of the Genocide Convention. This included the offence of "direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide" under Article III(c).
40
 However, the latter remained judicially 
untested in that the first prosecution for any form of genocide had to wait until the Akayesu case 
of 1994. Inter alia, he was charged with the offence of ‗direct and public incitement to commit 
incitement genocide‘.41 Given the near half-century of prosecutorial inaction between the 
Streicher and the Akayesu cases, questions concerning the use of racist incitement stemming 
                                                 
38 Telford Taylor, 1992, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, 103 . 
39 As defined either by Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, and - for the Subsequent Proceedings - under Control Council 
Order 10, which restated the substance of Article 6 as German domestic law 
40 Proposals to include incitement to commit in the Genocide Convention were contested, particularly by the United States, 
during deliberation by the Ad hoc Committee on Genocide. William A. Schabas, 'Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to 
Genocide,' 46 McGill  Law Journal 141, 152, (2000).  
41 The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-I; The Prosecutor v. Kambanda Case No. ICTR- 97-23-S; Prosecutor 
v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I. 
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from the Nazi era can still be considered comparatively recent precedents. As Gordon 
recognises: 
'International tribunals have found that hate speech targeting a population on the 
discriminatory grounds identified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute constitutes crimes 
against humanity (persecution). Jurisprudence to this effect finds its origins in the 
prosecution of Nazi war criminals Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche by the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.'
42
 
 
Catherine McKinnon has made a similar point in relation to the "Media Case" before the 
Rwandan Tribunal.
43
 
   This volume, which adopts a case study approach, is organised under four chapters . The first 
three provide details of the nature and types of anti-Semitic and other Nazi propaganda that 
Streicher, Fritzsche, and Schmitt produced, and the legal responses to such actions. In each case, 
between 1945-47, their anti-Semitic propaganda was deemed sufficient to warrant their detention 
by Allied Nazi war crimes prosecutors as possible defendants within the overall Nuremberg 
process (including the follow up American-led "Subsequent Proceedings." These chapters focus 
particularly on the details of their divergent treatment at the hands of international criminal law. 
Whilst the private publisher Julius Streicher was successfully prosecuted, convicted and 
executed, the mid-level government radio broadcaster, Hans Fritzsche, was interrogated, 
prosecuted, but ultimately acquitted by the IMT. Carl Schmitt, the former pre-eminent professor 
of law at the University of Berlin, was interrogated repeatedly by Robert Kempner, a senior 
German-Jewish émigré serving as a US Nuremberg prosecutor preparing a planned trial 
                                                 
42  Gregory S. Gordon, 'From Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran's President for Advocating Israel's Destruction and 
Piecing Together Incitement Law's Emerging Analytical Framework,' 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 833 (2008).  
43 Catherine A. MacKinnon, 'International Decisions, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 325, 328 
(2004): "This adjudication is the first since the Streicher and Fritzsche cases at Nuremberg to confront the responsibility of the 
media under international criminal justice principles." Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan 
Ngeze (hereafter Nahimana ), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgement and Sentence, 3 December 2003, 978. For 
more extensive background to the media's role in the Rwandan genocide than is possible here, see A. Thompson (ed.), The Media 
and the Rwandan Genocide (2007).Robert H. Snyder, "Disillusioned Words Like Bullets Bark": Incitement to Genocide, Music, 
and the Trial of Simon Bikindi, 35 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 645 (2007), which provides an overview of the ICTR incitement 
cases). 
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programme embracing Nazi propaganda and "education." After reviewing the interrogation and 
other evidence, Kempner and his colleagues decided to release Schmitt without charge.  
   Whilst other writers concerned with the origins of the criminalisation of hate speech at 
international criminal law have, for good reason, briefly contrasted the prosecution of Streicher 
and Fritzsche,
44
 our study is the first to include Schmitt within the overall comparison. Partly for 
this reason, we devote over half of the present study to this lesser known case. The interpretative 
grounds for his non-prosecution raise core issues concerning the legal accountability of 
academics inciting others to commit acts of genocide, an issue which merits wider attention 
within the academic literature.
45
 These still remain largely indeterminate and potentially 
controversial on classic liberal constitutional grounds. The final chapter will compare these cases 
studies with a view to answering a key question: namely, do their divergent legal outcomes 
represent "inconsistent" treatment of "similar" cases, explicable by reference to extra-doctrinal 
factors? Alternatively, is it possible to identify substantial material differences between them, 
which – once properly interpreted according to the protocols of formalistic legal reasoning – 
explain these divergent results by reference to a distinctly doctrinal logic? 
   We argue that this main question is important because, if the first argument succeeds, it then 
calls into question the ongoing validity of the Streicher judgment insofar as this has functioned 
as a primary source and significant precedent for prosecutions in a number of recent cases 
concerning incitement to genocide through racist propaganda. For example, over the past two 
decades the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has both expressly and 
                                                 
44 See, Justin La Mort, 'The soundtrack to genocide: Using Incitement to Genocide in the Bikindi Trial to Protect Free Speech and 
Uphold the Promise of Never Again,' 4 Interdiscip. J. Hum. Rts. L. 43 (2009-2010); Joshua Wallenstein, 'Punishing Words: An 
Analysis of the Necessity of the Element of Causation in Prosecutions for Incitement to Genocide,' 54 Stan . L. Rev. 351 (2001-
2002); Susan Benesch, 'Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide,' 48 Va. J. Int‘l L. 509 (2007-2008); 
Christopher Scott Maravilla, 'Hate Speech as a War Crime: Public and Direct Incitement to Genocide in International Law,' 17 
Tul. J. Comp. & Int'l L. 113, 144 (2008). 
45 There is an entire book to be written on how issues concerning the complicities of propaganda by academics has been selected 
interpreted and responded to by both national and international prosecutors, which could profitably review the personal files of 
the Nuremberg prosecutors and determine the extent of pressure exerted by countervailing doctrines of "academic freedom." 
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implicitly built upon the Streicher judgement to develop the doctrinal definition of incitement in 
several key cases: namely, Akayesu,
46
 The Media Case,
47
 and Bikindi
48
 decisions.
49
 During these 
cases, ICTR prosecutors have secured five convictions,
50 
two guilty pleas,
51
 and suffered only 
one acquittal,
52
 with Bikindi convicted only on appeal. In addition, the ICTR found Georges 
Ruggiu,
53
 guilty of using racist propaganda that was recognised as analogous with those offences 
committed by Streicher. Ruggiu was one of the cases tried for ‗direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide‘ under Article 2(3)(c) and Article 3(h) of the Rwandan Statute.54 The Media 
Case gave a thorough ruling on the level of subjective intent (mens rea) required for successfully 
prosecuting various forms of propaganda that have incited racial and ethnic hatred, which 
supplemented the Nuremberg judgements. Furthermore, controversy has arisen over whether 
incitement to genocide includes, or overlaps with, 'hate speech'.
55
 In relation to the 1998 Rome 
Statute for the ICC, debate has arisen concerning whether incitement remains an international 
crime in its own right,
56
 or has been relegated to being merely one among other elements of free-
                                                 
46 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 674 (2 Sep. 1998). See Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the 
Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, 531 (2003). 
47 In the "media case" (Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Judgement and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003), 
http://unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, 
Appeals Judgment, 858, 892 28 Nov. 2007), the ICTR Tribunal re-affirmed the principle that those who use the media for 
inciting the public to commit genocide can be punished for communications that amount to hate speech and "persecution" as a 
crime against humanity. This case provides rendered the first contemporary judgment following the Streicher case to examine the 
role of the media in the context of inciting the public to commit racist crimes. More generally, see A. O. Odora, ‗Criminal 
Responsibility of Journalists under International Criminal Law: The ICTR Experience‘, (2004)73(3)Nordic Journal of 
International Law 307. 
48 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-T, Judgment, 426 (2 Dec. 2008). 
49 Robert H. Snyder, Note, '"Disillusioned Words Like Bullets Bark": Incitement to Genocide, Music, and the Trial of Simon 
Bikindi,' 35 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 645, 670-73 (2007). 
50 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-T, Judgment, 426 (2 Dec. 2008); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-
A, Appeals Judgment, 857, 886 (28 Nov. 2007); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, 437 
(16 May 2003); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 674 (2 Sep. 1998). 
51 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, 24 (1 June 2000); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. 
ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 40 (3) (4 Sep. 1998). 
52 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, 858, 892 (28 Nov. 2007). 
53 Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-31-I. 
54 Other defendants charged with this offence were, Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-I; and  Prosecutor v. 
Kambanda Case No. ICTR- 97-23-S. 
55 Christopher Scott Maravilla, 'Hate Speech as a War Crime: Public and Direct Incitement to Genocide in International Law,' 17 
Tul. J. Comp . & Int'l L. 113, 144 (2008). 
56 See Art 25(3)(e) cf. ICTY Statute 4(3)(c) which separate complicity from the crime of incitement to genocide. One question 
here relates to the difference between incitement and ‗instigation' dealt with in Article 25(3)(b) and Article 4(3)(c). Wibke Kristin 
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standing offences.
57
 Finally, an argument has been put forward suggesting that racist statements 
by political leaders that are only potentially genocidal in their implications could still fall under 
this offence.
58
 
   Clearly, then, issues concerning the international criminal law basis for successfully 
prosecuting expressions of racist incitement remains a developing and, in places, a controversial 
field of international criminal law. As we aim to show, the demarcation of the doctrinal 
requirements for the first version of racist incitement falling under the category of "persecution" 
as a subset of "crime against humanity" regarding Streicher and Fritzsche, still remains open to 
controversy.  
   Whilst carrying out our cases studies, we have sought to avoid two possible pitfalls. The first 
would have been to approach our task with the preconceived notion that all three individuals 
were equally guilty of racist incitement, and the 'failure' to successfully prosecute and convict 
both Fritzsche and Schmitt represents a shameful, if still instructive, episode within the history of 
international criminal law: one which must never be repeated. The second, and equally 
prejudicial, pitfall would be to approach these case studies from the perspective of "freedom of 
expression," assumed on grounds familiar to American constitutional lawyers to be an absolute, 
or near-absolute, "human right."
59
 Adopting this second orientation would probably predispose 
scholars to interpret the non-prosecution of Schmitt as somehow "the norm,' as a "vindication" of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Timmermann, 'The Relationship Between Hate Propaganda and Incitement To Genocide: A New Trend In International Law 
Towards Criminalization of Hate Propaganda,' 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 257-282, 267 (2005): See, A. Eser, 
'Individual criminal responsibility, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, Vol. II, 767, 803-4 
(A. Cassese, et al ed., 2002). 
57 Thomas E. Davies, Note, 'How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement to Genocide,' 22 Harv. 
Hum. Rts. J. 245 (2009). 
58 Gregory S. Gordon, 'From Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran's President for Advocating Israel's Destruction and 
Piecing Together Incitement Law's Emerging Analytical Framework,' 98 J. Crim . L. & Criminology,' 853, 895 (2008). 
59Albin Eser, 'The Law of Incitement and the Use of Speech to Incite Others to Commit Criminal Acts: German Law in 
Comparative Perspective,' in Freedom of Speech and Incitement against Democracy,' 63 at 69. (D. Kretzmer and F. K. Hazan, 
eds, 2000) On the issue of human rights, see also, Timmermann, op cit 272. 
  
 
19 
the universal right to engage in free speech, even of a type widely defined as offensive.
60 
Here, 
the legally-sanctioned hanging of Streicher would be interpreted as legally and constitutionally 
problematic, perhaps even a deplorable, "miscarriage of justice" in that it involved a violation of 
"freedom of expression." It is doubtful whether either of these two prejudicial approaches, which 
start off from opposed – if equally fundamentalist - presuppositions, are capable of adequately 
coming to terms with the specific issues raised by our subject-matter. 
 
Kim McGuire and Michael Salter 
UCLan 
 
                                                 
60 On this tension, Susan Benesch, 'Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide,' 48 Va. J. Int'l L. 485, 509 
(2008); Kevin W. Goering et al. 'Why U.S. Law Should Have Been Considered in the Rwanda Media Convictions,' 22 Comm. 
Law. 10, 10 (2004); But see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, 'International Decisions, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & 
Ngeze, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 325, 330 (2004); Susan Benesch, 'Inciting Genocide, Pleading Free Speech,' 21 World Policy J. 62, 63 
(2004); Tonja Salomon, 'Freedom of Speech v Hate Speech: The Jurisdiction of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit 
Genocide,' in The Criminal Law of Genocide: International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects, 141, 151 (Ralph Henham & 
Paul Behrens, eds., 2007). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE CONVICTION AND JUDICIAL KILLING OF 
JULIUS STREICHER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Julius Streicher was the first journalist to be convicted of international crimes stemming from his 
media activities, and - as Joyce recognises - his case 'prefigured recent jurisprudence concerning the 
media in the context of international criminal law.'
61
 In its Akeyesku judgment, the ICTR considered: 
'Perhaps the most famous conviction for incitement to commit crimes of international dimension 
was that of Julius Streicher by the Nuremberg Tribunal for the virulently anti-Semitic articles 
which he had published in his weekly newspaper Der Stürmer.'
62
 Unlike Fritzsche and Schmitt, 
Streicher began his anti-Semitic propagandist 'career' in 1919 prior to joining Hitler‘s Nazi Party. 
In contrast to Schmitt, Streicher was not an academic. Indeed, the closest he came to an 
academic role was working as an elementary school teacher in a Bavarian village school in 1904. 
Five years later, he worked in a similar post in Nuremberg.
63
 Unlike Fritzsche, a civil servant, 
                                                 
61 Daniel Joyce, 'Human rights and the mediatisation of international law,' Leiden Journal of International Law, 2010, 513. 
62 At para. 550: http://unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf 
63 This information is taken from the document on the career and activities of Julius Streicher. WO 208/3806, Public Records 
Office, London, UK. 
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Streicher was a private publisher of the newspaper Der Stürmer, which was not a press organ of 
the Nazi Party, and thus not entitled to show the swastika, its distinctive symbol. This in itself 
indicated the lack of government recognition given to Streicher‘s newspaper, which contrasts 
markedly with the official status of Fritzsche's propaganda endorsed by the Nazi Propaganda 
Ministry.  
   In 1919 Streicher helped form "Wistrich," an anti-Semitic organisation. Hitler was involved 
with the German workers party which was led by Drexler until 1921, and the name changed to  
NSDAP in 1920 to highlight ‗national‘ issues. By 1920, Streicher had completely merged his 
own group of political followers with those of Hitler, earning the latter's lifelong gratitude and 
protection. In 1923, Streicher had also participated with Hitler in the 'Munich Beer Hall Putsch', 
an attempted insurrection. In April of the same year, he founded Der Stürmer, which reached its 
peak circulation of 480,000 in 1935, whilst fluctuating and declining throughout the war years.
64
 
In November 1923 publication was interrupted when Streicher was imprisoned for his part in the 
failed Munich putsch. He was released in February 1934, bringing out a new edition of Der 
Stürmer in the following month. It soon moved to a tabloid format with slogan 'A German 
Weekly in the Struggle for Truth'. Across the bottom of the front page was the quote from 
historian Heinrich von Treischke: "The Jews are our misfortune ('Die Juden Sind Unser 
Unglück!').  
   By means of Streicher's rhetoric and cartoons, Jews were represented as bacilli, vampires, and 
rats. When depicted in human form, Jews were portrayed as inferior and deformed examples of 
humanity possessing demonic powers involved in a sinister conspiracy against German society 
through sexual depravity, corruption and murder. Der Stürmer's rhetoric was simplistic and 
repetitious and designed to invoke an emotional effect. In conjunction with other instances of 
                                                 
64 Id. 
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Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda, Streicher's materials distanced Jews from other Germans and 
cultivated an ideological context that endorsed genocidal programmes.  
   By 1927, Der Stürmer was selling 14,000 copies a week, by 1934 circulation reached 100,000, 
and by 1935 it was almost up to 500,000. After 1933, Streicher brought out nine additional 
special editions, sometimes published to coincide with the annual Nuremberg rallies, some of 
whose print runs were two million copies. However, by 1940, circulation lowered considerably 
and the format was later reduced to four pages. The final edition appeared in February 1945.
65
 
   Any legal assessment of Der Stürmer's influence in terms of incitement must take into account 
that its readership substantially exceeded the numbers actually sold, because many more were 
read through public display cases located at bus stops, parks, and street corners. Often these 
display cases reiterated its slogan: "The Jews are our misfortune." 
After the Nazi Party came into power in 1933, Hitler soon appointed Streicher as Gauleiter
66
 of 
the Franconia region with his base in the city of Nuremberg. However, by 1940, after allegedly 
being involved in major financial and sex scandals and slandering Hitler's then deputy Hermann 
Goering, Streicher was stripped of all party offices, and forcibly "retired" to his rural estate in 
Pleikershof. From this time onwards, he played no official role within the Nazi Party, but 
concentrated solely on publishing his anti-Semitic newspaper, which Hitler still favoured even 
during the war. 
   Nevertheless, Streicher‘s indictment at Nuremberg charged him with committing offences 
under Counts One – by using his position as Gauleiter of Franconia and personal influence with 
Hitler to: ‗promote the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators.‘ More relevant for present 
purposes, he was also charged with Count Four for ‗the incitement of the persecution of the 
                                                 
65 Bryant, Mark, 'Streicher, Fips & Der Stürmer,' History Today, Aug 2008, Vol. 58, Issue 8: 60-6. 
66 A Gauleiter was the party leader of a regional branch of the Nazi Party. Gauleiter became a Nazi paramilitary rank, and would 
eventually become the second highest position, ranking only below the rank of Reichsleiter. 
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Jews‘.67  
Streicher‘s political background meant that he was a staunch Nazi and supporter of Hitler's main 
policies, and he was certainly notorious for his anti-Semitic persecution of the Jews. Streicher‘s 
propaganda was aimed directly at the Jews; it was vile, repulsive and sometimes obscene. 
However, the distinctly legal question arises as to whether or not individuals can be rightly 
convicted of "persecution" on the sole ground that they publicly express personal loathing for 
any particular group, and publish propaganda to this effect? As originally interpreted by the IMT, 
(although loosened in later case law) "crimes against humanity" had to manifest a connection 
with an "armed conflict." However, the prosecution in the Streicher case referred to many 
examples of pre-war propagandist hate speech without objection from the IMT itself. The IMT's 
judgment did not differentiate wartime from pre-war propaganda. This raises the question of 
whether a stream of hate speech can be considered as single entity extended over time, rather 
than a series of discrete episodic acts? 
   The US Chief prosecutor, Justice Jackson, stated during his opening address that the incitement 
of atrocities by words alone should clearly fall within the scope of the IMT‘s jurisdiction: 
' ….We want to reach the planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose 
evil architecture the world would not have been for so long scourged with the violence 
and lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions, of this terrible war.'
68
 
  
   To substantiate this part of their case, the prosecution contended that, for over 25 years, 
Streicher had indoctrinated the whole of the German people in an attitude of hatred, and that he 
incited them to commit acts of persecution culminating in the extermination of Jewish people. 
On this basis alleged that Streicher was: ―an accessory to murder, perhaps on a scale never 
                                                 
67 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 1 (Hereinafter, Charter), International Military Tribunal Trial of the 
Major War Criminals (Hereinafter, TMWC). Vol. 1 Indictment: Appendix A. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History 
and Diplomacy, Yale University Law School, online at: http: //www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm. (visited Aug. 16, 
2010). 
68 TMWC Vol. 2, Justice Jackson Opening Speech, November 21, 1945, at 104. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-21-45.asp. 
(visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
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attained before.‖69 They outlined the part he had played in the Jews‘ persecution between 1933 
and 1945. The prosecution's evidence against Streicher consisted mainly of extracts taken from 
speeches and copies from Der Stürmer. The prosecution could draw upon an abundance of anti-
Semitic material that both Streicher and his co-editors, Holz and Heimer, had written and 
published. Many of the quotes used in evidence were distasteful; and they reflected the vulgar 
tone of Streicher‘s viciously anti-Semitic views.70  
   Streicher‘s early propaganda had preached the philosophy of anti-Jewish attitudes prevalent in 
Germany for hundreds of years: ―We know that Germany will be free when the Jew has been 
excluded from the life of the German people‖71 A speech in April 1925, reflected Streicher‘s 
earliest expression that anticipated the Holocaust: ―Let us start today, so that we can annihilate 
the Jews."
72
 The prosecution claimed that Streicher‘s propaganda: ―gave birth to what was years 
later to become the official policy of the Nazi Government.‖73 These accusations had 
considerable justification in that Streicher‘s anti-Semitic propaganda changed its tone and 
became increasingly vicious after Hitler came to power, and increased his references to both 
"annihilation" and "extermination." In other words, Streicher‘s propaganda appeared to be 
coordinated with Hitler‘s polices of persecution that later intensified into a programme of 
physical destruction.  
                                                 
69 TMWC Vol. 5, 10 Jan. 1946, at 90. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-10-46.asp#streicher. (visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
70 It is arguable that, for rhetorical effect, the prosecution strategy tended to ignore how pervasive anti-Semitism was in European 
society at this time, even within children‘s board games and story books.  Historically, it might be more accurate to suggest that 
Streicher "intensified" pre-existing modes of anti-Semitism and highly inflammatory anti-Semitic themes and stereotypes 
including predatory sexual elements, rather than personally originated them.  For understandable institutional reasons, the 
prosecution had no interest in comparing Streicher's hate speech with the "moderate" anti-Semitism prevalent in and revered by 
Western ‗canons‘ of literature, such as Chaucer‘s Canterbury Tales (the Prioress‘ prologue and tale), or Dicken's Oliver Twist, or 
Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice?  Whilst the prosecutors needed to show the sheer "otherness" of Streicher's hate speech, 
academic analysis needs to be more self-critical of the very cultural traditions on whose basis historically specific conceptions of 
"normality" and "otherness" are set up, defined and applied as somehow self-evident and "obvious." 
71  Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 9 Iibd. 
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The so-called Nuremberg Laws, which codified Nazi anti-Semitism as state policy, were 
introduced on to the Party platform in the Autumn of 1935. At the IMT trial, the prosecutors 
argued that the adoption of these 'laws' was the platform for Hitler‘s anti-Semitic policies. 
Streicher had positively welcomed and approved of these measures that formed the official basis 
of, and authorisation for, the Nazi Party‘s increasingly severe persecutory measures directed 
against German Jews. 
   Part of the dilemma facing the prosecution was that, following Justice Jackson's opening 
speech concerning the importance of convicting the instigators of Nazi atrocities, someone 
needed to be convicted for actively inciting the deaths of approximately six million Jews. By 
mid-1945, Hitler. Himmler and Goebbels were already dead. The responsibility could not end 
with those who directly ordered or performed specific exterminations. Instead, anyone who 
encouraged, or "cried out," for the exterminations to continue might be held at least equally 
responsible for "inciting" mass murder. After presenting its main case against Streicher, the 
prosecution concluded that: ―It may be that this defendant is less directly involved in the physical 
commission of the crimes against Jews, than some of his co-conspirators. His crime is no less the 
worse for that reason.‖74 It did not, they claimed, matter that Streicher took no physical part in 
the extermination process. He had set himself the task of encouraging mass murders by 
"poisoning the minds" of the German people as a whole with racist hatred.
75
 Furthermore, once 
the Holocaust was underway, he intensified his anti-Semitic propaganda to the point where it 
became ever-more radically genocidal: 
‗In the early days he was preaching persecution. As persecutions took place he preached 
extermination and annihilation; and as we have seen in the ghettos of the East, as millions 
                                                 
74 Ibid. at 118. 
75 It is worth noting how this characterisation ascribes a particularly powerful role to the effects of hate speech as a form of 
propaganda, and its capacity to incite violence. 
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of Jews were being exterminated and annihilated, he cried out for more and more.‘76 
 
According to the prosecutors, was the essence of Streicher‘s crime of "persecution" at least with 
respect to the nature of his material acts of incitement. He had led the propaganda and 
indoctrination of the German people in increasingly radical forms of anti-Semitism, pointing 
towards a goal of extermination, and that this ideological activity prepared the preconditions for 
physical acts of persecution and, ultimately, genocide. Without him, the prosecutors, suggested: 
―the Kaltenbrunners, the Himmlers, and the General Stroops would have had nobody to carry out 
their orders.‖77 Streicher‘s crime was probably greater and - in terms of its impact - more far-
reaching than any of the other defendants. This was not least because elements of this 
propaganda were deliberately directed towards impressionable children and young people many 
of whom would go on to join the Hitler Youth and other Nazi Party institutions, and whose 
potential for racist hate crime could continue for many decades even following Germany's 
military defeat.
78
 Streicher was especially responsible for persecution because he had: 
‗injected poison into the minds of millions and millions of young boys and girls and that poison 
would live on ... He leaves behind him a legacy of almost a whole people poisoned with hate, 
sadism, and murder, and perverted by him. That German people remain a problem and perhaps a 
menace to the rest of civilisation to come.‘79 
 
The prosecution further claimed that, as part of his campaign to stir up fear and hatred, 
Streicher‘s anti-Semitic propaganda was responsible not only for inspiring genocidal hate crime 
but - as it was actually taking - ‗aiding and abetting‘ the Nazis' programme of expulsion and 
ultimately mass extermination of the Jews. In short, Streicher‘s propaganda was alleged to be 
both a pre-condition and motivating factor behind the genocide. 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.  
78
 Maggi Eastwood, 'Lessons in hatred: the indoctrination and education of Germany's youth,' I.J.H.R. 2011, 15(8), 1291-1314. 
79 Ibid.  
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   If the Tribunal decided that the prosecution had proven its legal case against Streicher, it 
needed to determine whether: ‗words used as persecution‘ warranted the death sentence. In truth, 
Streicher‘s life depended upon the selective judicial interpretation of evidence presented by the 
prosecution. The IMT‘s judges had to deal with a number of new issues of both law and fact. 
These included the legal implications of Der Sturmer, the duration and intensity of Streicher‘s 
anti-Semitic incitement, the width of his readership, and whether there was evidence that this 
defendant subjectively knew (or perhaps ought to have known) that his words coincided with 
physical acts of official persecution and anti-Semitic acts of extermination. The IMT had to 
decide whether there needed to be proof that anyone had, in fact, been incited by the words 
Streicher‘s newspaper used to carry out acts of persecution that would not otherwise have taken 
place, but for the influence exerted by his propaganda. In addition, the Nuremberg Charter did 
not set out "incitement" to commit crimes against humanity or war crimes as a separate offense, 
yet that type of charge may have been more appropriate for the facts of Streicher's case.
80
 
   In reaching a decision regarding Streicher‘s guilt under Count One – Article 6(a) - "crimes 
against the peace," the prosecution‘s evidence was held to have failed to establish his connection 
with the "conspiracy" or "common plan" to wage aggressive war as defined in the indictment. 
The IMT held that: 
'There is no evidence to show that he was ever within Hitler's inner circle advisers; nor 
during his career was he closely connected with the formulation of the policies which led 
to war. He was never present, for example, at any of the important conferences when 
Hitler explained his decisions to his leaders. Although he was a Gauleiter there is no 
evidence to prove that he had knowledge of those policies. In the opinion of the Tribunal, 
the evidence fails to establish his connection with the conspiracy or common plan to 
wage aggressive war as that conspiracy has been elsewhere defined in this judgment.'
81
 
 
   Prior to presenting the Tribunal‘s judgment regarding Streicher‘s guilt under Count Four - 
                                                 
80  See Robert H. Snyder, 'Disillusioned Words Like Bullets Bark: Incitement to Genocide, Music, and The Trial of  Simon 
Bikindi, 35 Ga. J. Int'l & ComP. L. 645, 654 n.72 (2007). 
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Article 6(c) - crimes against humanity, President Lawrence gave details of the defendant‘s anti-
Semitic propaganda that emphasised, in particular, the longevity of his genocidal campaign:  
'His persecution of the Jews was notorious. He was the publisher of ―Der Stürmer," an 
anti-Semitic weekly newspaper, from 1923 to 1945 and was its editor until 1933. … For 
his twenty-five years of speaking, writing, and preaching hatred of the Jews, Streicher 
was widely known as "Jew-Baiter Number One.‖'82 
 
Hence, it appears that the IMT considered that Streicher's anti-Semitic campaign had been 
extended over nearly two decades counted as a relevant and possibly decisive factor. The same 
point applies to the consistency and regularity of this publication‘s racist messages, and the 
extent of his potential readership. Such factors appear to have been sufficient in the eyes of the 
judges to give many of Streicher‘s statements the required quality of "incitement to persecution."  
   Arguably, on a narrow literal interpretation, the wording of Article 6(c) suggests that there was 
no need for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that any particular person was, in 
fact, ever incited to commit a specific act of physical persecution. Whilst such evidence was 
probably relevant in suggesting that his words had an "inciting quality," it may not have been 
strictly vital as a precondition for criminal liability. Regarding offences alleged under Count 
Four, the IMT held that the size of his readership was a relevant factor: 
'In his speeches and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the German 
mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and incited the German people to active 
persecution. Each issue of Der Stürmer, which reached a circulation of 600,000 in 1935, 
was filled with such articles, often lewd and disgusting. …83 
  
The judges certainly considered evidence of the breadth of coverage of Streicher‘s propaganda. 
However, it is not clear whether this represented a legally decisive factor, or simply an 
aggravating element that was not relevant to the issue of liability, but rather to that of sentencing. 
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   A more difficult doctrinal issue concerned whether, in order to be legally classified as an act of 
persecution, Streicher‘s propaganda had to be coordinated with physical acts that amount to non-
verbal forms of persecution. Alternatively, was the formulation and dissemination of his extreme 
racist hate expressions advocating mass extermination by itself sufficient? The IMT‘s judgment, 
which is less than impressive in terms of the quality of its legal reasoning, did not clarify or 
answer this particular issue. However, it cited evidence of such coordination, albeit without 
expressly deciding whether or not this represented a decisive or merely an incidental factor. A 
similar interpretive ambiguity attaches to the question of how directly exterminationist such 
propaganda statements have to be to cross the legal threshold between "lawful," if still grossly 
offensive speech, and unlawful "incitement" to acts of genocide. The Tribunal‘s judgment gave 
particular emphasis to the fact that some of this propaganda called directly for Jews to be 
exterminated: 
'... As early as 1938 he began to call for the annihilation of the Jewish race. Twenty-three 
different articles of Der Stürmer between 1938 and 1941 were produced in evidence, in 
which the extermination "root and branch" was preached. Typical of his teachings was a 
leading article in September, 1938, which termed the Jew a germ and a pest, not a human 
being, but a parasite, an enemy, an evildoer, a disseminator of diseases who must be 
destroyed in the interest of mankind.'
84
 
 
This judicial statement possibly implies that Streicher‘s words were sufficiently direct and 
unambiguous, and that this can be taken as a decisive element in the sense of a pre-condition for 
liability. There was no question that statements such as the following from Streicher, quoted by 
the prosecution, sought to encourage acts of extreme and murderous physical persecution in the 
most direct manner conceivable: 
'A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A punitive expedition 
which will provide the same fate for them that every murderer and criminal must expect. 
Death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be 
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exterminated root and branch.'
85
 
 
   A further issue relates to the difficult question of whether there is a need for the prosecution to 
prove a direct causal link between words and actions.
86
 It is one thing for Streicher to have 
intended to directly incite murderous acts, quite another to show that any specific atrocity was 
directly and primarily the effect of his words. This question is linked to whether international 
criminal law requires incitement to genocide to be classified as an inchoate offence, in the sense 
that there is no need to prove that actual harms or atrocities have resulted? Incitement is 
generally classified as an inchoate offence. However, although the prosecutor is not expected to 
prove that hate speech constituting the incitement resulted in to the commission of a crime, 
questions of causation remain relevant issues within the overall trial context. If prosecutors can 
present compelling evidence demonstrating that the hate speech words were published in, and 
were directed towards, an especially volatile social context where communal violence was, for 
example, capable of being ignited by such expressions, then this does form part of the conduct 
itself relevant to the determination of punishment.
87
 Was it the case that the prosecution had to 
demonstrate evidence that specific acts of physical persecution took place, which stemmed 
directly and exclusively from individuals reading his publications, and these acts would not have 
occurred but for this appropriation? 
    The IMT accepted that Streicher possessed sufficient subjective knowledge that acts of 
extermination were taking place in the East, and then responded by further intensifying his anti-
Semitic propaganda, including calling for even greater measures against Jews. Indeed, a key 
element of Streicher's  guilt lay in the IMT's acceptance of prosecution evidence that he 
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possessed sufficient knowledge of Hitler's extermination programme against the Jews, and that, 
despite this, he had made a deliberate attempt to 'poison the minds' of Germans in ways to 
encourage the intensification of such genocide.
88
 The IMT‘s judgment itself focused more on the 
criminal character of inciting murder, rather than evidence of Streicher's intent and whether this 
met an express legal standard. For example, it concluded that: ―Streicher's incitement to murder 
and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible 
conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with war 
crimes as defined by the Charter and constitutes a crime against humanity.‖89 On one reading, 
this judicial wording suggests that the coincidence of incitement with actual acts of genocide was 
sufficient, without needing to prove subjective knowledge of such acts, despite the fact that the 
prosecution had stressed Streicher‘s knowledge as a major factor of his guilt. Each of these 
issues appears to have been decided against him. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity 
and subsequently hanged.  
   For understandable reasons, academic commentators retrace the origins of incitement to 
genocide back to Streicher‘s verdict.90 Furthermore, academics and historians alike have 
expressed doubts concerning the IMT's judgment.
91
 In regard to his sentence, Bradley Smith 
observed: ―it is reasonable to harbour the feeling that it would have been better if the Court had 
taken more time and been more precise in dealing with the evidence.‖92 The American Judge, 
Francis Biddle, admitted that a lack of impartiality existed within the Tribunal.
93
 Taylor 
considered that all the judges except Biddle and Parker were to blame for not giving the fanatical 
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old Nazis‘ judgment more careful consideration and express justification: ―The carefree way in 
which the Tribunal members sent him to the gallows, as if they were stamping on a worm, is 
especially hard to condone.‖94 Others suggest that, in part at least, Streicher had been the victim 
of his own vulgar and repulsive reputation: ―The judges came hastily to their decision about 
Streicher, and it seems likely that they did so at least as much out of revulsion against his 
personality and the wartime crimes against the Jews ... as out of reaction to his own 
wrongdoing.‖95 Taylor, reflecting the characteristic American position on freedom of expression 
issues, questions whether the publication of a newspaper, no matter how scurrilous, should be 
considered an international crime?
96
 In this context, Streicher‘s warranted reputation as 
prominent and vociferous anti-Semite appeared to be a decisive factor. 
   Obviously, both inside and outside of the courtroom, Streicher had made more enemies than 
friends, even the other defendants would not associate with him.
97
 Smith claimed that: ―No one 
had come forward to defend Streicher‘s character or activities, or to deny that he might have 
been convicted on other charges and in a different jurisdiction.‖98 These opinions confirm that a 
degree of controversy still exists regarding both the legal basis, and hence precedent value, for 
the Streicher‘s judgment and his death sentence. This begs the question of whether a negative 
sentiment surrounding Streicher and Der Stürmer – together with the perception that, in the wake 
of belated knowledge of the Holocaust, ‗public opinion‘ demanded that someone be held legally 
responsible for anti-Semitic propaganda – had understandably affected the Tribunal‘s decision. 
   In one sense, this is a disappointing and ambiguous conclusion for anyone concerned to 
identify and explain the birth of the criminalisation of racist hate crime within international 
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criminal law in terms of a clear "legal logic" grounded in the meaning of applicable legal 
doctrine. It is possible, however, than such issues could in principle be resolved by reference to a 
close analysis, developed in the next chapter, of a parallel IMT case involving an acquittal for 
linguistic expression of hate: that of the Nazis' Radio Broadcaster Hans Fritzsche. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ACQUITTAL OF HANS FRITZSCHE 
 
Introduction 
Hans Fritzsche, in contrast with Schmitt, was not a distinguished academic. Nor, unlike 
Streicher, was he a well-known but private newspaper propagandist. Instead, he was a middle-
ranking civil servant with a journalistic background who was best known as a radio commentator 
broadcasting a weekly current affairs programme on his own programme, ‗Hans Fritzsche 
Speaks‘.99 He was steadily promoted by the leadership of the Nazi regime. However, his radio 
propaganda work began in September 1932, a year before Hitler came to power. In that year, he 
was appointed head of the Government's Wireless News Service. On 1st May 1933, the Nazi 
regime incorporated this agency into Goebbel‘s Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda. Only then did Fritzsche join the Nazi Party, probably as a precondition for retaining 
his post and advancing his career.
100
 
   The interaction of points of law and questions of fact in this case are especially interesting. If 
the essence of "persecution" as a "crime against humanity" was centred around, or even confined 
to, government acts directed against its own citizens, then it would be legally inexplicable why 
the Tribunal acquitted this leading radio propagandist in the Propaganda Ministry, whilst 
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convicting Streicher, a private publisher with no relationship to the Nazi government. In other 
words, the contrast between these two cases is instructive in highlighting the broad range of 
potential defendants including those producing expressions of racial and/or racist hate speech 
outside the state sector. Fritzsche was indicted inter alia on crimes against humanity being 
accused of "inciting" and encouraging the commission of war crimes: 'by deliberately falsifying 
news to arouse in the German people those passions which led them to the commission of 
atrocities.'
101
 
   In terms of Fritzsche‘s official functions that were relevant to this charge, the IMT found that 
his positions had not carried with them a creative policy-making role. For example, although 
Fritzsche was in charge of The Radio Division from November 1942, this was merely one of the 
twelve divisions of Goebbel‘s Propaganda Ministry. Furthermore, he did not have "sole 
authority" within this division until the final years of the war. Whilst head of the Home Press 
Division, Fritzsche‘s role was to supervise the daily press conferences and transmit the 
propaganda directives of the Propaganda Ministry to 2,300 daily newspapers. These directives 
were handed to him by his superior, Dr Otto Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief, who in turn, was 
Josef Goebbel‘s immediate subordinate.102 It was Dietrich, not Fritzsche, who had translated the 
general propaganda directives of his chief Goebbels into specific instructions to the controlled 
press, and he would later stand trial for this more "creative" role.
103
 In other words, whilst 
Fritzsche handed out specific press instructions, which included elements of racist propaganda 
concerning for example the "Jewish problem" and the at least implicitly genocidal issue of 
securing "living space" (lebensraum), Fritzsche had never been personally responsible for 
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formulating these, either in general or specific terms. This was in marked contrast to Streicher‘s 
"creative" role in relation to personally devising viciously anti-Semitic materials. 
   Fritzsche remained a senior mid-level official within the Propaganda Ministry. Dietrich, his 
immediate superior was in American custody. However, the US prosecutor Drexel Sprecher, 
primarily responsible for this case, considered that Dietrich would have made a more logical 
choice for prosecution before the IMT, perhaps because he was closer to the policy-making role 
and creative source for anti-Semitic propaganda.
104
 If Goebbels had not committed suicide and 
there been greater clarity as to Dietrich's role, Fritzsche may not have been indicted at all as a 
major war criminal.  
   A decisive factor behind the selection of Fritzsche was connected to the transnational politics 
of the trials: namely, that he had been arrested and held by the Russians. Given that it was the 
American and the British Allies who held most of the senior Nazis in custody, the Russian 
authorities insisted that Fritzsche should stand trial.
105
 Indeed, according to Taylor, Fritzsche was 
added to the list: ―only to caress the Soviet's ego.‖106 Other commentators assert that: ―Since the 
Russians could not take Goebbels prisoner, they had to be content with his dog.‖107  
   During the Nazis' extermination programme, Fritzsche had broadcast that the war had been 
caused by Jews and that their fate had turned out as unpleasant as the Führer predicted.
108
 In 
respect of the charges relating to incitement of the Jews, Sprecher argued before the IMT that 
propagandists expressing hate speech were uniquely and personally responsible for Nazi war 
criminality: ―the results of propaganda as a weapon of the Nazi conspirators reach into every 
aspect of this conspiracy, including the abnormal and inhuman conduct involved in the atrocities 
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and the ruthless exploitation of occupied countries.‖109 Sprecher further claimed that there 
existed a causal relation between expression of hate speech meeting the legal threshold of 
"incitement" and the committing of atrocities. This relation was claimed to be both direct and 
indirect, and included ideological conditioning as well as more direct "goading": ―Most of the 
ordinary members of the German nation would never have participated in, or tolerated the 
atrocities committed throughout Europe if they had not been conditioned and goaded to 
barbarous convictions and misconceptions by the constant grinding of the Nazi propaganda 
machine.‖110 This argument clearly linked Fritzsche‘s Nazi propaganda with that of Streicher as 
instances of 'persecution.' 
   Indeed, Sprecher reiterated Justice Jackson's demand for 'instigators' to be held fully 
responsible for the acts their hate speech  incited, and that - because of the impact of such 
incitement - they deserved more severe punishment that the foot soldiers of genocide whom they 
had deceived and corrupted. In particular, he argued that: ―the propagandists who lent 
themselves to this evil mission of instigation and incitement are guiltier than the credulous and 
callous minions who headed the firing squads or operated the gas chambers.‖111 This was a 
similar argument to that put forward during Streicher‘s prosecution, in which Griffith-Jones 
asserted that: ―The Nazi Party could not have done what they did, without having a large number 
of people, men and women, who were prepared to put their hands to their bloody murder.‖112 
   Sprecher argued that the Propaganda Ministry had a special branch for the misnamed 
"enlightenment" of the German people; and that Fritzsche took a particularly active part 
concerning the "Jewish question" in his radio broadcasts, which exerted a causal impact: ―These 
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broadcasts literally teemed with provocative libels against Jews, the only logical result of which 
was to inflame Germany to further atrocities against the helpless Jews who came within its 
physical power.‖113 
   Sprecher attempted to show that Fritzsche had been personally responsible for making 
inflammatory types of anti-Semitic propaganda that even rivalled those of Streicher, and which 
had in fact incited others to commit real atrocities: ―Even the defendant Streicher, the master 
Jew-baiter of all time, could scarcely outdo Fritzsche in some of his slanders against the 
Jews.‖114 In saying this, Sprecher suggested that this defendant's criminality was no different in 
kind from Streicher because his radio broadcasts had also sought to persecute the Jews.  
In response, Fritzsche remained indignant when the prosecution had likened him to Streicher: ―I 
do not believe that I deserve any such accusation.‖115 However, contrary to Sprecher‘s claims, it 
was not possible to treat Streicher and Fritzsche‘s different forms of propaganda as either on a 
par, or as stemming from, similar subjective motivations and intentions. Streicher alone clearly 
possessed both the criminal intent (founded on broadly accurate knowledge of mass 
exterminations), and had personally devised and formulated extreme racist propaganda. 
Sprecher concluded his presentation of evidence against Fritzsche by strongly re-emphasising the 
importance of propaganda as a direct causal factor in, and even a precondition for, Nazi atrocities 
against the Jews and other civilians under Nazi control. Without apparently thinking of the 
implications of his argument for the credibility of the prosecution's case against Streicher, 
Sprecher suggested that this defendant's position as a senior civil servant within Goebbel's 
Ministry was an especially incriminating factor: 
‗Fritzsche was not in the dock as a free journalist, but as an efficient, controlled Nazi 
                                                 
113  Document Number 3064-PS contains a number of complete broadcasts by Fritzsche.  
114  TMWC Vol. 6, Jan. 23 1946, at 66. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-23-46.asp. (Visited Aug. 12 2010). 
115  Id.  
  
 
39 
propagandist, a propagandist who helped substantially to tighten the Nazi stranglehold 
over the German people, a propagandist who made the excesses of these conspirators 
more palatable to the consciences of the German people themselves, a propagandist who 
cynically proclaimed the barbarous racialism which is at the very heart of this conspiracy, 
a propagandist who coldly goaded humble Germans to blind fury against people they 
were told by him were subhuman and guilty of all the suffering of Germany, suffering 
which indeed these Nazis themselves had invited.‘116 
 
Sprecher sought to demonstrate that Fritzsche had endorsed official propaganda that falsely 
blamed international Jewry and related capitalist interests, for the outbreak of the war, rather than 
Hitler‘s invasion of Poland.  
   In his defence, Fritzsche testified that he had heard that Jews and non-Jews were being 
arrested. However, he did not know anything about the removal of Jews from occupied 
territories. Concerning the fate of Jewry in Europe, this defendant maintained: ―I discussed the 
unpleasant fate of Jewry in Europe, and according to the things that we know today, this must 
appear as though I meant the murder of the Jews.‖ 117 Throughout his testimony, Fritzsche 
protested that he had been lied to by Goebbels and other Nazi leaders when he inquired about 
reports of atrocities taking place in the East. Fritzsche stated to the Tribunal that he did not know 
how often he had been the victim of a falsehood or a lie from his superior.
118
  
   He had used sharp propagandist language, even after he thought he was being lied to by 
Goebbels, because the Allies propaganda was always far worse: ―We were in a war, and the 
enemy was not too particular in his methods.‖119 Fritzsche, thus sought to excuse his statements 
as part of the inevitable process of exaggeration and half-truths characteristic of wartime 
propaganda and counter-propaganda on both sides of WW2. In the context of the IMT, this was 
hardly an effective argument because the legislative basis of the Nuremberg trials precluded any 
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legal consideration of the actions of the Allies. 
   Fritzsche attempted to rebut Sprecher's equation of his case with that of Streicher's more 
virulent and concerted expressions of anti-Semitic hate speech. He did so by emphasising that he 
had twice sought to suppress Der Stürmer. He testified that, during his 13 years of work, he had 
never quoted Der Stürmer, neither had any German press subject to his oversight. Fritzsche also 
denied ever possessing any subjective intent to persecute Jews, and insisted only that this group 
not attain disproportionate influence at the expense of others: 
‗I was not [basically] anti-Semitic. But I was anti-Semitic [only] in this sense: I wanted a 
restriction of the predominant influence of Jewry in German politics, economy, and 
culture, such as was manifested after the First World War. I wanted a restriction based on 
the ratio of Jews to Germans.‘120 
 
Fritzsche insisted that if he possessed and articulated anti-Semitic prejudices, these were of a 
familiar moderate nature with neither specifically genocidal implications, nor genocidal intent.  
He: ‗was not anti-Semitic in the idea of a noisy anti-Semitism,‘ or in the sense of either the 
radical theories or methods beginning with Theodor Fritsch to Julius Streicher.‘121 Concerned to 
negate an attribution of criminal intent, he presented himself as someone who, in retrospect, had 
himself been overly-trusting and gullible concerning Nazi propaganda. Fritzsche‘s testimony 
claimed that he was primarily a "victim" of the lies he had been told by his superiors. He 
presented himself not as a willing or knowing accomplice to genocide, but rather as a more or 
less innocent journalist who had been effectively "hoodwinked" by his superiors. He argued that 
Sprecher's accusations misunderstood fundamentally the nature of his radio audience, and their 
vulnerability to subtle and hence more insidious forms of propaganda misrepresented as 
statements of fact. In his final statement, this defendant adopted the rhetorical strategy of 
claiming: 
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'I wish I had in my radio talks carried out the propaganda of which the prosecution 
accuses me now! Had I only expounded the theory of the Master Race! Had I only 
preached the hatred of other nations! Had I only urged wars of aggression, acts of terror, 
of murder, and inhumanity! Then, gentlemen, if I had done all these things, the German 
people would have turned away from me, and would have rejected the system for which I 
spoke. But the misfortune lies in the fact that I did not propagate these attitudes which 
were the secret motives of Hitler and a small circle of his henchmen.'
122
 
 
His argument, which could have been counterproductive, was that -  taken as a whole - he had 
not broadcast the crude and obvious type of propaganda the prosecution had claimed. Had this 
been the case, then it would have proved counterproductive. Whilst this suggests that the actions 
(his actus reus) was undeniable, perhaps even worse than Sprecher suggested, it negates the 
equally necessary requirement of subjective intent. 
   The factual evidence the prosecutors laid against Fritzsche was not conclusive. One of the 
memoranda from a legal aide working for the prosecution frankly admitted that his speeches 
were: ‗no stronger than statements of American war correspondents in Washington during the 
war.‘123 This, in turn, raises the question of how the Tribunal‘s judges reacted to the 
prosecution‘s allegations that Fritzsche was guilty of producing inflammatory propaganda that 
endorsed the Nazi Party‘s persecution and degradation of the Jews and its plans for aggressive 
war? In particular, was his position decided to be sufficiently close to important policy-making 
aspects of Nazi racist propaganda, to its origination and authorship to merit the attribution of 
individual criminal responsibility? The Tribunal answered both of these questions in the negative 
deciding that: ―His position and official duties were not sufficiently important, however, to infer 
that he took part in originating or formulating propaganda campaigns.‖124 Clearly this accepted 
Fritzsche‘s argument that his case was clearly distinguishable from Streicher‘s who alone 
remained a creative source of hate speech. Despite the prosecution‘s forceful arguments 
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42 
regarding Fritzsche‘s role in producing propaganda that fuelled Nazi polices, the IMT judges 
came to the conclusion that: ―Fritzsche had no control of the formulation of these propaganda 
policies. He was merely a conduit to the press of the instructions handed him by Dietrich.‖125 
The judge's had reached the decision - contrary to Sprecher's efforts – not to equate the intent and 
knowledge of Streicher with that of Fritzsche, when the situation with respect to the latter was 
far less clear. For the IMT, it was certainly of a far lower order than that of Streicher, and 
possibly even different in kind: 
'Excerpts in evidence from his speeches show definite anti-Semitism on his part. He 
broadcast, for example, that the war had been caused by Jews and said their fate had 
turned out ―as unpleasant as the Fuehrer predicted.‖ But these speeches did not urge 
persecution or extermination of Jews. There is no evidence that he was aware of their 
extermination in the East.‘126 
 
    This finding suggests that the IMT considered (or assumed) that the prosecution's failure to 
prove Fritzsche's subjective knowledge of actual anti-Semitic atrocities represented a decisive 
factor in exonerating this defendant. The problem for present purposes is that this requirement 
contrasts markedly with the position taken by the IMT with respect to Streicher, and indeed 
appears to contradict itself in relation to whether such subjective knowledge of the facts of 
atrocities is an essential doctrinal requirement. The judgment acknowledged that in his 
broadcasts Fritzsche sometimes spread what must "objectively" be interpreted as "false news," 
but the prosecution had failed to prove that this defendant subjectively knew it to be false in a 
manner that clearly met the criminal intent requirements for 'incitement'. It is possible for any 
rationalisation of these two cases to suggest that this presumed lack of intent (or a failure to 
positively establish it with clear evidence and compelling evidence) proved decisive.
127
 It is 
important that, unlike Streicher, Fritzsche did not expressly advocate the extermination of Jews, 
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as this would, perhaps, have indicated what would later be termed a 'specific intent' to incite acts 
of genocide.
128
 Also in his favour, far from endorsing Streicher‘s anti-Semitic propaganda, he 
had actively sought to suppress it, even though it was widely known that Streicher's type of anti-
Semitic hate speech was personally supported and protected by Hitler himself.
129
 
   The IMT also distinguished between generic wartime propaganda of a familiar kind that is not 
specifically focused on the justification of atrocities, and active and – through deliberate acts of 
incitement - knowing and direct forms of participation in acts of persecution defined as a sub-set 
of crimes against humanity. On one interpretation, this contextually questionable distinction, 
which prioritises issues of ascribed subjective "intent" to incite over any reasonable and objective 
assessment of the actual harm done by racist hate speech, placed Fritzsche on the "lawful" side of 
this distinction. Hence, in one sense and perhaps by accident, it created a defence of 
"unknowing" participation in incitement to genocidal actions through the entirely semantic 
exercise of insisting that any type of "participation" in hate speech must be proven to be 
"intentional." If the prosecution fail to demonstrate compelling evidence of intent, which 
represents a real challenge in many if not most cases, then damaging examples of hate speech, 
could escape effective sanctions because of evidential difficulties of proving beyond reasonable 
doubt what was going through their mind at the time, or because of the presence of a more 
general propagandist subjective intent rendering the hate speech element "merely incidental." As 
the IMT stated: 
‗It appears that Fritzsche sometimes made strong statements of a propagandistic nature in his 
broadcasts. But the Tribunal is not prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German 
people to commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to have been a 
                                                 
128 Matthew Lippman, 'The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years 
Later,' 8 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 1, 45-46 (1994).  
129 TMWC, Vol. 1, Judgment: Fritzsche, 1946. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judfritz.asp. (Visited Mar. 30, 2013).  
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participant in the crimes charged. His aim was rather to arouse popular sentiment in support of 
Hitler and the German war effort.‘130  
 
The idea that, in this context of a war annihilation driven by a racist agenda, a clear-cut 
distinction existed between "purely" wartime propaganda and incitement to genocidal acts, 
understood as a separate category, is dubious. Here, we have to recall that the Nazis' anti-Semitic 
/ 'master race' theory provided a dominant legitimation, even motivation, for their acts of military 
invasion and conquest, and even explained the distinctive genocidal practices they adopted 
against the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe including Soviet POWs. 
   The judgment in Fritzsche‘s case has provoked debate on the doctrinal and extra-doctrinal 
reasons behind the Tribunal‘s decision. This is not least because only half the judges believed 
this defendant's protestations about being "lied to" by Goebbels.
131
 Furthermore, the IMT 
reached a split decision regarding Fritzsche‘s innocence with three votes for his acquittal taking 
precedence over three guilty votes. Obviously, and in marked contrast with the unanimous 
decision in Streicher‘s case, this lack of judicial consensus may be one factor in explaining why 
there still remains a question mark over the precedent value of the IMT's Fritzsche judgment.  
The Soviet judge, Major General Nikitchenko, claimed that the IMT's decision involved a highly 
selective interpretation and application of the relevant facts. This was presented as a critique. 
However, this naively presumes the possibility of a "non-selective" interpretation of both facts 
and law, and the relationship between them, in defiance of the insights of hermeneutics. Under 
the heading ‗The Unfounded Acquittal of defendant Fritzsche,‘ this judge usefully summarised 
the majority‘s reasoning for this acquittal: 
‗The acquittal of defendant Hans Fritzsche follows from the reasoning that Fritzsche, 
allegedly, had not reached in Germany the official position making him responsible for 
                                                 
130 Ibid.  
131  See, the notes on the Fritzsche case. Adjudged not guilty – Biddle Papers, Notes on Judgement, Meetings on 
Individuals, Sept. 9 and 11, 1946, cited in Robert E. Conot,  Justice at Nuremberg 491 (1983). 
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the criminal actions of the Hitler regime and that his own personal activity in this respect 
cannot be considered criminal. The verdict characterises him as a secondary figure 
carrying out the directives of Goebbels and Ribbentrop, and of the Reich Press Director 
Dietrich.‘132 
  
Nikitchenko contested this interpretation, mainly by reference to its understanding of the facts 
relating to Fritzsche‘s official positions and this judge's interpretation of the central and enabling 
role that state propaganda played in policies of "aggression" and associated "crimes against 
humanity." In fact, the Soviet judge maintained that, within Hitler‘s propaganda system, it was 
the daily press and the radio that were the most important weapons. Given that the Nazi 
leadership (and one could add the Stalinist dictatorship) realised the importance of propaganda 
for motivating the actions of citizens, the majority's decision that his position was not a senior or 
important one was difficult to accept. The remainder of Nikitchenko's judgment concentrated on 
supplementing and interpreting the facts of Fritzsche‘s biography in a far less sympathetic way 
than his colleagues. He interpreted this defendant's complicities in a manner that judged his 
official positions to be far closer to both the centre of the creation of propaganda policy and thus 
in possession of subjective knowledge of related atrocities against Jews and other civilians. 
Fritzsche‘s work brought him into closer contact with Nazi policies of persecution and 
extermination than he had admitted, many of which he must have been aware. Agreeing with the 
prosecutors, Nikitchenko insisted that this defendant‘s propaganda included some of the more 
virulent and dehumanising forms of anti-Semitism associated with Streicher. 
   Given this far less sympathetic interpretation of both the facts and their significance in relation 
to the meaning and scope of "persecution," it is not surprising that this judge favoured a guilty 
verdict. Superficially, as a radio broadcaster, Fritzsche's propaganda concentrated on issues that 
were more palatable to the German people, and he veered away from events happening in the 
                                                 
132 TMWC: Vol. 1. Judgement: Dissenting Opinion. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/juddiss.asp#fritzsche (Visited Mar. 12 2013). 
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concentration camps. The Soviet judge claimed that Fritzsche admitted having access to all 
foreign newspaper and radio reports, some of which reported on the details of Nazi atrocities. 
This focus implies that subjective knowledge of such atrocities, at least in outline if not specific 
details, can be judicially held to be a decisive factor, and that this defendant met this doctrinal 
test. Although ideologically-driven, taking orders from his political masters in Moscow, 
Nikitchenko was more consistent than the Allied judges.  He appeared to apply a broadly similar 
test to Fritzsche's case, as he and the other IMT judges had deployed with respect to that of 
Streicher. 
   The IMT's legacy for subsequent NMT prosecutors addressing anti-Semitic and other racist 
forms of "persecution' through words alone" was surely a mixed one. If we contrast Streicher's 
conviction with Fritzsche's acquittal, the task of determining the presumed "rationale" of the key 
distinctions at the level of doctrine is far from straightforward. Streicher was convicted and hung 
because he was held to have actively and expressly incited murder at a time when Jews in the 
East were being killed. This was held to self-evidently constitute "persecution." The IMT made 
this judgment without, however, the benefit of any judicial/judicious "weighing up" of doctrinal 
arguments for and against this proposition, and its policy implications for less extreme cases. The 
highly incriminating fact that, during the extermination programme, Fritzsche had broadcast that 
the war had been caused by Jews and that "their fate had turned out as unpleasant as the Führer 
predicted," was given a particularly sympathetic interpretation.  
   Furthermore, the IMT appears to have raised the doctrinal requirement for criminal intent 
significantly higher from that applied to Streicher, by justifying his acquittal by reference to the 
"fact" that Fritzsche had not been aware of what was happening to them. The idea that this 
comparatively senior figure within a government ministry with access to overseas media 
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containing considerable details of the unfolding Holocaust, clearly lacked subjective knowledge 
or intent, and that, unlike Streicher's, his more subtle (if perhaps more insidious?) propaganda 
had not "directly" urged persecution of Jews, was to remain controversial and strain 
credibility.
133
 Unsurprisingly Fritzsche was subsequently prosecuted by the German courts under 
the de-Nazification laws, found guilty, and sentenced to nine years of hard labour and loss of his 
civic rights.
134
 (He was pardoned in 1950 and died of cancer in 1953).
135 
 
  Both these IMT judgments are comparatively short and, given the novelty of the doctrinal 
issues raised, comparatively unsophisticated in their exhibition of legal reasoning. They have 
certainly bequeathed a difficult doctrinal and policy legacy of setting a high, if still ambiguous, 
criteria. From a doctrinal perspective, the following interrelated questions were not adequately 
posed let alone resolved, and have continued to generate controversy into the present day: 
1/.  Is a defendant's official position, or lack of it, a mitigating or an aggravating factor in  cases 
of "persecution" by words alone? 
  
2/. What is the significance of the elapse of time between the act of expressing hate speech and 
actual deeds falling within the legal definition of "crimes against humanity"? 
 
3/. Whether or not proof of causation, in the sense of a form of propaganda shown to be 
inextricably intertwined with the crimes Streicher's readers perpetrated against the Jews, is a 
necessary requirement? Alternatively, is there a defence that other factors were the more 
immediate cause of an atrocity or genocidal programme directed against the group previously 
singled out by the hate speech in question? 
 
4/. If causation is a requirement, then are there legally relevant distinctions between different 
forms of causation, such as direct and indirect types? 
 
5/. Is there a requirement to demonstrate a defendant's subjective knowledge of such atrocities 
                                                 
133 See Mark Thompson, 'Incitement, Prevention, and Media Rights,' in Confronting Genocide 97, 99 (Rene Prevost ed., 2010) 
who argues that effective hate speech techniques can be much more insidious than the more blatant calls to violence engaged in 
Streicher, and later in Rwanda by the RTLM. More generally, it is arguable that during wartime official broadcasters rarely 
emphasise the full nature of atrocities committed by their own side, including the rape of women, not least because they are 
themselves subject to forms of information control. 
134 'Sentence On Hans Fritzsche: Nine Years In Labour Camp,' The Times, Saturday, Feb 01, 1947, 4. 
135 Eugene Davidson, 1966, The Trial of the Germans, 549–61.  
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prior to, or at least at the time of, the hate speech in question?
136
 
 
6/. Whether words judged to have the quality of inciting can be articulated as descriptive 
statements and ominous predictions (as with Fritzsche), or do they need to take the form  of 
imperative demands (akin to Streicher's cruder propaganda expressly urging the  extermination 
of European Jews)? Is the crucial distinction between the Streicher and Fritzsche cases related to 
the  former's actual and express incitement to anti-Semitic violence? 
 
7/. What is the distinct quality of "inciting" hate speech more generally that distinguishes  them 
from other types of propaganda and mere expressions of ideological preference? 
 
8/. Can the incitement caused by implicit, euphemistic and more "subtle" forms of racist  hate 
speech similar in tone to Fritzsche's nevertheless be sufficient provocation of perpetrators to 
meet the legal requirement? Indeed, are these less blatant forms of racist  propaganda that avoid 
the crudities of Nazi master race theory and Streicher's vulgar provocations, indicators of greater 
culpability, particularly in contexts where cruder expressions of hate speech could prove 
counterproductive?
137
 
 
9/. Is it relevant if the audience of hate speech are diffuse and physically distant from the 
perpetrators of physical hate crimes and have limited direct communication with them, such as 
Streicher's? Alternatively, what is the legal position if the specific audience is restricted to those 
who in the immediate presence of defendant when he or she expresses hate speech, such as those 
attending a public rally, or even a more limited group such as  members of a paramilitary militia? 
 
10/. What is the legal position where the group persecuted by hate speech is individualised, such 
as members of a named family, or alternatively where words are directed against all members of 
an entire group in ways that segregate, denigrate and insult them as a whole?
138
 
 
11/. What is the significance of interpretations of the cultural context of both the original 
expression and reception of the meaning of hate speech? Are the likely interpretations of actual 
audiences at the time, including their understanding of the meaning and purpose of various 
euphemisms and other coded expressions, the decisive criteria for identifying "persecution" by 
means of hate speech?
139
 
 
                                                 
136 Although the IMT noted that Streicher continued his propaganda ‗[w]ith knowledge of the extermination of the Jews in the 
Occupied Eastern Territory‘, (IMT Judgment para. 538), it remains unclear whether this finding was necessary for finding 
Streicher guilty, or relevant only to his sentence. 
137 This point was only clarified later in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 557. 
138 The ICTR Ruggiu case stated: 'Those acts were direct and public radio broadcasts all aimed at singling out and attacking the 
Tutsi ethnic group . . . on discriminatory grounds, by depriving them of the fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity 
enjoyed by members of wider society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as its aim the death and removal of 
those persons from the society in which they live alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself.' Prosecutor 
v. Ruggiu. Case No. ICTR 97-32-1. Judgment and Sentence, 22 (June 1. 2000). By contrast, the ICTY held in Prosecutor v. 
Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 209 (Feb. 26, 2001) that the alleged hate speech did not constitute "persecution" 
because it did have the same level of "gravity" as the other enumerated acts. 
139 In Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [2004] 1 F.C.R. 3, Canada's Federal Court of Appeal stated that when 
assessing whether an utterance constitutes direct and public incitement to commit genocide, its meaning is to be assessed in terms 
of the speech as a whole, in terms of the particular context in which the speech was made, and in terms of whatever a reasonable 
listener would ordinarily interpret it to mean. 
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12/. How do the "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions relating, respectively, to "conspiracies" 
among peers, and institutional hierarchies between comparative superiors and subordinates, 
affect the ascription of liability for hate speech amounting to incitement? In particular, can 
diverse and even antagonistic sub-groups, all of whom promote a similar form of hate speech, 
nevertheless be charged with participating in a wider and overarching "conspiracy"? 
 
13/. Is a "stream" or "campaign" of hate speech to be legally interpreted as a "continuing 
 offence" that is only "complete" when there are physical acts of persecution? 
 Alternatively,  as an "inchoate offence," is verbal persecution "complete" on each 
 singular occasion when such speech is expressed, irrespective of whatever takes place 
 before or afterwards?
140
 
 
14/. Is the IMT application of the meaning of "persecution" (by words) of particular 
 relevance to contexts where the related category of "direct incitement" under the 1948 
 Genocide Convention, and parallel provisions in the ICTR statute,
141
 fail to giving fitting 
 expression to a pervasive climate of malice and terroristic intolerance, where the content 
 of hate speech is at least as problematic as their identifiable effects? On the other hand, 
 can hate speech arising from a single media source meet the requirement for a type of 
 persecution that is both "systematic and widespread," as required by modern definitions 
 of "crimes against humanity"?
142
 
 
15/. Although the Streicher case is often regarded as the precursor of the crime of  incitement to 
genocide‘ before the offence category of "genocide" became recognised  under international 
law through the 1948 Genocide Convention, this interpretation may  only reflect the purely 
factual overlap between the two scenarios, not points of law.  Indeed, it may fail to register 
the difference in legal doctrine between how "acts of  persecution" differ from incitement 
to genocide. "Persecution" is not an inchoate offence  but rather a criminal form of 
discrimination that violates the right to equality as  established in  international customary or 
treaty law. It is unclear how the Streicher  precedent features in the contrast between these two 
doctrinal categories. 
 
16/. Was Streicher's hate speech itself part of the Nazis' genocidal attack upon European  Jewry, 
akin to a weapon, or rather a background ideological and motivational factor  behind  this 
attack?
143
 It is unclear whether the doctrinal focus should be on the kind of  harm 
stemming from hate speech with respect to the bilateral relationship of insulter- insulted, or 
upon a wider type of environmental harm in which the character of social  relations between 
                                                 
140
 See G. Werle, 2009, ‗General Principles of International Criminal Law,‘ in A. Cassese (ed.), Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Law, 54 at 60. Instigation of these crimes is punishable only if the crimes themselves were eventually 
committed. 
141 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 2(3) (c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 
1994) [ICTR Statute]. The same language appears in the Genocide Convention. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide art. 3(c), Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
142 Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment, 7 922, 931-34 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
143
 In the Nahimana case, the Trial Chamber, the radio station and magazine in question were liked to ‗the bullets in the 
gun,‘ the actual weaponry of genocide and those in charge of them bore both individual and command ‗responsibilities 
stemming from their ownership and institutional control over the media (para. 979). The idea of media as an attack dog 
integral to genocide was carried forward into the appeal stage. 
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groups themselves are altered by pervasive hate speech.
144
 
 
17/. What relation, if any, is there between the interpretation and application of  "persecution" 
through media propaganda in the Streicher case, and wider ranging non- criminal aspects of 
international human rights laws against discrimination that set up and   embody 
universalistic norms of "human dignity" as fundament axioms?"
145
 
 
18/. Is the graphic, if seductive, judicial metaphor of racist hate speech "poisoning the  mind" 
of entire populations in ways that encourage genocide an appropriate characterisation of the 
difficult policy and legal issues at stake, or does its deployment tend rather to evade them?
146
 
 
19/. In the context of a racist war of annihilation as, for example, fought by Hitler is it possible to 
identify a credible and decisive legal distinction between, say, Fritzsche's "lawful" propaganda 
designed to support that overall war effort, which is only incidentally racist in quality and aim,
147
 
and that of, say, Streicher's fully-blown and concerted racism that openly embodies and promotes 
an exterminationist agenda? 
 
20/. What is the legal position for a defendant whose racist hate speech is as extreme as that of 
Streicher but which does not call upon its audience to commit physical hate crimes against the 
targeted group? This question stems from an ambiguity as to whether it is the resulting 
incitement-effect, or the hateful and racist quality of the words in themselves, which is the key 
determinant of illegal "persecution."
148
 
 
21/. The Streicher and Fritzsche judgments do not clarify the position of an editor or radio owner 
whose media outputs contain episodes instances of hate speech composed by other persons, and 
where this defendant's liability has to be based largely on their omission to police and prevent 
such content, rather than a deliberate decision to create initiate it themselves. 
 
Given the lack of sustained and careful doctrinal analysis contained in the IMT's judgment, there 
is a danger of over-interpreting the distinctions between these cases. It is too easy to assume that 
the IMT must – as a matter of strict logic – have possessed and applied a set of legal 
requirements and doctrinal tests. It may be further assumed that it is the task of academics to 
                                                 
144  In Nahimana 1072-3 the Trial Chamber insisted the hate speech functioned by "conditioning the Hutu population and creating 
a climate of harm" such that  ideological persecution was more than a provocation to cause harm  but was the harm itself. 
145 For example, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In N the Appeal Chamber of the ICTR found that 
"hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or any other discriminatory ground, violates the right to respect for 
the dignity of the members of the targeted group as human beings,' and it suggested that such speech could provide the sole basis 
for a conviction. See Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment, 7 922, 931-34 (Nov. 28, 2007), 986-7. 
This Court mooted such a possibility but did not go so far as to expressly endorse it. 
146 The Trial Chamber in Nahimana employed the "poison" metaphor from the Streicher case to justify its conclusion that the 
RTLM broadcast accusing all Tutsi of cunning and trickery amounted to "persecution." op cit, 1078. 
147 The IMT claimed that his propaganda was mainly intended: "to arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German 
war effort." Fritzsche Judgment, op cit, 338. 
148 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, 1073 (Nov. 28. 2007): 'there need not 
be a call to action in communications that constitute persecution [and thus] there need be no link between persecution and acts of 
violence.' 
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ascertain, describe and clarify these requirements, and - once this has been achieved - the 
underlying doctrinal rational for the differences in outcome will become fully explicable.
149
  
   For example, there is the legalistic temptation to distinguish these two cases in terms of 
questions of intent and purpose on the one hand, and causation on the other. The presumption - 
here is because Streicher's anti-Semitic propaganda used words such as "kill," "exterminate" and 
"eradicate" this means that it follows , as a matter of logic, that the Nazi regime killed millions of 
Jews. Few historians could accept this simple notion of causation, least of all between words and 
actions. At the same time, a doctrinal "explanation" of the Fritzsche decision on the grounds that 
he "lacked" the required intent and purpose, and that the prosecution had failed to establish a 
causal nexus between his words and anti-Semitic acts of persecution, merely restates rather than 
resolves, what is really at issue here. By contrast, a distinctly historical form of analysis would 
typically examine the particular social and institutional contexts within which Streicher could 
issue such statements, and also within which purely "doctrinal issues" could be raised as 
"explanations", without question. 
   Such formalist assumptions may suggest that, as a matter of pure legal doctrine, it is easier to 
secure prosecution of private publishers of racist words because they are acting exclusively on 
their own initiative as a creative source of acts of incitement. Here, the contrast is with official 
state propagandists, who are merely acting as a mouthpiece for others who may deceive their 
subordinates as to the true state of affairs, thereby nullifying the required element of 
purposefulness.
150
  
                                                 
149 Cf. Spencer W. Davis, 'Incitement to Terrorism in Media Coverage: Solutions to Al-jazeera after the Rwandan Media Trial,' 
38 The George Washington International Law Review, 749 (2006). 
150 There is the critical analytical question, which the prosecutors needed to avoid, of the extent to which, in both peace and war, 
all types of government deploy official statements for propagandist purposes, although rarely with the intensity and damaging 
effects of the Nazi regime? Is there a difference in kind, or just degree, between the rhetorical presentation of a highly selective 
interpretation of empirically accurate "facts," and "propaganda." Is "overt" propaganda more or less "propagandist" than more 
subtle and oblique forms that take care to present themselves as "objective," "impartial" and "properly balanced"? In responding 
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   Superficially, these propositions appear to make good doctrinal sense of the contrast between 
these cases. And yet the difficulties become clearer if we ask what if Streicher's words had been 
expressed by Fritzsche or vice-versa? Of if Streicher had exhibited Fritzsche's repentant and 
sympathetic demeanour in court and had been singled out for prosecution primarily to appease 
the Soviets? In short, it remains an open question whether racist hate speech that amounts to 
'declaratory propaganda' fell outside the scope of crimes against humanity, or whether any such 
distinction underplays the extent to which these cases were decided primarily on their particular 
facts alone with little reference to doctrinal distinctions and requirements. The IMT's statement 
that, in fact, Fritzche's speeches did not expressly incite and encourage the commission of war 
crimes, remains no more than a simple assertion; it fails to provide criteria for identifying and 
distinguishing that sub-set of war crimes directly "caused" by his type of racist hate speech, from 
other forms stemming from other factors.  
   If Fritzsche's "innocence" rested on this lack of evidence of an actual and proximate cause and 
encouragement of at least some persecutorial activity through hate speech, then Streicher's guilt 
would need to partly rest, upon proof of precisely such a direct causal connection. Yet, as already 
noted, that was not the case. It is, therefore, hard to avoid the suspicion that the IMT not only 
applied inconsistent legal tests in these two cases, but also chose to give a particularly 
sympathetic interpretation to the facts of Fritzsche's complicities not shared by later domestic 
German Courts considering the same evidence.  
   The intuitive revulsion prompted by Streicher, including his physical appearance, vulgar and 
unrepentant manner in court, radiates from the extremely brief, even cavalier, level of legal 
                                                                                                                                                             
to such questions, are questions of the comparative gullibility, receptiveness or dismissive cynicism of the intended audience just 
as vital as those of the quality of the propaganda itself, and is it relevant to consider the extent to which poorly crafted 
propaganda can, in practice, sometimes prove counter-productive, achieving the opposite effect to that which was intended? How 
would European audiences typically react to the type of propaganda messages characteristic of the current North Korean regime, 
or vice-versa? 
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analysis explaining the grounds for his guilt. If the dominant (and I would add entirely 
understandable) judicial perception was that, in the wake of revelations concerning the 
Holocaust, he simply "no longer deserved to live" on both moral and political grounds, then there 
was barely any need to show with care and clarity how the proven material facts of his case met 
determinate and specified legal criteria. Perhaps the court was simply unwilling to provide an 
extensive legal rationalisation in terms of the "objective meaning" of legal precedent, doctrine 
and the "logical implication" of legal rules for given proven facts for what was, in essence, a 
moral choice in favour of a judicial killing. Perhaps, such a stance could be defended in terms of 
the avoidance of excessive hypocrisy? On the other hand, it could be argued that the IMT's 
position was itself hypocritical insofar as Streicher's physical appearance, vulgar manner, etc., 
were factors taken to preclude the need for any serious legal investigation and debate. Here, we 
can ask what difference might it have made if Streicher had - despite his crass stupidity and 
repugnant character - still been able to present a more attractive, polished and repentant profile 
similar to the "smoother" manner of Fritzsche for example, and whether any such differentiation 
is morally as as well as legally justifiable? 
   In taking their minimalist approach, and avoiding the elaborate doctrinal clarification that legal 
purists expect from judges when deciding novel cases, the IMT evaded the embarrassment of 
presuming that there really is, or could ever be, a single correct meaning of the  single word 
"persecution," which had never previously been deployed in an international criminal law 
context, on whose basis life and death decisions may be dispassionately resolved. 
There are, we would suggest, specifically institutional factors that may be of more use in 
explaining the distinctions the IMT ascribed to these two cases. Although the IMT trial was, in 
one sense, a first instance hearing, there was no provision for an appeal chamber, and hence no 
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possibility of an appeal on a "point of law." Unlike other first instance trial judges, members of 
the IMT did not, therefore, have to be concerned with the prospects of having their judgments 
unravel when subjected to later and more clinical forms of legalistic scrutiny by a higher level 
court eager to display its institutional and cognitive superior "authority." Far from being 
provisional, in the sense of subject to appeal, the IMT's "initial" determination was also a "final 
decision." In this sense, the judges were also legislators. Within certain semantic and cultural 
limits, in this case "persecution," as a subset of "crimes against humanity," meant whatever they 
wanted this word to mean. This semantic elasticity allowed it to be extensively stretched in one 
case, while contracted in another. It was within the judges' discretion to define this term narrowly 
in each case (for the purposes of justifying the acquittal of both these defendants), or broadly (to 
legally authorise their convictions and killing). However, considered in terms of their policy 
implications and likely moral and political reaction, neither of these interpretive options could be 
considered ideal. Alternatively, the IMT judges had the option of defining "persecution" broadly 
to ensure and justify the killing of Streicher and - albeit at the expense of a measure of internal 
consistency - narrowly to authorise the Fritzsche's acquittal.  
   Independent of legal doctrine and its implications, the IMT had little choice but to attempt to 
draw a policy line between "lawful" and "unlawful" propaganda involving hate speech. Had 
Fritzsche, a middle-level official, been classified and punished as a "major war criminal," then 
there may well have been the demand for literally thousands of other journalists and broadcasters 
whose actions were broadly similar (and in many cases far more extreme) to be classified and 
prosecuted in the same way. Arguably, this would not have been a practical option during the 
immediate postwar years, where the agreed Allied plan was to deploy a quasi-administrative 
"denazification" programme to purge and punish such individuals. Furthermore, had the 
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unremarkable Fritzsche been classified as a "major" war criminal on a par with SS defendant 
Kaltenbrunner or Hitler's chief propagandist Goebbels for example, then this might have had the 
unwarranted effect of diluting the proper gravity attached to this classification itself. As already 
noted, only the Soviets had ever classified Fritzsche as any type of war criminal at all, and the 
other prosecutors had this case foisted upon them largely for geopolitical reasons. In other words, 
and independently of any "strictly legal" (i.e., legalistic) considerations, there is a pragmatic 
institutional and utilitarian argument to made in favour of the IMT's decision to draw an oblique 
and fuzzy line between the Streicher and Fritzsche cases.  
   On the other hand, some commentators, taking their cue partly from ICTR's "Media Trial" case 
of 2003, which was the first conviction at international criminal law exclusively for hate speech 
since the Streicher judgment, have recently suggested that a rational distinction, internal to legal 
doctrine, can be identified by reference to the category of "human dignity." It may also be 
ascertained from the difference between "direct" and other forms of incitement. For instance, 
Benton Heath argues : 
'The divergent outcomes in the early international criminal cases against journalists may 
be distinguished using this conception of dignity. Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche 
were the two Nazi journalists tried by the IMT at Nuremberg.  For the vitriol published in 
his newspaper, Der Sturmer, Streicher was convicted of crimes against humanity by the 
tribunal and executed. By contrast, Fritzsche, a radio propagandist, was acquitted on all 
counts. The difference between these two cases thus may prove important for 
understanding the status of hate speech in ICL, and lawyers involved in the Nahimana 
case have argued that the material distinction in the Nuremberg judgment was that 
Streicher directly incited the extermination of Jews, whereas Fritzsche did not. Therefore, 
it is argued, the Nuremberg precedent should be read to support only convictions for 
direct incitement, and not for other forms of hate speech. In other words, expressive 
activity should be the basis for a persecution conviction only when it urges violent 
action.'
151
 
 
                                                 
151 Benton Heath, 'Human Dignity At Trial: Hard Cases And Broad Concepts In International Criminal Law,' 44 Geo. Wash. Int'l 
L. Rev. 317, 363 (2012). See also Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor 
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Benton Heath then proceeds to claim that a certain legal conception and principle of "human 
dignity," and its attack by divisive forms of racism enhancing social stratification of humanity 
into supposedly "higher" and "lower" groups, underpins aspects of modern international criminal 
law. This conception, he claims, provides a more credible account of the distinction between 
these two IMT cases than the more traditional explanations: 
'Our focus on dignity as re-stratification points toward a second important difference 
between Streicher and Fritzsche, at least on the facts as they are recounted in the 
Nuremberg judgment. The portion of the judgment convicting Julius Streicher constitutes 
a catalog of grievous status injuries. Though Streicher's conduct cannot be divorced from 
his frequent calls for extermination of the Jews, his writings are also striking in their 
systematic attempts to accuse the Jewish people of lies and deception, to reduce them to 
vermin or to a virus, and to publish weekly "lewd and disgusting" portrayals of Jews.'
152
 
 
By contrast to such rationalisations, we would suggest that if there is a rational and legally 
explicable distinction between these two cases that adequately explains the difference in legal 
outcome, it lies in the selective interpretation of questions of fact and factual distinctions.
153
 
Fritzsche could, despite his title as political director of German radio, plead that he was a mere 
"stand in" for Goebbels and, to a lesser extent, his immediate superior Otto Dietriech, who alone 
were the creative sources of Nazi radio and press propaganda. By contrast, the influence of 
Streicher's position as editor in chief and owner of Der Stürmer was free of any such ambiguity 
and could, therefore, be relied upon as a decisive criteria. If Streicher had decided to desist his 
anti-Semitic propaganda, then that would have made an identifiable difference to the content of 
his publication. But the same cannot be said for Fritzsche whose personal responsibility for 
disseminating inciting content was, therefore, far less clear.  
   And yet one contradiction here is that Fritzsche appears to have been given credit for 
                                                 
152 Benton Heath, 2012 op cit, 363; Jean-Marie Biju-Duval, 'Hate Media '-Crimes Against Humanity and the Genocide: 
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exercising discretion to prohibit from German radio some of the more extreme official forms of 
anti-Semitic sentiments, including references to the "master race" and to Jews as "sub-humans." 
Yet, this generous, if questionable, interpretation of fact meant he was held not individually 
responsible and accountable for the remainder he chose not to block. This placed him in the 
fortunate position of "heads I win, tails you lose" situation of a truly favoured defendant. In 
addition, the IMT appeared predisposed to accept that the content of the anti-Semitic materials 
disseminated by the radio chief that denigrated Jews as inferior, was significantly less extreme 
and exterminationist than those of Streicher, who provided a convenient foil for this exonerating 
interpretation. However, this argument probably assumes that, as a matter of fact, the latter was 
itself a borderline case, such that any "less extreme" expressions would, as a matter of strict 
logic, have to fall on the other side of the relevant doctrinal distinction.  
   Had the prosecutors selected four defendants to represent (or more precisely "personify") the 
racist hate crime dimension of Nazi war criminality, then Fritzsche might have ended up falling 
on the "wrong side" of where the judges created a dividing line between "lawful" and "unlawful" 
racist propaganda. When considering the origins of the criminalisation of hate speech within 
international criminal law, it is, perhaps, too easy to accuse the IMT judges of a lack of doctrinal 
clarity and arbitrariness, which of course presumes that they chose perversely to ignore a non-
arbitrary option. The presumption that legal doctrines cover all relevant situations for which they 
have been enacted or judicially developed, and that legal codes lack "black holes," remains a 
strong one.
154
 In the context of Hitler's genocidal war of racist annihilation, there was possibly no 
non-arbitrary way of distinguishing, by reference to the newly-devised category of "persecution," 
"lawful" from "unlawful" forms of propaganda. A similar point applies to the distinction between 
propaganda in favour of "general German war aims" from Streicher's openly exterminationist 
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incitement to mass murder. Central to Hitler's war aims was a racial reconfiguration of humanity 
based on a master race ideology to be realised through a campaign of genocide directed mainly 
against European Jewry. 
   In short, the Streicher and Fritzsche cases raised but failed to resolve a number of key issues 
concerning incitement to genocide, and bequeathed a difficult legacy to those seeking to 
prosecute at international criminal law for  racist hate speech.  
   We would suggest that the considerable scholarly interest in the Rwandan "Media Trial" 
(Nahimana case) at the ICTR is indicative of the continuing importance of the unresolved issues 
handed down to ICL by the Fritzsche and Streicher cases, both individually and when read 
together.
155
 The continuing failure of international criminal to arrive at a shared understanding of 
the criminality of hate speech, which academic commentators have recognised, stems in part, 
from an understandable challenge contained with the IMT's legacy.
156
 
                                                 
155 Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 325 (2004); Gregory S. Gordon, 
'A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations': The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the 
International Law of Hate Speech, 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 139 (2004); But see Scott Straus, What Is the Relationship Between Hate 
Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda's "Radio Machete.', 35 Pol. & Soc. 609, 611 (2007);  Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or 
Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 Va. J. Int'l L. 485 (2008). 
156 Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial, Prosecutor v. Nahimana,' 21 Am. U. Int'l L. 
Rev. 557, 573-75 (2006). 
  
 
59 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE NON-PROSECUTION OF CARL SCHMITT 
 
Having discussed one successful and another unsuccessful prosecution and attempted to draw 
some legal and policy conclusions from their comparison, our next question concerns the 
practical implications of this mixed bequest for our third case study involving a case of selective 
non-prosecution: Professor Carl Schmitt. It is interesting to explore the borderline decision not to 
prosecute him because, on further investigation and interrogation, his case was deemed to fall 
outside the scope of 'persecution' as a crime against humanity. If re-interpreted in the light of the 
Fritzsche and Streicher cases, can our third case study cast new light upon either doctrinal or 
institutional-pragmatic questions as these appeared to the pragmatic field of awareness of 
international war crimes prosecutors? 
   In April 1947, Schmitt was facing the prospect of prosecution for Nazi war crimes at the NMT 
trials, which followed the earlier IMT trials.
157 
When Schmitt was interrogated in this month, the 
prosecutors were entitled to rely upon the precedent of Streicher's conviction and execution for 
the proposition that incitement by words alone, even by a private individual, could, in principle, 
constitute "persecution"; and thus a "crime against humanity." Furthermore, the idea of 
prosecuting leading academics for incitement to genocidal acts, including acts of persecution by 
words alone, would not have appeared outlandish if we appreciate the significant role that 
German scholars played in supporting Hitler for example, or the fact that many voluntarily 
joined Nazi-affiliated guilds, institutes and organisations. Indeed, from 1933 to 1945, a range of 
German academic or quasi-academic institutes of various kinds actively promoted Nazi race 
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theory, eugenics and overtly anti-Semitic programmes.158 Lenard and Starck, Nobel prize winners 
in physics, are perhaps the most infamous professors who endorsed Hitler. However, this long 
list includes Martin Heidegger, Wundt and Alfred Rosenberg from philosophy, Erich Marcks and 
Srbik in history, and Hans Frank and Carl Schmitt in law. Therefore, many legal academics, 
lawyers and judges actively collaborated, with only a fraction of those expelled by the Nazis on 
racial and/or political grounds ever later regaining their posts in the legal profession.
159
  
   Few established senior academics, who had a choice, decided to emigrate rather than work 
under the inevitable compromises imposed upon them by the Nazi regime.
160 
Hence, it is 
unsurprising that, in 1946, Max Weinreich, Research Director of the Yiddish Scientific Institute, 
published a well-researched and documented book entitled Hitler's Professors: The Part of 
Scholarship in Germany's Crimes against the Jewish People, with the clear view of having its 
contents deployed optimally during the NMT trials.
161
 
   There is considerable ambiguity and conflicting statements as to the precise reasons why 
Schmitt was interrogated and upon whose initiative within the America's Occupational Military 
Government (OMGUS) headed by General Lucius Clay. Robert Kempner, who was Schmitt's 
primary interrogator, provides only inconsistent accounts,
162 
even concealing relevant materials - 
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including the fact that, contrary to his published accounts, he had conducted a fourth 
interrogation.
163
 With respect to the orientation of the Nuremberg prosecutors, Bendersky notes 
that: 
'The question of whether Schmitt merited prosecution as a Nazi war criminal is not only 
of historical interest but also relevant to the current massive revival of scholarly interest 
in his work, including within international law and relations literature. Much of this is 
predicated on the belief that this writer's Weimar and post-war legal writings possess 
continuing value: one that transcends his short, but deplorable, period of intense 
collaboration. The latter signified a 'break', a temporary aberration, the cancerous fruits of 
which can and must be surgically removed from an otherwise healthy body of work.'
164
  
 
Critics of this revival, such as William Scheuerman, re-affirm many of the arguments with which 
the Nuremberg prosecutors confronted Schmitt concerning the alleged "continuity" between his 
Weimar and Nazi writings. Typically, such critics argue that the overall Nazi project, including 
its viciously anti-Semitic doctrines and its associated atrocities against the Jewish people, 
represented an all-too practical realisation of Schmitt's theories and their author's hopes and 
dreams.
165
 The contention that, taken as a whole, Schmitt's legal and constitutional writings 
contain and, insofar as they are influential, publicly incite anti-Semitism, as the Nuremberg 
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prosecutions attempted to establish, still remains controversial today as a damning objection 
routinely advanced by his critics.
166
 From this diametrically opposed stance, Schmitt‘s work 
during the Third Reich provides the key to understanding his pre-Nazi era writings. The latter 
allegedly incited readers to accept Nazism, not least by discrediting and counteracting familiar 
intellectual arguments of liberal constitutionalism and institutional practices incompatible with 
Hitler's project.
167
 
   Such attacks, which have recently taken on a cultural-theological twist,
168
 are largely rejected 
by his defenders as a cynical, ill-informed and prejudicial smear tactic. The latter entails the 
expedient avoidance of the considerable intellectual challenges these writing's continue to pose 
to liberal and socialist agendas.
169
 In this respect, despite dying in 1985, Schmitt remains on 
posthumous trial in absentia within contemporary scholarship, with no prospect of a conclusive 
verdict in sight.
170
 
   In 2005, Caldwell's review of recent literature makes the interesting point that scholarly 
reflection upon Schmitt's responses during his Nuremberg interrogation raise interesting and 
more general academic issues that exhibit continuing relevance: 
'Along with the apologetics, Schmitt‘s intellectual energy comes through in the documents as 
well. He raises interesting questions about the connection between an intellectual‘s ideas and 
their effect and about what the limits are to legal and moral responsibility—questions that point 
beyond his specific situation to more general issues about the intellectual in politics.'
171
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Anti-Semitic statements within Schmitt's personal diaries and notebooks (Glossarium) need to be 
excluded from discussions of his potential criminal liabilities for acts of incitement and/or 
"persecution", primarily through his publications.
172
 Schmitt could not be prosecuted for acts of 
incitement or for acts of persecution by reference only to his unpublished private words. 
Whereas, the interrogation and proposed prosecution of Schmitt remains highly relevant to, and 
topical for, current academic controversies over Schmitt's changing orientations, the inverse can 
only be true in part.
173
 
   The institutional details concerned Schmitt's proposed prosecution now need to be clarified. 
Interesting archival research by Kevin Jon Heller indicates that, on 14 March 1947, 20 May 
1947, and 4 September 1947, the Nuremberg prosecutor's office (OCC) submitted three different 
potential trial programmes to the America's Occupational Military Government (OMGUS). 
Schmitt was listed as a potential defendant in the first trial program in what was envisaged as the 
'Propaganda and Education case.' According to this initial plan, there were three definite 
defendants in the trial: Max Amann, the President of the Reich Press Chamber; Arthur Axmann, 
Schirach‘s successor as Reich Youth Leader; and Fritzsche's immediate superior, Otto Dietrich, 
Chief of the Press Division of the Ministry of Propaganda. Characterised as a ―university 
professor and propagandist,‖ Schmitt was listed with the following other potential defendants: 
Hartmann Lauterbacher, a District Commander in the Hitler Youth; Dr. Gustav School, Reich 
Leader of Students and Lecturers; Helmut Sundermann, Press Chief and Chief of Staff in the 
Press Chamber, and Werner Zachintisch, from the Science, Education, and Popular Culture 
Division (of Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda); Bernard Rust, Hitler's Minister of Education; 
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and Herman Muhs, the Minister of Church Affairs. Between 14 March and 20 May but probably 
after the final interrogation session at the end of April, Telford Taylor‘s prosecution staff took 
the decision not to prosecute Schmitt since the documentation for the second proposed trial 
programme dropped his name form the list of defendants.
.174
 
   Schmitt's transition from law professor at Germany‘s leading Law Faculty, the University of 
Berlin, to the status of accused "war criminal" was an especially poignant episode in the 
controversial life of this legal academic. Until 1933, he had been widely recognised by Marxists, 
liberals and fellow conservatives as one of Germany‘s pre-eminent constitutional jurists. During 
the early 1930's, Schmitt was, perhaps, the most prominent of the conservative-authoritarian 
scholars who strongly opposed both Communism and National Socialism.
175
 At that time, he 
became one of the strongest critics of parliamentary forms of liberal democracy.
176
 Part of this 
critique was that liberal constitutionalism endorsed an "equal chance" doctrine that, on grounds 
of an exaggerated and unqualified notion of "freedom of expression", refused to prohibit any 
political movement or expression of ideology, however undemocratic and connected to a 
programme of the "lawful" destruction of democratic governance from within.
177
 As Ulmen 
recognises, Schmitt's politics in the final years of the Weimar republic were those of a traditional 
Hobbesian statist conservative, which found expression in his practical collaboration not with the 
strengthening a resurgent Nazi movement, but with General Kurt Schleicher and Von Papen: 
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both strong political enemies of Hitler from the traditional conservative side of German politics 
willing to work within the democratic framework of the Weimar Republic.
178
 
   Wieland's reliable review of the biographical evidence concludes that it would be 'false to see 
him as a theorist who supported the rise of the Nazis,' and that, in July 1932, he expressly 
'warned in the Tagliche Rundschau, a paper close to General von Schleicher, against a further 
strengthening of the Nazis in the upcoming elections'. Wieland then quotes key parts of Schmitt's 
public intervention that expresses the implications of his more theoretical writings from 1931 
and 1932: 
'Whoever provides the National Socialists with the majority on July 31, acts foolishly ... 
He gives this still immature ideological and political movement the possibility to change 
the constitution, to establish a state church, to dissolve the labor unions, etc. He 
surrenders Germany completely to this group .... It would be extremely dangerous.., 
because 51% gives the NSDAP a "political premium of incalculable' significance."'
179
 
 
At the beginning of Hitler's chancellorship and coalition government with non-Nazi conservative 
politicians, Schmitt expressed hope that the army would bring the "Nazi adventure" to an end 
and sought privately to bring this about.
180
 This was at the time when fellow conservatives had 
attempted to keep Hitler away from power, and - of course - preserve it for themselves.
181
 
Following Hitler's entry into government, Schmitt remained at first aloof from direct political 
activity while serving as a behind-the-scenes adviser to the conservative clique within the 
government. "I am a theorist," he told Veit Rosskopf in a radio interview the day after Hitler's 
appointment, "a pure scholar and nothing but a scholar."
182
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   Schleicher's resignation and the President's refusal to act against Hitler, signalled the collapse 
of Schmitt's preferred alternative. After having publicly opposed Nazism from a conservative 
perspective, even calling for this movement to be legally suppressed on the basis of his critique 
of the liberal "equal chance" doctrine and affirmation of broad Presidential powers under Art.48 
of the Weimar Constitution to take 'necessary measures' to defend constitutional governance, 
Schmitt abruptly reversed his position.
183 
This apparently took place within the first month after 
Hitler took power in 1933 as head of a coalition government with other traditional conservatives, 
with whom Schmitt had associated.  
   Schmitt was appointed by the coalition government, in which the Nazi party remained a 
numerical minority, to a committee charged with drafting a law that would significantly change 
the federal relationship between the Reich and the regional German states. Since the 1933 
Enabling Act had, in effect, already legalised the Nazi take-over of regional governments, 
compliance with Von Papen's directive marked a turning point in Schmitt's life and work.
184
 This 
was his first act of collaboration with the still emerging Third Reich. Schmitt's subsequent rapid 
transition from firm opponent to Nazi collaborator was made easier by his personal association 
with leading conservative members of what remained a coalition government, particularly Von 
Papen and Popitz.
185
 Their continuance within Hitler's coalition government tended to reinforce 
the deceptive appearance of there being a "moderating," and by implication "responsible," 
conservative influence within a government in which the Nazi party remained a numerical 
minority, and which needed support to control the hopefully temporary Nazi threat.
186
 However, 
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once the Enabling Act was passed on March 23 1933, it produced a new constitutional situation 
in effect signalling the end of the short-lived Weimar Republic.
187  
   
Notwithstanding, his previous private and public aversion to National Socialism, Schmitt 
rapidly came to terms with the new situation, and sought to exploit it for his own advantage. 
Whether for opportunist careerist motives, or as a defensive move, or for a combination of the 
two, he joined the Nazi Party only on May 1st 1933. His party number was, 2,098,860 - 
emphasising his internally problematic status as a late-comer to a movement that particularly 
valued long-standing members ("old fighters") who could not be accused of opportunism and 
jumping on a bandwagon for reasons unconnected to personal convictions.
188 
   For the purpose of discussing questions of incitement and/or persecution as defined my 
international criminal law, a key issue is whether or not Schmitt's practical endorsement of Nazi 
governance signified a "fulfilment" of his prior theoretical work? Can the latter can be accused of 
"laying the theoretical foundations" for the former? Or did it rather signify the crass betrayal of 
both the content and implication of his own Weimar writings, on which his reputation among 
centrist and leftist thought had been built up?  
   There is no doubt that proponents of the continuity thesis, such as Scheuerman, who adopt a 
prosecutorial even inquisitorial orientation towards the interpretation of Schmitt's major Weimar 
works, can extract apparently damning quotes to support their thesis. The latter appear to suggest 
Schmitt's commitment to a 'decisionist' public law theory centred around legally unrestrained 
acts of sovereign power where "might alone makes right," harmonised with the Nazis' 
"leadership principle." In addition, such critics can cite other statements that seemingly endorse 
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notions of "homogeneity" apparently requiring the expulsion of non-conformist elements of 
society. This interpretation suggests that Schmitt's writings anticipates, even prepared the 
grounds for, Hitler's notorious anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws of 1935.  
   On the other hand, a well-prepared defence lawyer would have had little difficulty in 
countering such unsympathetic and retrospective interpretations of extracts of Schmitt's writings 
torn out their scholarly context, with other quotations. The latter might well inspire at least 
reasonable doubt concerning the validity of the highly selective prosecutorial interpretation of 
Schmitt's Weimar-era publications. The IMT's judgement had expressly rejected the prosecution 
claim that anyone who had been significantly involved as an "instigator" or "accomplice" with 
the promotion of Nazism since 1919 was potentially caught by the "common plan" / 
"conspiracy" dimension of the Nuremberg Charter. Rejecting this overly-broad contention, the 
IMT had held that the conspiracy must not have been too far removed from the time of decision 
and of action.
189
 
   Furthermore, prior to the summer of 1933, Schmitt had positively cultivated a wide range of 
outstanding German-Jewish students and scholars. As a scholar deeply committed to the 
discussion of challenging ideas from every part of the political spectrum spanning Kirchheimer's 
revolutionary Marxism through to the deep Hobbesian conservativism of Leo Straus - he 
personally encouraged and assisted these individuals in various ways.190 Ulmen recognises that 
Schmitt's abrupt reversal of position in 1933-4 was inexplicable to these and other scholars who 
had closely studied not only his Weimar-era academic works but also his political practices. Both 
had appeared firmly rooted in a distinctly Hobbesian conservative tradition strongly resistant to 
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central tenets of Nazism. It appeared that, for purely personal and shameful reasons, Schmitt had 
now betrayed the very political culture he had previously been promoting at both theoretical and 
political levels. Ulmen recognises that: 
'Most of Schmitt‘s colleagues, students, and admirers were shocked by his decision to 
join the Nazi Party. To make sense out of this development, they looked for clues in his 
previous writings, but they could not find any, and Schmitt was warning against a Nazi or 
Communist takeover of the Weimar Republic as late as 1932.'
191
 
 
Many of his more brilliant leftist German-Jewish students and academic associates, including 
Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann, who had admired his published work,
192
 turned against 
Schmitt only at this point. They turned against him precisely for having betrayed and acted 
grossly inconsistently with the implications of his previous constitutional scholarship,
193 
which 
they had 'endorsed and adapted.'
194 
Even scholars critical of Schmitt who defend the continuity 
thesis supportive of Schmitt's prosecution at Nuremberg have recognised that the latter's theories 
decisively influenced a number of other major scholars from a Jewish background, including 
Joseph Schumpeter, Leo Strauss, and Hans Morgenthau. Both before - and even after - the Nazi 
era, a considerable number of leading scholars from a Jewish background engaged with Schmitt's 
ideas, including Jacob Taubes, Julien Freund, George Schwab, and Alexander Kojève. Yet, there 
is no evidence that any of them detected any essential, even implicit, anti-Semitism within his 
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overall theories.
195
 Indeed, in 1930, Schmitt had published an essay praising Preuss, a German-
Jewish founder of the Weimar Republic.
196
 
   The problem with the inquisitorial approach supportive of Schmitt's prosecution for incitement 
/ persecution is that it fails to appreciate the contradiction involved in ascribing an essentially 
anti-Semitic theoretical approach of the kind and quality analogous to the hate speech of 
Streicher, or at least Fritzsche, to his pre-Nazi era publications. If, as alleged, Schmitt's Weimar 
theoretical writings at least implicitly lay the theoretical and ideological foundations for Nazism, 
then – on what legal logic – could one claim that Kirchheimer, Neumann Straus and other 
German Jews, who fled the Nazis, avoid prosecution (or at least denazification trials) for their 
role in spreading Schmittian theory even as late as 1933?
197
 Yet, the very idea of prosecuting 
such German émigré victims of Nazism, who possess unimpeachable anti-fascist backgrounds, 
for alleged criminal complicity concerning anti-Semitic incitement, would surely have appeared 
grotesque, even to the most zealous Nuremberg prosecutor. 
   On the basis of the earlier Streicher precedent, prosecutors might have considered that 
Schmitt's participation in aspects of Nazi ideologies that, it could be argued, were ultimately 
supportive of atrocities and illegal war was, in itself, unlawful. However, they would also have 
been aware of the IMT's decision acquitting defendant Schacht (Hitler's early Finance Minister 
who had resigned in 1937).
198
 Whilst this defendant had engaged in actions close to the centre of 
state power that had helped legitimate and materially stabilise Hitler's early rule, there was 
insufficient proof that he had thereby subjectively intended to participate in this regime's wider 
criminal acts, which intensified towards genocidal policies after his resignation. Thus, another 
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legal difficulty facing any proposed prosecution of Schmitt lay in establishing and ascribing 
evidence of the required subjective element of criminal intent, and then co-ordinating any 
pertinent evidence of this with the factual details of his allegedly criminal actions. The 
identification of 'intention' ('guilty mind' or mens rea) within criminal trials has, of course, to be 
retrospective ascribed or imputed by others, often based upon specific presumptions, including 
common sense understandings of typical human motivations in given contexts, together with 
circumstantial evidence.
199 
Our point is that to ascribe war criminality to Schmitt for his pre-Nazi 
era writings on the basis of the continuity thesis would have faced a difficult task. It would have 
to had to clearly demonstrate that his subjective intent, purpose and motivation was primarily to 
promote Nazism, including the latter's extreme anti-Semitism, albeit perhaps – if for tactical 
reasons alone - in a disguised and indirect manner. 
   Given that there was little chance of extracting a confession from Schmitt to substantiate this 
legal requirement contention concerning his subjective intentions, the difficulty facing the 
prosecutors was that there was little material evidence to support it, and ample counter-evidence 
available to a defence lawyer. For example, this academic and writer of a series of expert 
constitutional commentaries clearly possessed a massive professional investment in the 
preservation of the Weimar constitution, albeit possibly in a modified, more authoritarian 
Presidential form, until Germany's economic and political crisis were resolved. In addition, there 
was evidence contained both in his late-Weimar writings and personal actions within the party 
political sphere that Schmitt was deeply troubled regarding the prospect of the Weimar Republic 
being swept away and replaced by the predictably non-constitutional form of governance by 
either Communists or Hitler.
200 
This ominous development threatened to destroy his own 
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'intellectual capital' as a constitutional law expert. The emergence of a one-party dictatorship 
dismissive of the very idea of constitutional governance would have meant that his hard-won 
expertise – and its widespread domestic and international recognition by other scholars - would 
have become irrelevant. A defence lawyer would have had little difficulty in arguing that 
Schmitt's actions in the final years of the Weimar Republic were, in fact, consistent with – and 
were intended to be consistent with – the fulfilment of his own professional material interests. It 
would not have been difficult for any defence lawyer to argue that, at the subjective level, his 
Weimar works were never intended to encourage the Nazi take over of Germany. On the 
contrary, and given his material interests, it is more credible to believe that Schmitt's intent and 
purpose was to oppose such a development, and his scholarly and practical actions need to be 
interpreted in this light. 
   Furthermore, in a criminal trial, it is of course, for the prosecution to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt, not for defence lawyers to have to prove their clients' innocence. Hence, any 
ambiguity concerning Schmitt's motivations and actions prior to the Hitler era, of which the 
historical record suggests that there were certainly many, could not be expected to be judicially 
interpreted in favour of the prosecution. In other words, with respect to his publications and 
political actions prior to joining the Nazi party in May 1933, prosecutors would have had to 
assume that, within any future trial, conflicts of evidence generated by the sharply opposed 
narratives of defence and prosecution lawyers would be resolved in favour of the former.  
   On the other hand, the situation with respect to the next three years is very different. Schmitt 
actively participated in the first three years of Nazi regime by giving lectures and writing 
publications, newspaper articles and pamphlets. In these, he attempted to 'give meaning to 
Hitler's phrases' and implicitly reshape the intellectual and constitutional void within Nazi 
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doctrine along less extreme, more traditional lines that implicitly resisted the assimilation of the 
traditional state structures into mere tool of the Nazi movement. As Wieland notes, Schmitt 
became an active propagandist within popular, as well as academic, publications on behalf of the 
Nazi movement and its programme of dictatorship, and that any potential prosecution case 
alleging "crimes against humanity" would have been well-advised to concentrate upon on the 
content, style and quantity of these numerous writing: 
'In the years between 1934 and 1936, Schmitt wrote about forty articles that supported the 
restructuring of the legal system in a National Socialist way. Only one week after the 
Enabling Act had been passed, he presented an article that justified the suspension of the 
constitutional guarantees.  In May 1933, he was the author of a column entitled The 
German Intellectuals in the Cologne Nazi newspaper Westdeutscher Beobachter that 
fiercely attacked the oppositional German emigrants. Schmitt argued that they had never 
belonged to the German nation and finished his article with the sentence: "They are spit 
out of Germany for all time." Many of Schmitt's articles appeared in regular newspapers 
and not in exclusive legal magazines, thus helping even more effectively to consolidate 
the National Socialist basis in the founding years of the regime. This alone would be 
enough to warrant the charge of a disgusting opportunism towards the Nazis.'
201
 
 
Consequently, Schmitt became widely known abroad at least as the Nazi's 'Crown Jurist' and 
―the self-appointed ideologue of the Nazis‖.202 As a member of the Prussian State Council 
personally appointed by Goering in July 1933, Schmitt had also materially assisted with drafting 
Nazi legislation. This included the municipal laws of December 1933, and other: ―practical 
questions of Prussian administration and organisation.‖ He helped write new laws that placed 
municipalities under direct Nazi party control, rather than under the control of the central state 
machinery, thus destroying federal aspects of the German system of government.
203
 Schmitt even 
publicly welcomed the notoriously anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws as signalling the end of the 
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mere legality of earlier German constitutions, which did not originate in ―German blood and 
German honor‖.204 
   Especially relevant for present purposes concerning the possibility a successful prosecution for 
incitement and/or persecution is the fact that Schmitt published several short articles, such as 
State, Movement, Nation (1933), and National Socialism and International Law (1934) in which 
he sought to render considerable service to the ideological transformation and subordination of 
the judiciary into a subservient branch of Nazi government.
205
 Other publications from this 
period express Schmitt's strong support for the Nazi regime, and have formed the object of 
particular controversy. For example in The Fuhrer Defends the Law, published on August 1st 
1934, he justified the murders by the SS of scores of internal party rivals associated with the SA 
in the notorious 'Night of the Long Knives' purge of June 30, 1934. According to Schmitt, such 
killings were concrete expressions of the highest jurisdiction of the Fuhrer, who unified judicial 
with political and governmental authority. This work contains only heavily coded and implicit 
criticism of abuses of this purge involving the murder of his former mentor General Schleicher 
and the latter's aides. It now appeared that a former principled conservative opponent of the 
Nazis had now been converted into an apologist for a murderous one-party dictatorship. 
Thereafter, Schmitt would find it increasingly difficult to either sustain or extricate himself from 
his Nazi entanglements.
206
  
   Schmitt was materially rewarded for such endorsements of Hitler and collaboration more 
generally. In autumn 1933, he accepted the directorship of the Berlin faculty group of the Nazi 
Lawyers‘ Guild, an organisation created by Hans Frank Minister for Legal Affairs (and later 
                                                 
204 Ibid. 168. These biologistic references, in fact stupid if rhetorically powerful metaphors, are of course stock in trade of 
extreme nationalism more generally, and rarely if ever encourage positive outcomes, least of all for those deemed to fall outside 
their cherished zone of exclusivity. 
205 C. Wieland, op cit, 98. 
206 J. Bendersky, 1983 op cit, 218. 
  
 
75 
notorious Governor General of Poland (1939–1945) and Nuremberg defendant, who had became 
his protector. Schmitt‘s standing within this organisation was, he claimed, dependent upon the 
patronage and support of Frank, which ended in December 1936.
207 
Schmitt profited 
professionally from his co-operation with the Nazis by being appointed chair of law at the pre-
eminent University of Berlin and chairman of the Nazi League of German Jurists. He was also 
appointed editor of the leading law journal, Deutsche Juristen-Zeituing.
208
 This was a prestigious 
academic journal, not comparable to the tabloid Der Stürmer.  
   And yet, as already noted, the prosecutors would have been all-too aware of the IMT's acquittal 
of Fritzsche and Schacht who had left official posts in 1937, and the remarkable failure to 
convict even Baldur Von Schirach, the leader of the Nazi Youth, for "crimes against humanity" 
with respect to the indoctrination of a generation with anti-Semitism. These legal decisions 
would have caused potential difficulties with respect to Schmitt's potential case before the NMT. 
Schacht had not been convicted of "crimes against humanity" because his administration of anti-
Semitic expropriatory exchange controls took place entirely before the war, and could not be 
linked to the preparation for warfare in any material way. In particular, this judgment raised the 
question of whether Schmitt's anti-Semitic statements, and later Grossraum theory of 
international law, could be convincingly interpreted as being sufficiently proximate in time to 
actual criminal acts of physical persecution?  
   Despite his rapid rise to prominence within academia and legal affairs during 1933-34, Schmitt 
soon ran into difficulties with his rivals within the Nazi Party. He discovered that determined 
attempts to readjust his prior Weimar ideas to suit the distinct policy imperatives of National 
Socialism fell significantly short of what was demanded by longer standing party ideologues. 
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Furthermore, he became personally affected by some of the bitter and sectarian divisions within 
the party itself, which were contested in a particularly unscrupulous manner.209 Leading figures 
such as Goering, Himmler, Rosenberg and, to a lesser extent, Hans Frank, fought each other and 
jostled for position through their proxies and subordinates.  
    Schmitt was not well-equipped to succeed in this vicious institutional context. He had never 
previously taken seriously Nazi ideology, other than as a dangerous and primitive rival political 
movement needing legal suppression. Nor had he ever engaged with distinctly Nazi ideas and 
beliefs rooted in race / master-race theory. On the contrary, his constructionist/phenomenological  
approach was categorically hostile to any form of reductionist and biologistic approach. Whilst 
his Weimar studies had discussed Marxism, liberalism, anarchism and Mussolini's Fascism in a 
scholarly way, without endorsing any of them as suitable models for Germany, he had pointedly 
ignored Nazism and Nazi racist philosophy. Ironically, Schmitt's prior studies and expertise 
would have been better prepared intellectually to contribute to the ideological work for a 
Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, or perhaps that of Franco, than for a Nazi one. Presumably, his 
earlier lack of engagement with Nazi ideology, even within the fields of constitutional and 
international law, is explicable because he had long recognised that its ideological content lacked 
any significant intellectual content whatsoever.210 Hence, despite his personal ambitions and self-
confidence, Schmitt was singularly ill-equipped to collaborate at the ideological level in ways 
that would harmonise with the divergent expectations of this movement's longer-established 
ideologists. The arrogant idea, shared with philosopher Martin Heidegger, that National 
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Socialism could be refashioned and redefined by means of the intellectual superiority of his 
interventions was always a vain delusion. 
   Schmitt's status as a "March violet," a high-profile late-comer to the Nazi cause, aroused 
particular suspicion and envy among the party's "old fighters."211 Many were angered by the fact 
that someone who was both a new arrival and former political opponent received so much 
acclaim and rapid promotion with the support of Frank and Goering. Schmitt's aspiration to play 
the dominant role of 'Crown Jurist' was deeply resented. For these reasons, his party critics, some 
of whom aspired to this role following many years of service, argued with justification that 
Schmitt had acquired neither great influence nor popularity with the Nazi party itself.212
  
    
Furthermore, his enemies were not confined to long-standing Nazis. Since 1934-35, Schmitt 
became increasingly vulnerable to the publication abroad of scathing personal attacks upon him 
by refugee émigrés and Nazis concerning his previous cordial association with German Jews, 
including many well-known leftists and liberals who were vocal critics of Hitler's regime. Critics 
emphasised his genuine support for General Schleicher, Catholic commitments, and – most 
damning - for having once referred to Nazism as: ―organized mass insanity.‖213 Once again, these 
points were factually accurate as even Schmitt's critics accept.214 
   In response to such attacks, and for the first time, Schmitt began to include a small number of 
gratuitous anti-Semitic remarks within his published articles and books.215 However, he soon 
discovered that even these efforts to pay strategic lip-service to Nazi anti-Semitism, and thereby 
counteract these attacks by passing himself off as a hard-core Nazi, was starting to backfire 
horribly upon him. As Bendersky notes, Schmitt had seriously underestimated the Nazi 
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movement's capacity to detect and turn against those new-comers who sought to exploit this 
party for their own ulterior career purposes: 
'By 1934 the Jewish question has serious personal ramifications for Schmitt. Jewish 
émigrés, many of whom were his former students and friends, are exposing his past 
relationships with Jews and the contradictions between his theories and Nazi ideology. 
His Nazi opponents used this against him .... There is a reciprocal sense of betrayal and 
bitterness between Schmitt and émigrés.'
216
 
 
These factual point would have probably supported a defence lawyer's argument rebutting the 
accusation that Schmitt's Weimar works laid a theoretical foundation for Nazism. Of course, 
prosecutors could have selected a dozen incriminating examples of Schmitt's anti-Semitic 
statements from the 1933-36 period of active collaboration as part of a prosecution brief 
organised in a similar way to that of Streicher‘s support of the Nazi Party‘s racist policies. And 
yet the problem remained that, when viewed in context Schmitt, it would have been extremely 
difficult to portray Schmitt as anti-Semitic fundamentalist and obsessive racist propagandist 
broadly akin to Streicher without facing a mass of counter-evidence. It could be anticipated that a 
defence lawyer would argue, perhaps with some success, that his expressions of anti-Semitism 
were sporadic and haphazard and – with rare exceptions - rarely at the centre of whatever 
theoretical or policy argument he was developing at the time.
217 
By contrast, Streicher's 
propaganda was essentially and zealously anti-Semitic and specifically called for ever greater 
persecution of European Jewry in direct and unambiguous terms that intensified in coordination 
with acts of physical persecution.  
   Concerning the 1933-6 period, Bendersky notes that there is evidence that many instances of 
Schmitt's deplorably racist expressions of this kind appears to be an insincere, tactical, and 
defensive. In this regard, and with respect to the earlier IMT decisions relevant to questions of 
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anti-Semitic incitement and the restriction of crimes against humanity under Art 6(c) to the 
period 1939-45, it is possible that his case would have been judicially interpreted as far closer to 
that of Fritzsche than to Streicher. The fact that Schmitt's anti-Semitic statements trailed off 
markedly after having reached a virulent peak of intensity in 1936, would certainly have posed a 
challenge for his prosecutors, not least following Schacht's acquittal. As Bendersky notes: 
'Here [in Schmitt's publications from 1933-36] we find anti-Semitic expressions totally 
uncharacteristic of his earlier work and relationships. Yet, even in these years, we do not 
find an immediate emergence of anti-Semitism or even an extensive, pervasive or 
constant manifestation of it. Instead, it emerges only gradually and always remains 
limited. Given the kinds of compromises he was already making, he would have had 
much to gain by exploiting this issue. But early on he never does. Initially, his few anti-
Semitic references appear only as minor lip service to Nazism and gradually escalate as 
he is under attack for not being a true believer. His anti-Semitism reaches its peak in 
1936, when he is under assault by the SS. After this watershed showdown with the Nazi 
state, he actually has very little to say on the Jewish Question at all. This pattern is also 
evident in perhaps his three major works during the Nazi years: The Three Types of 
Juristic Thought, his work on Hobbes‘ Leviathan, and his Grossraum theory. Nowhere in 
these works is what he has to say, or even imply, about Jews a necessary element in his 
theory. One could eliminate these references or insinuations without in any way affecting 
the theory.'
218
 
 
Nuremberg prosecutors may have appreciated that a competent defence lawyer would have 
argued that these outbursts were made, at least in part, under duress. They represented a 
desperate and transparent response to his being outflanked by the Nazi zealots of the SS during 
an internal power struggle.219 At this time, both the Rosenberg Office, responsible for promoting 
and defending Nazi ideology, and the feared Nazi internal security organisation Schutzstaffel 
("SS"), headed by Himmler, began gathering incriminating evidence against Schmitt.220 Thus, in 
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1935-6, Schmitt‘s claims to be a genuine Nazi were increasingly under threat and unravelling, 
not least from his fellow legal theorists Otto Koellreutter.221  As Bendersky recognises:  
'As the aspiring regime crown jurist, Koellreutter launched a campaign denouncing 
Schmitt as a neo-Hegelian conservative whose political theory lacked a racial foundation 
and contributed nothing substantial to National Socialism. Koellreutter eagerly 
contributed to the SS attacks on Schmitt ....'
222
 
 
   Such attacks typically included references to Schmitt's many Jewish friends, professional 
associations and scholarly influences that allegedly betrayed his long-standing "lack" of required 
anti-Semitism, and hence credentials as a Nazi. As Ulmen recognises, these ominous SS 
denunciations had a valid factual basis, one which a defence lawyer for Schmitt could have 
exploited: 
'Any discussion of Schmitt and the Third Reich immediately raises the issue of anti-
Semitism. Yet, there was no trace of anti-Semitism in any of Schmitt‘s writings or 
personal relations prior to 1933; on the contrary, not only were some of his brightest 
students and admirers Jews, but he dedicated his major treatise on constitutional law 
[1928] to the memory of his friend, Dr. Fritz Eisler, who fell on September 27, 1914, and 
he had high praise for Hugo Preuss, both of whom were Jews.'
223
 
 
   From the summer of 1936, Schmitt and his associates became increasing subject to SS 
surveillance as potential subversives, even with respect to their academic duties. In response to 
these growing threats, he tried to rehabilitate himself by resorting to a more intense, public 
display of anti-Semitism. The despicable low-point of this attempted included his organisation in 
a 'Conference of Judaism in Jurisprudence', which opened in Berlin on October 3rd 1936. 
Schmitt concluded the event with a crassly anti-Semitic Nazi speech on 'German Jurisprudence 
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in the Struggle against the Jewish Intellect.'224 As the following extracts from the latter address, 
published in the Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung under the title German Jurisprudence in Combat 
Against the Jewish Mind, make clear, this ―conference‖ promoted the policy of having the works 
of Jewish legal writers labelled as ―non-Germanic‖, and then ultimately expelled from libraries 
of ―pure German‖ legal scholarship: 
'A Jewish author does not have any authority for us, not even a "purely academic" 
authority .... A Jewish author, if he is quoted at all, is for us a Jewish author. Adding the 
word and the attribute "Jewish" is not a formality, but something essential. However, 
most important ... is the clear and final finding that Jewish opinions, in their intellectual 
content, cannot be put on the same level with German and other non-Jewish authors. 
Again and again at this conference, the knowledge got through that, for the German kind 
of mind, the Jew is unproductive and sterile. He does not have anything to say to us, may 
he combine as sharply as possible, or may he assimilate as zealously as possible. When it 
is said time and again that this man [Stahl] was "subjectively honest," it may be so, but I 
have to add that I cannot look into the soul of a Jew and that we do not have any access to 
the internal essence of the Jews. We only know their disparity from our kind. Who once 
has understood this truth also knows what race is.'
225
 
 
On 2 December 1936, Schmitt followed up this conference with a letter to SS Leader Himmler 
explaining his personal anti-Semitic efforts to "purge" German legal scholarship, and committing 
himself to serve this policy within the legal sphere. As his biographer Bendersky notes 
concerning the 'conference': ―[T]his was self-serving, dishonest and morally despicable – and it 
failed to convince even his opponents that it was anything but a sham.‖226 Another low-point was 
his written praise of the 1935 Nuremberg laws that withdrew German citizenship from Jews as a 
"constitution of freedom."227 
   At this time, close surveillance by the political intelligence sub-division of the SS showed that 
Schmitt intended to better secure his position within the party by acquiring the sympathy of men 
close to Hitler, and it was this intention that explained his invitation to Julius Streicher to attend 
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the Berlin Conference. (Both Schmitt and Streicher had been subjected to SS surveillance). The 
SS judged, probably correctly, that Schmitt's "conference" was little more than a cynical and 
self-serving attempt to defend himself from various incisive and factually accurate attacks from 
more ideologically-committed, die-hard Nazi lawyers, and to rehabilitate himself within the 
National Socialist regime.228 
   It soon became even clearer that Schmitt's attempts at strategic deception had failed miserably, 
and his sham had even proved counterproductive for him. Certainly immediately after the 
conference, on December 3, he was heavily criticised by successive issues of the SS magazine 
Das Schwarze Korps (The Black Corps). These articles charged him with"'insincere 
opportunism," with various articles pointed out his numerous Weimar connections with Jews, the 
statist and non-racist nature of his political and legal theories, and Schmitt‘s earlier sustained 
support for the conservative political opponents of Hitler, such as Von Papen and Schleicher.
229 
In Schmitt‘s defence, Hermann Goring, who had personally appointed him to Prussian State 
Councillor, complained to the editor about an attack upon his own personal appointee (which 
implicitly recognised how senior Nazis fought with each other through attacks upon each other's 
appointees and supporters.) However, the damage to Schmitt's credibility within the Nazi 
movement and beyond had been done, and Goering's protection was sufficient only to preserve 
his academic position as law professor, and protect Schmitt and his family from physical attack. 
As of January 1st 1937, Hans Frank relieved Schmitt of his various posts within the Nazi legal 
organisation. Despite Goering's intervention, the internal SS campaign against Schmitt for crass 
opportunism and careerism continued, although not in overt media attacks. 
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   After Schmitt's fall from favour within the Nazi movement, he became mistrusted by all sides, 
either for his demonstrable insincerity, or – by former friends and colleagues outside that 
movement - for his initial collaboration and betrayal of his earlier positions.230 For the next two 
years, he focused his academic studies on the less contentious field of international law, and an 
important product of this was his 'Grossraum Theory' (large space).231 As Schmitt first presented 
these ideas only weeks after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the press took special 
notice. Articles appeared not only in Germany, but also in England. Two British newspapers, The 
Times and The Daily Mail, presented Schmitt as the key theorist behind Hitler's ‗expansionary 
policy‘ (Lebensraum).232 To those outside the National Socialist camp at least, it appeared that 
Schmitt had returned to the Nazi fold as their main academic theorist supportive of a type of 
military expansionism which (although absent in Schmitt‘s writings) nevertheless was itself 
rooted in Nazi anti-Semitic race theory.
233
 Schmitt appeared to have formulated and refined a 
theory of Grossraum that anticipated and 'justified' Hitler's military expansionist policies, which 
the Nazis' ideological rhetoric termed 'Lebensraum', or 'living space', supposedly reserved for the 
so-called 'master race' at the expense of the Jewish, Slavic and other peoples of Eastern Europe. 
   One complicating factor here was that the Nazi press strongly attacked Schmitt precisely 
because his cultural-ethnic conception of Grossraum was entirely independent of the Nazi race 
theory, which expressly underpinned Hitler's Lebensraum conception.
234
 It was as if one side of 
Schmitt wanted to collaborate and receive official recognition as an intellectual leader of Nazi 
international law but another, more scholarly part of his make up wilfully refused to endorse a 
                                                 
230 J. Bendersky, 1983 op cit, 244. 
231 Ibid. at 250-262. This theory of international law was based largely upon the idea that the era of the nation state was now 
finally over, and that sovereignty was increasingly centred on regional power-blocs. Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche 
Grossraumordnung Mit Interventionsverbot Für Raumfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag Zum Reichsbegriff In Völkerrecht (1939).  
232 J. Bendersky, 1983 op cit, 258. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid, 258-9. 
  
 
84 
race theory that would destroy his international scholarly reputation. Another possible 
complication was that the IMT prosecutors had failed to connect even Streicher‘s extreme and 
genocidal anti-Semitic propaganda with Hitler‘s theory of "living space." Through his 
Grossraum studies, Schmitt still clearly sought renewed influence over German foreign policy at 
a time of impending conflict, but he sought to do so at least partly on his own terms. Despite a 
smattering of some anti-Semitic statements in these Grossraum studies and an underlying 
nationalistic orientation in favour of Germany, his stance still refused to endorse the toxic 
absurdities of Nazi master race theory. Unlike other Nazi jurists, he had a hard-won and 
international scholarly reputation to protect, and was probably unwilling to sacrifice this.  
   Sympathetic scholars have engendered controversy by directly confronting and seeking to 
rebut a central claim on which rested Schmitt's status as a potential war crimes defendant. 
Bendersky, for example, claims that Schmitt: ―did not advocate war or the Nazi conquest of 
Europe,‖ and ―did not provide the theoretical foundations for Nazi foreign policy.‖235 Later, we 
will examine how Schmitt's Nuremberg interrogators attempted in vain to reinterpret the 
evidence of his Grossraum theory as proof of his complicity in the planning of aggressive 
warfare. 
   Immediately following the final defeat of Germany in April 1945, Schmitt carried on working 
as usual at the University of Berlin. However, he was soon arrested by the Russians, interrogated 
for several hours but then released. For the next six months, he lived undisturbed in his 
apartment in the American zone of this city. In June, he completed the required Fragebogen 
questionnaire, an initial part of the Allied 'de-Nazification' process, designed to assist in the 
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official determination of a person's classification status and potential legal culpability.236 Schmitt 
had neither featured on any Allied CROWCASS 'wanted list' used by Nazi war crimes 
investigators. Nor did he fall under the automatic arrest categories for senior and mid-ranking 
members of Hitler's regime. 
   It was the American authorities who reclassified him as a political danger - probably at the 
request of Karl Löwenstein, the legal advisor for the military occupation government in Berlin, 
and former German constitutional scholar. On 26 September 1946, US officials re-arrested 
Schmitt without charge, subsequently detaining him in various camps in the Berlin region, 
including Berlin/Lichterfeld-Süd and Wannsee. During this time, the professor was questioned 
first by U.S. Army counter-intelligence officials, and then by Ossip Flechtheim, a German 
émigré lawyer working with the U.S. war crimes staff. The resulting 'Preliminary Interrogation 
Report' claimed that Schmitt was the 'official constitutional apologist' for the Nazi regime, and 
he was 'the most eminent legal exponent of the Nazi ideology'.237 It remained to be determined 
whether, as far the Nuremberg prosecutors were concerned, his location within the legal sphere 
and his 'eminence' within it were positive, neutral or mitigating factors. 
   On October 4, 1945 Otto Loewenstein and a Captain Fearnside visited Schmitt‘s apartment in 
Schlachtensee to examine his library containing over 5,000 volumes on German law and political 
science, which was impounded partly for general purposes but also because it provided 
―instruments of confrontation‖ for future interrogation and possible prosecution. As potential 
evidence of incitement, Loewenstein removed a 1940 edition of Schmitt‘s essay on Grossraum 
and his 1934 ―ill-reputed article‖ ―Der Führer schützt das Recht.‖ Bendersky notes that:  
'Loewenstein made extraordinary, though erroneous, claims about the first work: ―This is 
the foundation of the policy of aggrandizement of the Third Reich, the scientific 
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incorporation of expansion by might into what the Nazis considered international law.‖ 
His depiction of the second, though incomplete on crucial aspects, accurately captivated 
its impact: ―a defense of the assassinations committed by Hitler in which more than one 
thousand persons were illegally killed . . . tries to justify Hitler‘s acts by pseudo-legal 
methods. The article had aroused widespread horror in the legal world as a token of the 
perversion of German legal thinking.‖238 
 
Clearly, this  émigré  official was committed to Schmitt's ultimate prosecution if at all possible. 
Indeed he wrote: 
'In the opinion of this writer Schmitt qualifies as a war criminal. He is one of the 
intellectual instigators of Hitler‘s acts of aggression and aided and abetted them by his 
intellectual authorship. I hardly know of any individual person who has contributed more 
for the defense of the Nazi regime than Carl Schmitt. I suggest that the case be submitted 
to the War Criminals Commission for further action.'
239
 
 
The brief, but reasonably balanced, military intelligence interrogation report on Schmitt of 
October 18 1945 listed his Nazi affiliations and noted his contention that, following the SS 
attacks in 1936, Schmitt lacked all official positions within Hitler's regime or the Nazi movement 
more generally, with any influence confined to his purely academic activities.240 This report 
recognised, however, that even after this period he continued to provide support to the regime: 
―he continued to publish works advocating totalitarianism and a European control system 
dominated by Nazi Germany‖; and that he had lectured abroad in 1943–44.241 
   Although prohibited from publishing, Schmitt was released on October 10, 1946. However, six 
months later, he was arrested again and then held in another internment camp, until March 1947, 
when he was brought to Nuremberg as a potential war crimes defendant (and possible witness) 
for repeated interrogations by Robert Kempner.242 These took place on April 3, 21,
 
27 and 29. 
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The decision to re-arrest and interrogate him at Nuremberg was largely due to the reputation he 
had acquired abroad as the ‗Crown Jurist‘ of the Hitler‘s regime.243 Kempner may have had a 
personal interest in seeing Schmitt convicted as he and a number of his colleagues, a number of 
whom were former academics, had been driven from their homeland by the same Nazi regime 
that Schmitt had enthusiastically endorsed, served and personally benefited from. 
   The question of the reasons for his classification as a war crimes suspect, and their justification 
has generated controversy that continues into the 21
st
 century. For example, according to one of 
the key German author‘s on the significance of Schmitt‘s interrogation at Nuremberg, Quaritsch, 
Schmitt's innocence of crimes against humanity was so obvious that his release was a foregone 
conclusion. For this commentator, the very decision to interrogate him reflected political and 
personal factors, rather than those grounded on a credible interpretation of the relevant legal 
provisions. Kemper must, therefore, have been motivated by an effort to recruit Schmitt as an 
expert witness against those members of the traditional state machinery who served Hitler, in 
particular the leaders of the Reich Chancellery.
244
 Kempner's recollections to the contrary, are - 
Quaritsch claims - an unreliable guide, not least because they contain numerous internal 
contradictions.
245
 The fact that, from 1936, Schmitt had worked full-time as a professor of public 
law meant that, within the institutional context of Hitler's Germany, he had no access to power 
sufficient to exert influence over WWII war crimes, even at the level of this regime's official or 
semi-official propaganda, which was the preserve of Goebbel's ministry.
246
 Quaritsch addresses 
Schmitt‘s limited cooperation with Kempner implicating others accused in the NMT 
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Wilhelmstrasse trial against officials of the German foreign office as something other than a 
strategy to mitigate his implicitly admitted guilt.
247
 Instead, such collaboration was merely a 
strictly tactical response to the threat of a trial and the poor prison conditions under which 
Schmitt was being kept.
248
 
   Yet, there are good reasons for questioning Quaritsch‘s clearly partisan analysis, and for taking 
seriously the idea that Kempner was genuinely seeking to evaluate the legal responsibility of 
intellectuals who supported Hitler‘s regime, and that he was concerned that Nazi academics who 
had directly and indirectly incited acts of persecution, even even genocide, might evade 
prosecution altogether.
249
 Quaritsch‘s dismissive interpretation fails to explain why Kempner had 
strongly pressed Schmitt for an explanation of the significance of the Grossraumordnung and, 
more generally, of the influence of intellectuals on Nazi politics and policy. 
   The fact that Schmitt‘s 1933-40 writings were, in most cases, distinguishable from the tabloid-
style outpourings of Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda by virtue of their scholarly style, is a 
double-edged argument. Goebbels already possessed sufficient crude and intellectually-
groundless propaganda resources, and Schmitt's endorsements of the new regime arguably had 
greater force, perhaps even as acts of 'incitement', precisely because they stood out from more 
predictable content and sources of official and semi-official propaganda. During the Weimar 
period Schmitt was well-known not as a Nazi but as a prominent and influential proponent of 
political Catholicism. Hence, his unlikely public endorsement of the new regime probably 
exerted heightened propaganda value, at least in comparison with other sources.  
   Furthermore, Schmitt's intellectual work during the 1920's and 30's had never taken the form of 
purely abstract theory. It had typically involved political engagements with controversial aspects 
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of concrete realities, such as the criticism of the contradictions and hypocrisies of parliamentary 
forms of democracy, the naiveté‘s of supposedly politically neutral approaches to law akin to the 
legal positivism of Hans Kelsen, and the wide potential scope for government deployments of 
emergency powers under Art. 48 of the Weimar constitution. The idea that the author of such 
openly polemical works had not subjectively sought to exercise political influence with respect 
to these issues and their policy implications is difficult to credit, least of all with respect to his 
writings within the Nazi era. It is arguable that public displays of intellectual endorsement 
provide a uniquely powerful form of incitement within the context of a genocidal regime, with 
Schmoekel arguing that: ‗Indeed, Schmitt tried to develop a myth that would influence the 
German people and thus add force to the German quest to subdue eastern Europe. In Schmitt's 
view, his contribution was more important than Hitler's feeble intellectual efforts. … ‘250 
 
   At first sight, and following the review and interpretation of evidence of collaboration just 
presented, the idea of prosecuting Schmitt as a Nazi war criminal might strike many as self-
evidently justified, particularly if we focus on evidence of his subjective intent to become a pre-
eminent and influential theorist within a new regime that had never concealed its anti-Semitic 
agenda, which it developed through an increasingly severe series of repressive measures during 
the mid-1930's onwards. Admittedly, the first wave of Schmitt's morally reprehensible actions 
took place under conditions of possible threat to himself and his family following General 
Schleicher's murder committed in July 1934 under cover of the purge of the SA leadership. 
However, the extent to which he then actively sought out and consistently exploited the 
opportunities offered by Nazi regime for as long as these were on offer, particularly in relation to 
his initiative in organising the anti-Semitic conference, remains significant. It went far beyond 
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any of the recognised criminal law defences of necessity or duress. At most, any conceivable 
element of self-defence in relation to personal threat could have served merely as a mitigating 
factor, possibly relevant to questions of sentencing, but not to any determination of guilt. 
   On the other hand, the prosecutors needed to establish that, over and above evidence of 
Schmitt's subjective intent to support and promote Hitler's regime that continued after his 
expulsion from official positions, his actions as a scholar objectively fell within the scope of 
legally prohibited acts. What factual evidence was there that his words had actually incited 
anyone to commit persecution analogous to those contained in Streicher‘s propaganda, which 
was the only available precedent? 
   Other institutional factors supportive of prosecuting Schmitt within the NMT trials included 
the fact that returning German émigré victims of Nazi anti-Semitism, including former 
academics and professional associates of Schmitt, who were fully aware of his complicity, now 
held influential official positions within the occupation government and prosecutors office 
dealing with him. Such officials could hardly be expected to look favourably upon his case by 
interpreting the factual evidence and legal requirements in a manner that was supportive of 
Schmitt's cause.  
   However, there is also the conclusion of a study where Bendersky significantly updates his 
earlier studies, which is based upon closely studied the primary archival sources. He notes that 
such an initial orientation strongly in favour of prosecution, which was driven by political and 
moral value-judgements, became more complicated when examined from a strictly legal 
perspective: 
‗The subject of Carl Schmitt and Nuremberg involves all the major aspects of intriguing 
historical research. It contains prominent personalities, momentous historical episodes, 
significant impact on longstanding heated (often hostile) interpretive debates, and 
decades-long documentary discoveries and revelations. The spatial settings of the 
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collapsed Third Reich and a Nuremberg cell are also dramatic. And within these are 
juxtaposed — in juridical, intellectual, and moral confrontations—Schmitt and returning 
émigrés serving in official capacities with the American Military Government (OMGUS) 
or Nuremberg prosecuting teams. On the surface it appears as a black-and-white story of 
good and evil, the pursuit of justice against, at best, a significant collaborator and, at 
worst, the person legally culpable for providing the intellectual and legal foundations for 
Nazi oppressive policies at home and wars of aggression and war crimes abroad. But as is 
so often the case in history, this particular morality play is complicated by documentary 
evidence, which categorically shatters such simplistic dichotomies.'
251
 
 
In particular, and despite the entirely understandable desire among relevant officials to see 
Schmitt face legal accountability, it became necessary to address the classic prosecutorial 
question of what credible evidence supported which specific charges under recognised categories 
of international criminal law. As Bendersky recognises, if prosecuted, Schmitt could avail 
himself of a series of strong counterarguments, stemming from earlier IMT decisions, relating to 
the lack of objective evidence of demonstrable influence over Nazi policy-makers: 
'His subsequent Grossraum theory had no impact on the motivation, planning, or 
execution of World War II; it was explicitly rejected by Nazi theorists and neglected by 
even those decision-makers aware of it, such as Werner Best. Any survey of the Nazi 
journals in Schmitt‘s library would have revealed this indispensable part of the story. It 
surely would surface in any public airing or trial.'
252
 
 
   Schmitt's potential allocation to the NMT defendants at Nuremberg for incitement of anti-
Semitic genocide was thus certainly complicated by a number of factors pressing in contrary 
directions. A number of these nuanced, and arguably undermined, Kempner's claims that Schmitt 
was self-evidently a Nazi war criminal who had, echoing the case deployed against Streicher, 
"poisoned the young" and provided the theoretical foundations and motivations for the domestic 
and foreign policy of the Third Reich, including wars of aggression and war crimes.253 Among 
these factors are the implications of newly-discovered archival documentation including 
complete transcripts of the fourth interrogation – together with Schmitt's own copies of studies 
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he was asked to write to assist the OCC in their preparation for what became The Ministries 
Case.  Bendersky claims that this new material re-affirms Kempner's seriousness in seeking to 
make a case against Schmitt, as distinct from merely harassing him in order to secure witness 
testimony: 
'Most surprising, however, was the discovery of the only surviving transcript of a fourth 
(completely unknown) interrogation of Schmitt that had occurred on April 11, 1947. …   
Aside from its inherent documentary value, this fourth interrogation and related material 
show that, contrary to other interpretations, Kempner was determined to prosecute 
Schmitt.'
254
 
 
This historian also corrects Quaritch's somewhat dismissive account of what lay behind Schmitt's 
arrest and interrogation by showing that fellow German scholars with firsthand knowledge of 
Schmitt's work and activities were also active in this matter: 
'The extant evidence also indicates that the impetus for the various arrests and 
internments of Schmitt, as well as the push for his prosecution, emanated from German 
émigrés serving with OMGUS in Berlin or with prosecuting teams in Nuremberg. At 
each stage, they took the initiative and persisted in action against Schmitt. All knew him 
personally, or of him professionally, as a colleague, student, and/or political opponent in 
Weimar and early stages of the Nazi regime.'
255
 
 
Bendersky suggests that, when taken together, these new materials demonstrate how Kempner's 
own account of the non-prosecution of Schmitt, contained in Das Dritte Reich im Kreuzverhör 
(1969), must also be considered: ―incomplete, distorted, and unreliable.‖256 
   A major problem facing Kempner was that, even when subjected to a hostile interpretation, 
Schmitt's legal and political theories did not directly and expressly endorse any essentially racial 
and biological – as distinct from essentially political – grounds for the unity of the sovereign 
nation state.257 His repugnant anti-Semitic statements expressed within, for example, his 1938 
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scholarly study on Hobbes largely but not exclusively singled out Jewish writers for being 
allegedly responsible for undermining the political unity integrity of the nation state.258 Such 
statements more closely resembled classic and familiar forms of Catholic religious prejudice 
against Judaism as routinely preached at this time, and not just in Germany of course. It is 
significant that such statements were, in fact, almost entirely gratuitous, and certainly not integral 
to his overall scholarly analysis. It would have raised problems for Kempner's claim, also later 
endorsed by leftist critics, that his writings supplied "theoretical foundations" for Nazism. Even 
Schmitt's most remorseless critics would have to concede that whilst his theoretical writings 
lacked adequate normative resistance to Nazi, or any other types of dictatorship, they were never 
rooted in the Nazis' distinctive biologistic master race theory that radiated genocidal 
implications. 
    As difficult from the prosecutors' perspective was the fact that defence counsel could have 
cited other passages from Schmitt's Hobbes study that contained coded criticisms of Hitler's 
regime for betraying the Hobbesian compact requiring obedience to positive law in return for 
guarantees of physical security for citizens. The oblique and encoded critique here was that 
Hitler was emulating earlier forms of unconstitutional and illegitimate tyranny.259  
   Indeed, arguably it was precisely Schmitt's refusal to endorse a racially-based theory of 
Grossraum, i.e., large-scale geopolitical power blocs, as distinct from his own ethnic-cultural 
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concept, which explains the ―failure‖ of his work between 1933–1945 to feature within the 
approved lists of official Nazi publications.260 Of the thousands of grossly anti-Semitic 
publications that the Nazi regime published, sponsored or otherwise encouraged, which 
expressly incited 'persecution', Schmitt's are noticeably only for their absence of official 
recognition. In turn, Schmitt's writings pre-dating and during the Nazi era generally but not 
exclusively avoided the standard repository of clichés, imagery and rhetorical excesses that were 
characteristic of Goebbel's official propaganda.
261
 
   Having explored some generic issues, it is now timely to examine the details of Kempner's 
interrogation where the conflict of interpretations was played out concretely and for high 
stakes.262 Although Kempner attempted to force Schmitt to incriminate himself by responding to 
―yes or no‖ type questions, the latter displayed considerable tactical skill in challenging the very 
terms of the questions. Often Schmitt gave qualified, negative replies, engaged in diversionary 
tactics, or offered only minor concessions, in respect of only the least serious matters, a tactic 
which often successfully frustrated any ―follow up‖ questions. At the outset, Kempner, told 
Schmitt: ―I will tell you quite candidly what I am interested in: your participation, direct and 
indirect, in the planning of wars of aggression, of war crimes and of crimes against humanity.‖263 
Given that the category of ‗war crimes‘ in this context relates to the narrowly technical realm of 
offences against the laws and customs of war typically committed by the armed forces, Kempner 
could not seriously have thought that Schmitt, who from the end of 1936 remained a civilian 
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academic, a full-time professor of public law throughout the war, could have been prosecuted 
under this heading. 
   In order to determine whether Schmitt should face trial, Kempner pursued three main lines of 
questioning. Did Schmitt's Grossraum writings provide the theoretical foundations for Hitler's 
expansionist policies oriented by an anti-Semitic master race theory and Lebensraum, making 
him an accomplice in wars of aggression? Had Schmitt served in a decision-making capacity 
within the Nazi government machinery? And – most important for present comparative purposes 
- what had been his relation to the Jewish question?  
   Kempner addressed Schmitt's work in National Socialist legal affairs, which potentially could 
have made him a defendant in the Ministries Case that eventually swallowed up the planned 
propaganda trials. In response, Schmitt maintained that he always acted and wrote under the 
control and censorship of a brutally totalitarian party demanding of public displays of support. 
His anti-Semitic remarks must be viewed in this context as mere lipservice.
264
 Kempner 
explained that: ‗[W]e are of the opinion the executing agencies in the administration, the 
economy and military are not more important than the men who conceived the theory and the 
plans for the entire affair . . . to what extent did you provide the theoretical foundation for 
Hitlerian Grossraum policy?265 In an ominous exchange, Kempner told Schmitt that the 
prosecutors sought to draw a legally relevant connection between even indirect ideological 
support for Nazi Lebensraum/Grossraum and the most concrete atrocities on the basis that the 
former was a causal factor in, and perhaps even a precondition for, the latter. Kempner expressly 
referred to the Streicher case claiming Schmitt's responsibility was even higher than that of the 
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recently executed IMT defendant. Unsurprisingly, Schmitt response was to locate Streicher's 
propaganda on an altogether different level: 
'Kempner: You can assume that everything you have written is well known and that these 
demonstrate that you have theoretically established the foundations for war crimes, wars 
of aggression. 
Schmitt: No, that is not correct. 
Kempner: Would you not admit that your influence in this area is much more significant 
and much more dangerous than when, on the basis of your work, some members of the 
SS ultimately invade foreign countries and shoot people en masse? 
Schmitt: That is taking things too far. I would very much like to address that matter. That 
is a complicated subject. 
Kempner: From a criminal perspective it is straightforward. Aren‘t you engaging in 
metaphysical somersaults? 
Schmitt: I‘m not denying anything. The problem of the responsibility for ideologies 
doesn‘t require any metaphysical somersaults. 
Kempner: ...You sermonized 30 years in order to bring about ―Grossraum.‖ 
Schmitt: That doesn‘t necessarily follow from my writings either. 
Kempner: Of course it does. Without men like you Nuremberg would not be laying in 
ruins. 
Schmitt: That‘s another topic. 
Kempner: In comparison to you isn‘t Streicher a harmless sermonizer? 
Schmitt: On an entirely different level. I am an advocate of free scholarship. 
Kempner: On another occasion you have said that you compare yourself to someone who 
diagnoses a plague. But didn‘t you yourself spread a plague? 
Schmitt: That was not my intention.'
266
 
 
Kempner thus made it clear that he rejected the distinction between purely scholarly diagnosis at 
the descriptive-analytical level and evangelising for Nazism and Hitler's anti-Semitism in 
particular. He also unsuccessfully pressed Schmitt to admit that a causal relationship existed 
between a number of his scholarly statements and subsequent events within the Nazi era, such 
that the latter represent the practical fulfilment of the former, possibly akin to the relationship 
between the Holocaust and Streicher's propaganda: 
Kempner: You did however enthusiastically welcome the Enabling Act. 
Schmitt: That is a provisional constitution. 
Kempner: Of a great new era? 
Schmitt: That relationship is not causal. 
Kempner: Didn‘t you enthusiastically welcome the dictatorship as the fulfillment of your 
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scholarly dreams? 
Schmitt: No, in 1928 [actually 1932] I published a work, ―Legality and Legitimacy,‖ an 
affirmation of the parties of the Weimar Coalition..... 
Kempner: Didn‘t the doctrine that one should shoot allied pilots derive precisely through 
men like you? 
Schmitt: But, please. You will not find a single word in anything I‘ve written about 
marching into Poland and about such things.'
267
 
 
To rebut this central charge, Schmitt thus sought to rely upon his Weimar opposition to Nazism. 
Schmitt denied that, despite being one of ‗the leading university professors in this field,‘ within 
public and international law, he had ever exercised any role at the crucial point of decision-
making comparable with that of: ‗other high state or party officials.‘268 Whilst this defence 
appeared to work in Streicher‘s favour, as he was not found guilty of "conspiracy" under Art. 
6(a), which might have been a pertinent point to Schmitt‘s defence, however, in wake of 
Streicher's overall conviction this was hardly a decisive legal argument. 
   Schmitt‘s more ingenious argument, which was hardly available to Streicher, was that 
Kempner‘s accusations ignored the minimal role that respect for the purely scholarly realm of 
intellectual ideas played, or can ever play, within the policy-making processes of an essentially 
totalitarian state: one that renounces democratic consultation because the actual or presumed 
political will of the leader constitutes the supreme source of government policy. Schmitt‘s 
interesting response was not to deny his fame and high reputation as a scholar but to argue that, 
with respect to government activity: ‗such a position was not "decisive," not even as a basis for 
making decisive contacts:  
'E]nough to say here that it was impossible for a chair in jurisprudence to be regarded as a 
decisive position or as a basis for exercising a decisive influence at decisive points in 
Hitler‘s totalitarian system, given its prevailing conceptions of science, education and 
jurisprudence. Such a position would never have been considered for initiation into 
                                                 
267 It is arguable that between 1933-36 the Nazis' "future plans" for foreign relations, if they existed, were far from well-known 
and perhaps strategically concealed, and there was no overt indication of plans to drag the German people into a new world war 
so soon after the previous catastrophe and national humiliation. 
268 Ibid. at 102. 
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Hitler‘s secret planning. . . . Theories and ideas do have influence, but this influence is 
not traceable to ‗decisive points‘. The effects of spoken, written and printed words are 
various and incalculable. . . . When an author makes public the results of this research 
and thinking, his intent is as scientific as his intellectual habitus is scholarly – the purpose 
is to further knowledge and the exchange of opinion. It is well known that my 
publications have always greatly stimulated both. But many listeners and readers do not 
respond to theories and formulations in a scholarly way, but automatically and 
unreflectively link them with practical matters and their momentary goals and interests. 
This is particularly dangerous with theories, theses and formulations of international law, 
constitutional law and politics.‘269 
 
   A hostile reading of Schmitt‘s responses would suggest that he was seeking to deflect any 
responsibility for the practical effects of his scholarly activities of collaboration away from 
himself, and on to both segments of his audience, and the scholarly discipline to which he had 
contributed. And yet students of international criminal law cannot entirely dismiss his related 
argument that the high standard of proof required to demonstrate a causal link between a 
scholar's publication of theoretical ideas and the 'planning' of practical actions, especially war, 
transcends the realm of what can be decided upon by any properly judicial process. More 
generally, Schmitt argued polemically that: ‗not even the political opinions expressed in Hitler‘s 
Mein Kampf constitute criminal planning as such‘.270 His implication was that if the prosecutors 
would have struggled to successfully prosecute the author of Mein Kampf (or similar populist 
work) for 'planning' aggressive war, then how much more difficult is it to bring such a charge 
against a university law professor. Schmitt suggests that if these prosecutors fail to recognise the 
easily-overlooked distinction between the propagandist exploitation of an already well-known 
conservative scholar, which Schmitt freely conceded was what had happened in his case, and the 
promotion of academic work that is clearly grounded in Nazi racial theories, then they risk 
making a highly questionable supposition. 
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   Kempner failed in his attempts to force Schmitt to draw analogies between his role as both a 
constitutional lawyer and member of the largely ceremonial Prussian Chancery, and the activities 
of Hans Lammers, who was Hitler‘s legal advisor and chief of the overall Reich Chancery. 
Lammers was later convicted and sentenced by the NMT to 20 years‘ imprisonment for war 
crimes.271 Whilst Schmitt was willing to help Kempner by analysing, as a ―constitutional expert,‖ 
the legal responsibility of Lammers under Nuremberg principles, he refused to accept that any 
analogies could then be drawn with his own situation.272 
   During this interrogation, Kempner certainly pressed Schmitt him on his occasionally negative 
and stereotyping remarks about the ability of contemporary Jewish international and public 
lawyers to properly understand ‗territorial‘ theories of the state because of their own status – 
prior to the creation of the state of Israel - as a distinct people lacking soil to call their own:  
Kempner: What is your attitude toward the Jewish Question, in general, and how it was 
handled by the Third Reich? 
Schmitt: It was a great misfortune and, indeed, from the very beginning. 
Kempner: Did you consider the influence of your Jewish colleagues, who were teachers of 
international law, a misfortune? 
Schmitt: With the exception of Erich Kaufmann, there were no Jewish legal scholars there 
[in Nazi Germany]... 
Kempner: Would you say there was a definite distinction between international and 
constitutional law influenced by Jews and that which you taught and advocated? 
Schmitt: The standpoint of Jewish colleagues was not sufficiently homogeneous for that. 
Kempner: Have you ever written such things? 
Schmitt: I wrote only once that Jewish theorists have no understanding of this territorial 
theory. 
Kempner: Where did you write that? 
Schmitt: In a little essay in the Zeitschrift fur Raum-Forschung, 1940-41. 
Kempner: What was that essay called?  
Schmitt: I cannot recollect the title. 
Kempner: Who published the journal? 
Schmitt: The Reich Office for Raum Research. 
Kempner: How long is the essay? 
Schmitt: Volkerrechtliche Grossramordnung had 50 large octavo pages. 
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Kempner: How many editions? 
Schmitt: I believe 5 or 6. The essay was reprinted there from the Zeitschrift fur deutsche 
Raumforschung, published by Deutscher Rechtsverlag, a press of the National Socialist 
League of Jurists. 
Kempner: It had a swastika on its publisher‘s insignia? 
Schmitt: Yes, of course. 
Kempner: Reading your writings creates a completely different impression from the one 
you are now providing. 
Schmitt: If one reads them completely, they have very little to do with the Jewish 
Question.‘273 
 
Clearly, Kempner wanted to press Schmitt on this point and to ascertain the extent and published 
source of his incriminating anti-Semitic remarks, together with the length of time that they were 
available over successive editions. In this last respect, he may have been taken his cue from the 
IMT's judgement on Streicher which emphasised the longevity of this defendant's anti-Semitic 
publications. The fact that the publisher was a recognised Nazi agency was also deemed relevant 
in that it seemed to amount to evidence that Schmitt had directly contributed towards official 
Nazi propaganda. This did not seem to matter in Streicher‘s case, who as a private publisher was 
not allowed to display the swastika on Der Stürmer.  
   Kempner then 'confronted' Schmitt with a snippet extracted from his publication 
Volkerrechtliche Grossramordnung, 4th Edition, as on a par with, and a contribution to, 
Goebbel's official form of anti-Semitic propaganda   
Kempner: ―The Jewish authors had, of course, as little to do with the previous 
development of Raum theory as they had with the creation of anything else. They were 
also here an important cause of the dissolution of concretely-determined territorial 
orders.‖ Do you deny that this passage is in the purest Goebbels-style? Yes or no? 
Schmitt: I do deny that the content and form of that is in Goebbels‘ style. I would like to 
emphasize that the serious scholarly context of that passage should be taken into 
consideration. In its intent, method, and formulation it is a pure diagnosis ... Everything I 
stated, in particular this passage, was intended as scholarship, as a scholarly thesis I 
would defend before any scholarly body in the world. 
Kempner: Here, however, we are before a criminal court. You were the directing, one of 
the leading jurists of the Third Reich. 
Schmitt: Someone who in 1936 was publicly defamed in Das Schwarze Korps [the S.S. 
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journal] cannot be described in that fashion.'
274
  
 
It is doubtful whether Kempner had adequately researched this topic, particularly with respect to 
Schmitt's 1933-36 writings.
275
 His surviving files from this period contained Schmitt‘s three-
page expressly Nazi pamphlet ―Five Principles for Legal Practice‖ (―Fünf Leitsätze für die 
Rechtspraxis‖), as well as ―Jews in Legal Science‖ (―Das Judentum in der Rechtswissenschaft,‖) 
the long anti-Semitic article in the Jüdische Rundschau (both published in Berlin in 1936).276  
   Schmitt sought to rely upon the claim that the 'intent, method, and formulation' of Goebbel's 
style racist propaganda is one thing, those of his writings quite another. In addition, he did not 
deny that his generalising claims about Jewish orientations, prior to the creation of the state of 
Israel, were offensive. He only insisted that, when understood in context, they clearly and 
intentionally amounted to constitute a scholarly hypothesis capable of debate, further study and 
possible revision. He implies that his 'pure diagnosis,' although possibly offensive to Jewish 
scholars, remained a strictly descriptive social scientific claim. By reminding Schmitt that 
whatever his subjective intentions and self-definition, his Nazi-era writings had the authority and 
status of a leading Nazi jurist, Kempner clearly resisted Schmitt's self-serving interpretation. 
However, this prosecutor could not, as Schmitt reminded him, coordinate any of his published 
statements written after 1936 to any official position he had held during Hitler's regime. 
Ironically, he sought to use the SS public attack and his resulting loss of official positions as an 
alibi, as a vindication for the claim that that his post-1936 writings, including negative references 
to Jews, were made as anything but pure scholarship. In response, Kempner then sought to 
expose a contradiction that discredited Schmitts' alibi.
277
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   Schmitt sought, in the second interrogation, to counteract this evidence of his anti-Semitism by 
pointing out that on his trip to Paris he was accompanied by a 'Jewish friend and his wife', and 
directed Kempner to a publication that summarised the main points he made on these lecture 
tours, which he clearly thought would counteract the negative impression created by the 
publications highlighted by this prosecutor. The latter challenged Schmitt's claim to be an 
intellectual adventurer oriented only to the pursuit of knowledge and personally responsible only 
for the theoretical implications of his writings, not their propagandist appropriation by Hitler's 
regime: 
'Kempner: You have the blood of an intellectual adventurer? 
Schmitt: Yes, that is how thoughts and knowledge develop. I assume the risk. I have 
always accepted the consequences of my actions. I have never tried to avoid paying my 
bills. 
Kempner: If, however, what you call the pursuit of knowledge results in the murder of 
millions of people? 
Schmitt: Christianity also resulted in the murder of millions of people.'
278
 
 
Of course, this response relies upon a dubious analogy. Whilst the content of Nazi doctrine 
possessed genocidal aims and implications, this hardly applies to the ethos of the New 
Testament. Although it is possible to argue that sectarianism within the interpretation of 
Christianity had murderous consequences, the resulting carnage was hardly the realisation of this 
religion in the way that the Holocaust was anticipated by the programme announced by Mein 
Kampf and constituted the fulfilment of Nazi ideology and race theory.
279
 Yet Schmitt's wider 
point appears to have been that neither scholars nor theologians can be held criminally 
accountable for how their analyses of doctrine are appropriated and abused by others. 
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   Other aspects of Kempner's interrogation alluded only indirectly to questions of genocide by 
confronting Schmitt with the charge that he was affiliated intellectually with the SS or factions 
with it, which was denied. This prosecutor then put to Schmitt the latter's statement that German 
law should now be interpreted in line with Nazi doctrine, which by implication incorporated anti-
Semitism as a legal principle. His rhetorical response was to counter the possibility of this being 
legally defined as "incitement" by reinterpreting his own clearly normative contention as if it 
were merely a descriptive thesis, one which had proved embarrassingly false, as if it were akin to 
a scientific hypothesis that is disproved by subsequent experiments: 
'Kempner: Did you state that German legislation and the German administration of 
justice must be carried out in the spirit of National Socialism?  Yes or no?  Did you state 
that between 1933 and 1936? 
Schmitt: Yes.  I was from 1935 to 1936 head of the professional organization.  I felt 
superior at that time.  I wanted to give the term National Socialism my own meaning. 
Kempner: Hitler had a National Socialism and you had a National Socialism. 
Schmitt: I felt superior. 
Kempner: You felt superior to Adolf Hitler? 
Schmitt: Intellectually, of course.  He was to me so uninteresting that I do not want to 
talk about that at all. 
Kempner: When did you renounce the devil? 
Schmitt: 1936. 
Kempner: Are you not ashamed to have written these kinds of things at that time, such as, 
for example, that the administration of justice should be National Socialist. 
Schmitt: I wrote that in 1933. 
Kempner: Do you deserve good or poor grades for that? 
Schmitt: It was a thesis. The National Socialist League of German Jurists extracted it, so 
to speak, from my mouth. At that time there was a dictatorship with which I was not yet 
familiar. … 
Kempner: Are you not ashamed that you wrote these kinds of things at that time? 
Schmitt: Today, of course.  .... Without question, it was unspeakable.  There are no words 
to describe it.'
280
 
  
   The brief nature of this exchange on the persecution of the Jews, and the lack of follow up 
questioning on this theme in later interrogations are significant. They suggest that Kempner 
considered that Schmitt‘s answers, and other available evidence supplied by his varied 
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publications, were insufficiently incriminating to constitute evidence of a specific international 
crime as recently interpreted by the IMT, in Streicher‘s case. It may have assisted Schmitt's case 
that, unlike Streicher, he rarely touched upon "the Jewish question" and it was never a particular 
focus of his research. Also most of his racist statements cited by Kempner were made before the 
onset of the Nazis' genocidal campaign against the Jews. Therefore, the arguments the IMT 
prosecutors had made against Streicher that he continued with increasingly radical calls for 
Jewish persecution at a time when he knew of their mass extermination was not available. 
Hence, Kempner could not follow the lead of Streicher's prosecutors by showing how Schmitt 
knew of the Holocaust and actively and deliberately encouraged its intensification as willing 
cheerleader for mass murder. His interrogator was clearly alert to Schmitt's interpretative 
strategy of drawing a sharp line between his position in 1933-36, where his words could be 
defined as expressions of a leading figure within the Nazi regime, and afterwards. 
   Kempner did not pursue one possible argument that was available to him. Namely, that the 
strong emphasis Schmitt's work places upon substantive cultural "homogeneity" as the 
precondition for an effective democracy.281 He could have put it to Schmitt that within a historical 
context where national identity was being officially defined by the Nazi regime in strictly 
"racial" terms, Schmitt‘s theory could be taken to imply that German Jews, simply by virtue of 
their Jewish identity, fell outside the rights and protections otherwise afforded by full German 
citizenship. He could have supplemented this point by reference to Schmitt's contention that 
politics is constituted by a friend/enemy polarity, and that the terms in which he expressed this 
anticipated the fate of German Jews as well as his notorious address to the anti-Semitic 
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conference he organised in December 1936.282 One possible explanation is that Schmitt‘s Weimar 
works never expressly advocated any specific substantive normative criteria for homogeneity, 
and hence both heterogeneity and the resulting differentiation of collective friend from enemies. 
His analysis was presented as a sober-minded and realistic scholarly description and 
generalisations of what often happens in practice as part of the politics of national identity, which 
liberal constitutional notions of "equal rights for all" tends to ignore. Schmitt did not present 
these theoretical analyses drawing attention to the exclusionary logic within militant nationalist 
ideologies and political practices (Ireland for the Irish alone or 'Sinn Fein' etc.) as prescriptive 
statements concerning what ought to happen to, say, the Jews and other minority groups within 
Weimar Germany. Instead, Schmitt's defensive claims relating to the descriptive-analytical 
nature these contentions, based on 'prudent observations' of common tendencies for collectives to 
divide themselves into antagonistic groups, would have been difficult to rebut with textual 
evidence.283 Unlike the pseudo-science of Nazi race theory, which is typically rooted in crude 
biological prejudices, Schmitt's political theory suggests that there is no natural-biological basis 
for making such distinctions, with the result that whatever criteria are deployed can only be 
culturally relative, historically contingent and comparatively arbitrary.  
   Kempner would not have been able to discover statements claiming that, for example, that the 
re-assertion of a 'healthy' form of German national identity required the expulsion of Jews of the 
type common in Streicher's anti-Semitic propaganda. Hence, Kempner could have placed a more 
subtle accusation to Schmitt; namely, that, within the late Weimar context at least, his broader 
theory of politics lent itself to anti-Semitic reinterpretation and application, and that his 
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republication of these ideas in unmodified form in 1932 and 1933 in the second and third 
editions of the Concept of the Political respectively in a situation shaped by the growth of Nazi 
anti-Semitism, implicitly encouraged such interpretation.284 However, if this was the case, then 
Kempner may have rejected this strategic interpretation for being too diffuse and indirect, at least 
for criminal law purposes related to incitement to war crimes.  
   There was, after all, no evidence that Schmitt subjectively intended his political theory, which 
made no reference whatsoever to Jews, to be interpreted and applied in an anti-Semitic way, or 
even that it ever had been by Nazi ideologists, politicians or those in charge of anti-Semitic 
persecution.285 Indeed, if this theory was essentially anti-Semitic and intended to endorse and 
incite this prejudice, then it is inexplicable that Schmitt illustrated it with reference to Australian 
immigration laws, for example, and remained entirely silent on: "The Jewish Question."286 
   Kempner may have believed he was on stronger ground with respect to the apparent 
connection and coordination between Schmitt‘s scholarly model of Grossraum as a post-liberal 
conception of sovereignty within international affairs, and an early form of Nazi military 
expansionism that followed only weeks afterwards. As Schmoecke notes, Schmitt appeared 
vulnerable to a hostile interpretation by the Nuremberg prosecutors of his international law 
writings: 
‗Apparently, some Allied officials considered Carl Schmitt not only an important legal 
scholar of the Nazi era, but also an influential author who had promoted the idea of a war 
of aggression. Indeed, the first interrogation concerned Schmitt's 1939 booklet on the 
Großraumtheorie. In it, he developed his theory of the 'greater space', according to which 
more important states may, due to the force of their dominating political theory, control 
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not only their own territory but also other adjacent countries. Hitler had used this concept 
almost immediately to repudiate US requests to refrain from further actions in central and 
eastern Europe. Modelled after the US Monroe doctrine, the 'European Greater Area' was 
to become an area of exclusive German interests. As Germany invaded Poland a few 
months later, a direct link between Schmitt's theory and the Second World War and its 
crimes could be discerned.‘287  
 
Such close connection, even possible co-ordination, thus appeared to bestow on Schmitt's theory 
an intensely practical aspect suggestive of a linkage between ideas and practical actions of a 
criminal nature. Kempner's line of attack was extremely direct: 
―Kempner: I will tell you quite candidly what I am interested in: your participation, direct 
and indirect, in the planning of wars of aggression, of war crimes and of crimes against 
humanity. 
Schmitt: Planning wars of aggression is a new and very broad concept. 
Kempner: I take it for granted that, as a professor of public law, you know exactly what a 
war of aggression is.  Do you agree with me on the fact that Poland, Norway, France, 
Russian, Denmark, Holland were invaded? Yes or no? 
Schmitt: Of course. 
Kempner: Did you not provide the ideological foundation for those kinds of things? 
Schmitt: No. 
Kempner: Could your writings be so interpreted? 
Schmitt: I do not think so - not by anyone who has read them. 
Kempner: Did you seek to achieve a new international legal order in accordance with 
Hitlerian ideas? 
Schmitt: Not in accordance with Hitlerian ideas and not sought to achieve but diagnosed. 
 
Schmitt thus denied each of Kempner's suggestions, claiming they were founded upon a careless 
or misreading of his writings whose focus was, in any event, upon developing a scholarly 
"diagnosis" of unfolding contemporary events utterly distinct from Hitler's primitive type of 
military expansionism, which in any event relied upon no theory:  
Schmitt: ‗[M]y theory of Grossraum and international law has a broad scholarly 
framework, is the result of scholarly research; it is a theory which had been and should be 
taken seriously as a scientific hypothesis. Hitler had no Grossraum policy in the sense of 
this theory. He pursued a policy inimical to this theory in both thought and principle. ... 
Hitler‘s policy of conquest was so primitive that any kind of scholarly analysis 
necessarily threatened it.'
288
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According to Schmitt, the difference between his own conception and a biological-racial Nazi 
ideology, together with the former‘s potential threat to the latter, explained why Schmitt ideas 
were responded to in ―deadly silence‖ by the Nazi Party press.289  
   It might be possible to accept Schmitt‘s argument that Nazi war criminality not only lacked any 
scholarly foundation but was hostile to the very critical processes of rational inquiry required by 
independent scholarship. Yet, even if this were the case, Schmitt had hardly drawn attention to 
the alleged tension between the substance of his own scholarship and the requirements of Nazi 
propaganda. Indeed, it is possible that the inclusion of various, and often entirely gratuitous, anti-
Semitic statements in his Nazi era writings, which continued until 1940, was designed to disguise 
such tensions, possibly as part of a strategy to promote his own different conception of what 
National Socialism entails. Also by admitting that some degree of connection necessarily existed 
between the theoretical and practical realms, between pure scholarship and state policy, Schmitt 
does appear to have further undermined the theory/practice dichotomy on which rested his 
general defence to the charges of providing a criminal form of endorsement to Nazi war 
criminality. He may have realised that, although this dichotomy may have offered protection for, 
say, a biologist whose pure scientific research was abused, it badly fitted the facts of a 
politically-engaged intellectual such as Schmitt. As Bendersky notes in relation to his 
interrogation answers: 
'One could easily get the impression from these disquisitions that his works were abstract 
analyses of political and legal subjects intended primarily for intellectual discussions 
among scholars. He conveniently forgot that before his rebuke in 1936 he had hoped that 
his works would influence political and legal developments, and that despite the 
distortion of his ideas, he thrived on the public attention he received as a result of his 
publications and activities within Nazi institutions.'
290
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   On the vital legal question of whether or not Schmitt‘s writings and various institutional 
involvements contributed to the ‗waging of an aggressive war‘ under the Nuremberg principles, 
Schmitt turned the tables upon Kempner. He argued that he had already been involved in a 
debate with Professor Wehberg, a famous Geneva pacifist and international lawyer who helped 
originate the very idea that the preparation for such a war should constitute a "war crime." At no 
time during this debate had Wehberg ever suggested that Schmitt‘s own theory, with which the 
former was already familiar, could be linked to the proposed war crime of "waging aggressive 
war." Schmitt argued that if one of the earliest and most important originators of a key 
Nuremberg principle had failed to accuse Schmitt‘s work of complicity in war crimes as: ‗a party 
to the new criminal offense inaugurated by Wehberg himself,‘ then this remained significant. It 
should be treated as a defence that was both conclusive and decisive.
291
 Schmitt also argued that 
his role within Nazi Germany as both a Prussian State Councillor and as Director of the Nazi 
Lawyers‘ Guild was confined to purely technical organisational matters. Such affairs had no 
bearing on the charge of: ‗collaborating in the preparation of a war of aggression‘ at a ‗decisive 
point‘.292 
   Kempner confronted Schmitt with a hostile interpretation of his Grossraum writings – together 
with both their timing and influence, to suggest that they harmonised all too closely with the 
Nazis‘ notion of Lebensraum (living space). From this perspective, Schmitt must be judged 
culpable because the Nazis advanced the latter as an ideological "justification" for their own 
military expansion and colonisation of Eastern Europe, which in turn provided the context for the 
Holocaust.  
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   Schmitt‘s defence was that those extracts Kempner singled out and quoted to him created a 
false impression when taken out of their original context, and that, when restored to their original 
context, they lacked those incriminating qualities that Kempner was a trying to read into them. 
(This was an argument put forward by Streicher‘s defence counsel, but subsequently discounted 
by the IMT). Schmitt‘s scholarship, he claimed, had nothing material to do with acts of planning 
or promoting aggressive wars as criminalised by the Nuremberg Charter. He argued that his 
conception of Grossraum was quite different in kind from the Nazis' Lebensraum theory rooted 
in their characteristic race theory. Indeed, and as already noted, a major problem facing Kempner 
and his colleagues was that Schmitt's theory had been strongly attacked by orthodox Nazi legal 
scholars precisely for its ―neglect‖ of racial factors in favour of cultural formations in a context 
where the former were, of course, essential to authentic Nazi ideology.293  
   These writings also take the form of lengthy and largely descriptive-diagnostic studies of the 
implications of the decline of an international system based upon individual nation states and the 
rise in Latin American of a US-dominated regional power-bloc. Since Schmitt's publications 
expressly grounded his Grossraum concept in America's comparatively benign and initially anti-
imperialist 1832 Monroe Doctrine, his prosecution by US-led prosecutors for further developing 
this idea might appear incongruous, if not politically embarrassing. Insofar as his writings 
implicitly endorsed any specific German foreign policy at all – it was to emulate American 
domination of Latin America through creating a defensive pan-European regional security 
alliance under a German hegemony but by means of bilateral treaties and respect for principle of 
cultural self-determination. Crucially, these writings contain no advocacy of imperialistic 
invasion and annexation, followed by ethnic cleansing and genocide, as practised by Hitler's 
wars of annihilation within Eastern Europe. 
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   In this respect, and despite his vigorous attempts during four interrogation sessions in April 
1947, Kempner clearly struggled to reinterpret these writings as constituting even an "indirect" 
form of participation in Hitler's planning and waging of "wars of aggression" as defined by the 
Nuremberg Charter. He failed to force Schmitt to accept, or otherwise substantiate, the charge 
that he had provided – both in substance and in style – ―an international legal theory of 
Lebensraum,‖ i.e., an idea of existential ―living space‖ central to Hitler‘s racist justification for 
German military invasion and expansionism closely connected to master race ideology.294 
Schmitt argued that no serious scholars who were concerned for their reputation as such, could 
ever have endorsed a patently unscientific and irrationalistic Nazi racial ideology.295 
   Kempner's central problem was that not even a hostile interpretation can show these writings to 
amount to be belligerent calls for military invasion, or a bellicose affirmation of militaristic 
glorifications of war. Worse still, a defence lawyer could have cited contrary passages from 
Schmitt's Concept of the Political (1932, 1933) As a political realist conscious of the 
contradictions of pacifism, he recognised that states defined political enemies, and thereby 
potentially initiated wars involving deadly force. However, he expressly opposed any belligerent 
resort to military force outside of an act of national self-defence to resist an enemy invader bent 
on destroying the entire way of life of a people.296 His position was arguably more attune to the 
Polish and French resistance movements against Nazi military invasion, occupation and 
annexation, then supportive of such aggression. 
   In addition to his verbal responses, Schmitt was asked by Kempner to furnish more, thoroughly 
written explanations on four different issues: To what extent did you further Hitler's policy of the 
greater space? To what extent did you participate in the preparation of an aggressive war and the 
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crimes resulting from it? Legal remarks on the constitutional position of the Reichsminister and 
the Head of the Reichskanzlei; and why did the German Secretaries of State follow Hitler? 
   In his written answers, Schmitt reiterates the evidence that the Nazis had merely tolerated him 
because of his international scholarly reputation, and that he never exercised any measure of 
personal influence on their totalitarian system, or on the plans and policies of its leaders.297 In 
short, throughout the interrogation process, Schmitt denied Kempner's charges that his writings 
on Grossraum had provided 'the theoretical foundation' of Hitler‘s expansionist polices.298 
Schmitt maintained that he was only involved in National Socialist matters in his capacity as a 
law professor. He argued: [I]f a few authorities, journalists and propagandists tolerated my name 
being used as a figurehead, that is still no theoretical foundation. It belongs much more to the 
style of a totalitarian system, which exploits the names of numerous scholars, destroys what it 
cannot exploit, and seeks to exploit what it cannot destroy.'299  
   During interrogation Schmitt stated: ―For me the Schleicher government offered the only 
option to stem the chaos." This was an important claim. Even well-informed émigré  officials in 
the occupation government who had repeatedly used their influence to have Schmitt punished, 
showed that they were aware of evidence more supportive of Schmitt's defence than to his 
prosecution.  
   The evidence of Schmitt's activities prior to the Nazi assumption of power, both political as a 
constitutional adviser to Chancellor General Schleicher (who in 1934 was murdered by the SS 
under the cover of the purge of the SA or Brownshirt leadership during the notorious 'night of the 
long knives), and in terms of his publications, certainly did provide a 'theoretical foundation' for 
one form of German governance in the early 1930's. The problem for Kempner's proposed case 
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against Schmitt, however, was that was that this was for the pre-Nazi authoritarian conservative 
governments headed by the aging President Hindenburg who, when confronted with chronic 
parliamentary deadlock caused by negative majorities comprising obstructive communist and 
Nazi parliamentarians, made extensive use of Art 48 Emergency Powers measures. As 
Bendersky argues:  
'He actually did provide the legal and political theories for the Presidential System of 
Hindenburg (1930 and 1933), in which emergency powers and other legal presidential 
authorities were used to attempt to stabilize Weimar economically as well as politically. 
And, as should be common knowledge ..., he served as the adviser to Chancellor 
Schleicher in his efforts to preclude a seizure of power, through force or legal democratic 
means, by the Communists and Nazis. And while one should not avoid, minimize, or 
excuse the reprehensible compromises that Schmitt did make with the Nazis, the 
overwhelming amount of evidence clearly establishes that he neither prepared the way for 
their seizure of power nor provided the theoretical foundations for their policies or 
practices. The Third Reich was not the fulfilment of his theories, and he did not welcome 
it enthusiastically as later charged.'
300
 
 
   In early May 1947, a week after his final interrogation, Schmitt was released from custody at 
Nuremberg and transferred to a residence for witnesses for the Nuremberg trials until he had 
completed his study of the state secretaries in the Third Reich that Kempner had required of him. 
Once this was completed, he was allowed to return home. In the absence of further admissible 
evidence of his direct involvements in war crimes, as strictly defined by the initial Nuremberg 
judgments, his extra-judicial punishment was to have his university career ended and a refusal to 
return his personal library of books and other research material.301  
   According to Quaritsch, one of the key German author‘s on the significance of Schmitt‘s 
interrogation at Nuremberg, there is little legal interest or relevance to what took place. Indeed, 
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he claims that Schmitt's innocence of crimes against humanity was so obvious that his release 
was a foregone conclusion.302  
   The outcome of Kempner‘s interrogation was that insufficient evidence was deemed 
forthcoming to warrant Schmitt‘s being formally charged with war crimes.303 It appears from 
recently available diaries that there was a conflict among the prosecutors between Kempner and 
others among the US occupation authorities, such as the German-Jewish  émigré  Karl 
Loewenstein, who, as a civilian German constitutional theorist, had expert knowledge of 
Schmitt's academic writings as a whole. Bendersky argues that the latter's diaries reveal how 
although personally determined Loewenstein was to Schmitt's arrest and prosecution, the specific 
details he provided on Schmitt's work undermined Kempner's main thesis, which: 
'… was all premised upon the faulty assumption that through his work and reputation he 
had significantly influenced the policies and practices of the Third Reich. This 
perspective, which had been developed abroad, never attempted a thorough examination 
of his writings or an analysis of his actual personal, political, and professional 
relationships with the institutions and policies of the Nazi regime. Indeed, when in his 
OMGUS reports Loewenstein wrote from personal knowledge of Schmitt in Weimar and 
an extensive scholarly familiarity with his works at that time, he actually refuted 
Kempner's claims that Schmitt had sought to undermine Weimar democracy, establish a 
dictatorship, and for thirty years promoted the conquest of Europe. For Loewenstein 
depicts Schmitt as one of the most world-renowned "political writers of our time," whose 
analysis of Weimar's political structure, if followed, "might have led to its preservation." 
Moreover, Schmitt's Verfassungslehre was "probably the best treatise on democratic 
constitutional law in Germany," and earlier than most he warned against the "overthrow, 
by legal methods, of the Weimar Republic by Hitler." Schmitt's subsequent turn to 
Nazism, Loewenstein argued, was an opportunistic path of a morally flawed personality 
with inherent authoritarian tendencies.'304 
 
This new material is instructive in that it shows how those committed to the idea that Schmitt 
deserved punishment on moral and political grounds, and who had insisted upon his repeated 
arrest and questioning, nevertheless made their case in ways that undermined Kempner's attempt 
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to build up a strong distinctly legal case. There is no doubting the political will of both 
Loewenstein and Kempner to see Schmitt held accountable. Yet the former was better placed to 
appreciate the difficulties of making the available facts meet the admittedly open-ended legal 
requirements. As Bendersky notes: 
'… Kempner was determined to prosecute Schmitt. Nevertheless, the factual information 
in Schmitt's written disquisitions about his actual writings and activities during the Nazi 
years, combined with the judicial constraints of the trials, quickly proved Kempner's case 
of legal culpability unfounded, though discussions of Schmitt's intellectual and moral 
responsibility remain open to this day.'
305
  
 
   Despite his release, the conclusion of Schmitt‘s interrogation reports reiterated moral 
condemnation stating that he was the ‗official constitutional apologist‘ for Hitler, and the: ‗most 
eminent legal exponent of the Nazi Ideology.‘306 According to Bendersky, Kempner had 
reluctantly come to this conclusion even before Schmitt handed him his final written disquisition, 
and, at the end of the last interrogation on April 29th, Kempner informed Schmitt: "I want to see 
that you return home."
307
 The loss of his chair and effective banishment from academia became 
Schmitt's punishment for the part he played in the Nazi regime, along with the confiscation of his 
private library. If you count the time that Schmitt was held in internment, he also lost a year‘s 
freedom, unlike Julius Streicher, who lost his life for publishing racist propaganda that supported 
the Nazi Party policies that led to their extermination programme.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Comparing the three cases  
 
Whilst each of these case studies contains interesting elements in their own right, the main point 
of our study has been to compare them to identify whether these strikingly different outcomes 
can be interpreted in terms of a logic of legal doctrine alone. In other words, are they accounted 
for in terms of the technical meaning and scope of the word ―persecution‖ as defined by Art 6(c) 
of the Nuremberg Charter?  
   Compared with the Streicher case, Fritzsche‘s judgment established a high standard to pass 
when seeking to demonstrate a causal relationship between racist words and specific atrocities. 
Guilt in this area appears to require evidence of statements that include calls for extermination 
made either explicitly, or at least in a coded manner understood by their immediate audience. 
Criminal responsibility does not – and for pragmatic reasons could not - attach to everyone 
involved in the distribution of racist propaganda. That is, from a journalist and editor through to 
a newsagent who merely re-transmits already formulated statements previously drafted by their 
institutional superiors. If the test for criminal acts of incitement had been formulated in these 
broad terms, then it would embrace those who repair radios or merely printed, sold and delivered 
newspapers.  
   Instead, the IMT held that such liability attaches primarily to those who first originate racist 
propaganda as part of a wider and deliberate campaign of persecution that includes murderous 
atrocities, and can therefore be considered "participants" in a strict sense of this term. Applying, 
at least implicitly, this "test," Fritzsche was interpreted as a mere "conduit" for Nazi wartime hate 
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speech, rather than, as with Streicher, its "creative" source, and thus a criminally liable 
participant.  
   The critical distinction between the Streicher and Fritzsche cases was not that latter's 
propaganda had no racist elements whatsoever. Indeed, the Tribunal held that there was clear 
evidence of anti-Semitism in Fritzsche‘s broadcasts as he had clearly blamed the war on the 
Jews. However, the distinguishing factor was that there were major differences in both the 
content and tone of Fritzsche‘s anti-Semitic propaganda. Streicher had expressly called for the 
official extermination of Jews; whereas Fritzsche‘s expressions of anti-Semitism were of a far 
less direct and virulent kind, lacking exterminationist implications. Given the context, Fritzsche‘s 
broadcasts generally contained a "conventional" kind of wartime propaganda that did not stand 
out from the mass of Nazi regime‘s anti-Semitic ideology as particularly virulent or otherwise 
remarkable. If Fritzsche was guilty on the basis of the racist propaganda he transmitted, then so 
too were the majority of German radio broadcasters, newspaper journalists and even academics 
such as Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt.  
   If there is a credible doctrinal explanation for Fritzsche‘s acquittal, then it may be that the 
evidence was not considered sufficient to establish any more than a generic and indirect 
involvement in hate speech of an anti-Semitic kind. In the absence of evidence of subjective 
knowledge of exterminations, and any clear and malicious intent to "persecute" Jews through his 
words, which had been amply shown in the prosecution's case against Streicher, the case against 
Fritzsche was not proven. The Tribunal thus attributed a far lower measure of criminal intent to 
Fritzsche‘s actions than to those of Streicher. They even accepted that the former was naïve 
enough to believe everything he was told by Goebbels and others in positions of power, even 
when he admitted that he sometimes doubted the truthfulness of their denials. Whilst the 
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Tribunal accepted that Fritzsche was responsible for producing propaganda that, when 
considered objectively, was in the nature of things deceitful, it did not consider that it was 
perpetrated with the intention to incite atrocities sufficient to constitute "persecution of the 
Jews." In contrast to Streicher‘s judgment, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that despite 
finding evidence of incitement within Fritzsche‘s radio broadcasts it was not "direct enough" to 
be classified as "persecution" or "incitement" within the meaning of "crimes against 
humanity."
308
 
   In addition, and without expressly defining the legally required level of subjective intent for 
"incitement," the Tribunal found that Fritzsche lacked any form of criminal intention relevant to 
the charges he faced. Indeed, and in contrast with the Streicher case, they gave a particularly 
generous interpretation of the evidence of Fritzsche‘s subjective motivations, underlying 
intentions, and knowledge. Taken as a whole, his broadcasts were interpreted as more or less 
routine forms of wartime propaganda that, in common with its Allied equivalents, aimed to rally 
the nation behind the policies of its leadership and the overall "war effort." Given this relatively 
generous judicial interpretation of the material facts, and somewhat vague glossing over of the 
points of law, the conclusion that this defendant was not guilty of the charges relating to "crimes 
against humanity" comes as little surprise. The comparison, as a rhetorical foil, with Streicher 
and his involvement with Nazi propaganda, may well have worked to Fritzsche‘s advantage 
because his intentions and deeds then appeared comparatively benign.  
We would argue that the Fritzsche and Streicher cases were decided as much on their facts as 
upon doctrinal grounds relating to the understanding of persecution under Article 6(c). In support 
of this view, it is useful to review both the Soviet judge's dissenting judgement and how a later 
German court conducting de-Nazification trials convicted Fritzsche. It is possible that non-
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doctrinal factors were particularly important in the IMT‘s decisions. Fritzsche, in comparison to 
Streicher was apologetic, and remorseful. His manner, even his appearance, was one of 
respectability contrasting markedly with Streicher‘s clear vulgarity. His testimony appeared to be 
carefully and intentionally prepared to emphasise how regretful he had become. Fritzsche 
presented himself as more intelligent than Streicher and aware of the prejudice that existed inside 
and outside of the Tribunal. In marked contrast with Streicher, everyone at the trial appeared to 
gain a favourable impression of Fritzsche‘s character. The main exception was the Russian 
judges who were insistent that 'their' defendant ought to hang, which probably accounts for their 
strongly dissenting arguments. 
   It was clear from the IMT‘s Streicher judgment that "crimes against humanity" has been legally 
defined to include the deliberate use of written words to incite others to engage in acts of racist, 
religious or ethnic persecution. Prosecutor Justice Jackson was unwilling to prosecute academics, 
anthropologists and scientists who had collaborated with the Nazi regime where their support 
was by words alone. However, it is also clear from the wording of the definition of this offence 
that providing ideological support for a regime that was working to a programme that included, 
or even required, the commission of war crimes, including policies of racist or religious 
discrimination and "waging aggressive war," could amount to complicity in "persecution:" and 
be recognised as a subset of "crimes against humanity.". Streicher‘s status as a private citizen 
was certainly not considered a mitigating factor, any more than Fritzsche's official government 
position was judged to involve enhanced criminal responsibility. It might have been important to 
the Tribunal that Fritzsche, unlike Streicher, never had any direct contact with Hitler. That said, 
although the latter had an early friendship with Hitler, he did not have any direct contact after his 
removal as Gauleiter in 1940. Taken all these factors into account, including the inconsistent 
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formulation and application of legal tests in relation to subjective knowledge of atrocities, 
Streicher‘s execution (as distinct from conviction with a life sentence of imprisonment) seems 
extreme in the light of Fritzsche‘s acquittal. The fact that Streicher was executed for 
persecution/incitement, with his ashes scattered in the river Isar to avoid any burial ground 
becoming a focus for neo-Nazis, serves to emphasise the highest severity with which the IMT 
regarded his type of racist propaganda.  
   That a precedent exists for the most severe permissible punishment for using hate speech is 
surely significant. Assuming that the nature of their racist propaganda is comparable, Streicher's 
punishment contrasts dramatically with Fritzsche's acquittal before the IMT, and – to a lesser 
extent – the non-prosecution of Schmitt. 
   Our next comparative theme is whether, given the ambiguous legal tests applied in the earlier 
two cases, Schmitt‘s own writings could, in principle, have generated a serious case to answer 
sufficient for him to be successfully prosecuted on the same grounds as Streicher? The case 
against Schmitt was founded on the proposition that his ideas and writings had exerted political 
influence, including with respect to Nazi anti-Semitic policies, and that he had played a 
significant part in the decision making within the Nazi Party. The prosecutors needed to consider 
the prospects of securing a successful prosecution Schmitt, given the grounds the IMT gave for 
Fritzsche's aquittal, and recent decisions of the NMT in relation to defendant's with equal or 
greater levels of complicity. If high-ranking and longstanding members of the Nazi youth were, 
as seemed likely, to escape prosecution for war crimes despite their direct complicity for 
indoctrinating almost an entire generation into anti-Semitic racism and providing much of the 
personnel for the notorious Waffen-SS, then, in comparison, it may have seemed incongruous to 
charge Schmitt with incitement. 
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   There are grounds then for taking at face value Kempner‘s claim that, at least in principle, the 
Nuremberg Charter allowed academics, intellectuals, educationalist and propagandists more 
generally to face prosecution for acts of "persecution'"through inciting words alone. It is more 
difficult to explain why, in a context of the many more extreme examples of wartime anti-
Semitic propaganda distributed within the education and cultural sectors, it was reasonable to 
focus on Schmitt, who had been forced out of any even semi-official role three years before 
WW2 started. However, the fact that Streicher had been removed from the official position of 
Gauleiter in 1940 had little bearing on his arrest and prosecution before the IMT. Furthermore, 
why, other far more directly incriminated legal and other academics were spared, or otherwise 
evaded arrest and interrogation, can be viewed as more a question of institutional pragmatics and 
policy factors than the strict and consistent application of legal principles. On the other hand, 
together with the philosopher Martin Heidegger, Schmitt's contribution to the pre-war 
rationalisation of aspects of Hitler's overall programme, was arguably extremely powerful in part 
because it traded on the pre-existing intellectual standing of one of Weimar Germany's pre-
eminent and widely respected legal academics. 
   Of course, neither the prosecutors nor the judges could subcontract the question of whether any 
particular academic's writings constituted "persecution" within the meaning, scope and purpose 
of "crimes against humanity" to the decisions of the Nazis regime itself. In principle, and as they 
would have known from the earlier judgment in the Streicher case, "unofficial" forms of racist 
propaganda stemming from private individuals and organisations, even those disapproved of by 
leading members of Hitler's genocidal regime, could fall within the scope of this offence. 
Arguably the main precondition here was that they had to be shown to be closely coordinated 
with physical acts of genocide, such that they materially contributed to the rhetorical effects of 
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official incitements. By contrast, Kempner was not able to locate or cite any passages from even 
the most problematic of Schmitt's Nazi-era writings that specifically called for, or otherwise 
encouraged or endorsed on any grounds (political, religious or racial) the physical persecution of 
Jews. 
   If Schmitt‘s intentions and actions between 1933-36, particularly in relation to his anti-Semitic 
publications and conference organisation had been subjected to the more hostile legal scrutiny 
akin to the Streicher case, then it is difficult to see how he would have avoided prosecution and 
conviction. It is probable that Schmitt was not prosecuted for three reasons. First, his legalistic 
guile during prolonged interrogations in which he avoided the various traps set for him, and 
provided at times powerful counterarguments. Second, Schmitt‘s defences about the ‗purely 
scholarly‘ nature of his involvements with Nazism in a context of a murderous dictatorship 
where even theoretical work was heavily censored and internal opposition dangerous; and, 
thirdly, the difficulties in establishing to a high standard of proof any direct causal relationship 
between his theoretical ideas and the events that were either pre-existing crimes or became the 
object of retrospective criminalisation within the Nuremberg process, such as "crimes against the 
peace."
309
  
   However, had the facts of Schmitt‘s brief period of collaboration and ideological service for 
Hitler‘s regime from 1933-36 been judicially interpreted in a manner as sympathetic as those of 
Fritzsche, then it is likely he would have been acquitted. The fact that Schmitt‘s propaganda role 
was in effect over before the Holocaust started, may have counted in his favour for the same 
reasons that it worked against Streicher, who intensified his propaganda in coordination with 
Hitler‘s extermination programme. On the other hand, his role in helping to legitimate the early 
phases of Nazi rule, which was already known to have a strongly anti-Semitic ideology, could 
                                                 
309 J. Bendersky 1983 op cit, 265–273; Wiegandt, op cit, 1575–1576. 
  
 
123 
have been interpreted as laying the foundations for persecutions and later atrocities. On an 
unsympathetic reading of his contributions to National Socialism, Schmitt‘s position is closer to 
that of Streicher than Fritzsche in that both men were the creative source and initiators of anti-
Semitic propaganda, whereas Fritzsche was held to be a mere conduit for the hate speech of 
others. On the other hand, if Schmitt had stood trial as an eminent professor of law, he would 
have presented himself with considerable guile to create a positive impression as someone who 
was essentially misled and abused by a movement he had initially resisted, which was a 
successful argument put forward by Fritzsche‘s defence. 
   In short, it is arguable that the explanation for the ‗discrepancies‘ and divergent outcomes in 
these three cases was related less to the application of settled legal doctrine to material facts, than 
to the selective interpretation of the facts themselves, driven in part by the subjective impression 
created by these three individuals. 
 
